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Major Field: SOCIOLOGY 
 
Abstract:  Societies in late modernity are highly dependent upon electricity produced by 
technologies that use primary fuels implicated in ecological expropriations and 
degradations.  Technological dependency and risk make electric generation a site of risk 
controversies.  This qualitative study, using a framework grounded in Beck’s risk society 
thesis, investigates the corporate communication strategies and risk definitions developed 
by Chesapeake Energy Corporation in the 2007 risk controversy surrounding the 
proposed Red Rock coal-fired plant in central Oklahoma.  Data include newspaper 
articles, Oklahoma Corporation Commission (OCC) documents, and multi-model 
advertisements from the Know Your Power (KYP) issue advocacy advertising campaign 
and associated knowyourpower.net website.  Results of a content and discourse analysis 
indicate that Chesapeake engaged in communication strategies targeting both state and 
civil society actors in an effort to control the social construction of risk.  Indirect 
representation through an unincorporated association before state regulators provided 
privileged access to expert knowledges that supplied much of the information contained 
in the KYP issue advocacy advertising campaign.  Chesapeake’s risk definitions showed 
marked differences dependent upon the intended audience, yet all messages 
communicated Chesapeake’s long-term goals of loosening government oversight of the 
public utility and creating an expanded market for natural gas.  In the KYP campaign in 
particular, Chesapeake managed public participation in political-democracy by drawing 
upon highly stereotypical images of socially responsible action, suggesting appropriate 
responses to Red Rock, and structuring pathways of communication and message content 
for concerned individuals.  Notably, public participation was directed away from the 
OCC and toward government actors far removed from the actual Red Rock proceedings.  
The implication of corporations as  legal ‘persons’ with rights to political speech is the 
expansion of corporate power and the restriction of public participation in the practice of 
political-democracy.               
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The opening lines of aChesapeake Energy Corporation-sponsored, three-page 
advertisement published in Oklahoma newspapers in August, 2007, proclaimed: 
KNOW YOUR POWER…TO INSIST ON ANSWERS…Oklahomans 
deserve thorough answers to the questions surrounding the proposed 
coal-fired power plant in Red Rock, Oklahoma.  As citizens with 
serious concerns about this issue, we encourage your interest and look 
forward to shedding much-needed light on a decision that will impact 
Oklahoma for years to come.  
So began the controversial and politically charged Know Your Power (KYP) issue 
advocacy advertising campaign against the proposed Red Rock coal-fired electric 
generation plant.  The proposed facility was intended to meet projections for future 
continuous electricity capacity requirements, known as baseload demand, and was to be 
the first utilization of ‘ultra supercritical’ “clean coal” technology in the U.S.  Red Rock 
was the result of a Request for Proposals (RFP) issued by the Public Service Company of 
Oklahoma (PSO), in response to which Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company (OG&E) 
submitted the winning bid.  Red Rock would have expanded OG&E’s already existing 
coal-fired Sooner Power Plant in northern Oklahoma, ultimately representing a combined  
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effort between two public utilities (PSO and OG&E) and an unregulated municipal 
electric power company (Oklahoma Municipal Power Authority (OMPA)) to meet 
projected future electricity demands.  While the Red ock proposal was officially 
challenged at the state level by numerous interveners b fore the Oklahoma Corporation 
Commission (OCC), the Know Your Power issue advocacy advertisements were designed 
to influence public opinion.  The advertisements, professing to be the work of a broad-
based coalition of concerned citizens across the stat , were sponsored by Oklahoma City-
based Chesapeake Energy Corporation (Chesapeake), the number one driller of 
unconventional natural gas wells in the U.S.  In addition to the Know Your Power print 
advertisements, the Know Your Power campaign spread ‘educational messages’ about the 
risks of burning coal through television and radio sp ts and even created a website where 
concerned Oklahomans could voice opinions and take action.  Aubrey McClendon, 
Chesapeake’s owner and CEO, appeared at the OCC public hearings on Red Rock as a 
concerned citizen, voicing opposition to the plant with the message that “Red Rock is 
Wrong”. 
The Red Rock controversy is an interesting example of the contentions that occur with 
some frequency in late modernity (Beck 1992/1996; Giddens 1999).  Contentions, called 
“ risk controversies” (Beck 1992), tend to revolve around the negative sid -effects and 
threats of harm created by the very technological advancements of progress upon which 
societies have come to depend.   Electricity, a secondary energy source, is considered by 
some to be the most important technological advancement of all time (Gellings 1994).  
Electricity’s ease of use and cleanliness for end users has undoubtedly contributed to its 
high degree of integration in contemporary life, with demand for electricity consistently 
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increasing since its introduction for public uses at the end of the 19th century (U.S. EIA 
2012).  The placement of electric generation facilities, coupled with long-distance 
transmission systems, gives electricity the appearance of cleanliness.  However, electric 
generation is historically reliant on the burning of fossil fuels, and fossil fuel 
consumption is strongly implicated in negative ecological outcomes such as climate 
change, air and water pollution, and acid rain, among thers.  Electric generation facilities 
are, in fact, the largest consumer of fossil fuels in the U.S. today (U.S. EIA 2012).   
In risk society, expert knowledge is required to develop, implement, and assess complex 
technologies and their risks.  Expert knowledge production occurs in sites structurally 
removed from the general public, making individuals in civil society less able to judge 
the accuracy and quality of statements concerning risks and harm related to the 
technologies they use.  At the same time, however, th  general public has grown aware of 
residual risks and potential harms of advanced technologies.  For private corporations 
producing products in risk society, the control of information regarding risk and harm 
becomes a source of power (Beck 1992/2006).  Corporations, especially those dealing 
with products with known risks such as fossil fuels, can establish, maintain, and/or 
restore public trust and legitimacy through the careful control and presentation of 
information to targeted publics (Miller and Sinclair 2009), manufacturing public consent 
to corporate practices and limiting civic engagement in democracy. 
Private corporations have gained increasing legitimacy as legal ‘persons’ with attached 
rights to protected political speech.  As ‘persons’, corporations can engage in educational 
advertising campaigns which seek to influence public opinion and regulatory agencies in 
such ways as to enhance the expansion of capital.  Chesapeake’s Know Your Power 
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campaign was but one of many communication strategies used by the corporation to 
control information and shape the public’s evaluations of risk (Giddens 1991) in order to 
create a non-market environment favorable to the increased consumption of natural gas 
(Miller and Sinclair 2009; Hodgson 2004).  The actul site of authoritatively binding 
decision-making, however, was at the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (OCC), the 
regulatory agency with authority to issue final orders on all applications filed by public 
utilities in Oklahoma.   
The OCC’s consideration of the Red Rock electric generation facility, which became 
popularly known as the ‘Red Rock case’, is particularly significant.  In addition to 
considering future continual/baseload and periodic high demand/peaking electricity needs 
in Oklahoma, the proceedings also progressed in tandem with new, legislatively 
mandated OCC rule-making regarding pre-approval of new construction for public 
electric utilities, financing options for construction, and competitive bidding practices.  
The formal proceedings before the state regulatory agency involved a large number of 
interveners and were fundamental in establishing procedures for future applications filed 
by public utilities in Oklahoma, as well as deciding the parameters of future electric 
generation needs within the state.  Chesapeake’s prominent and decidedly anti-coal  and 
pro-natural gas multi-media issue advocacy advertising campaign, which featured the 
slogan “Know Your Power” and claimed to be a coalition of concerned citizens, appeared 
near the conclusion of public hearings concerning Red ock.  Other energy interests, 
including The Center for Energy and Economic Development (CEED), an industry group  
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promoting clean-coal technologies1, and Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company (OG&E), 
responded to Know Your Power print advertisements in Oklahoma newspapers with 
advertisements of their own.       
In order to understand the complex dynamics associated with the Red Rock controversy, 
as well as the role of corporate strategic communications in risk society, I undertook a 
qualitative content analysis and a critical discourse analysis of the manifest and latent 
content of regional newspaper coverage, state documents, and Chesapeake’s publicly 
accessible corporate communications in the Red Rock case.  Grounding the research in 
Ulrich Beck’s conceptualization of risk society, Jürgen Habermas’ concept of the public 
sphere, and the historical development of the private corporation, I ask:  “What corporate 
communication strategies did Chesapeake use to control i formation concerning the Red 
Rock case?” “How did Chesapeake construct risk and shape the coal versus natural gas 
debate?” “How does Chesapeake’s involvement in the Red Rock case illustrate corporate 
power?”  and finally,  “What are the implications of c rporate power on public 
participation in democratic processes in risk society?” 
Even though an in-depth investigation of one case and data restrictions prevent broad 
generalizations of my findings, this piece nevertheless makes a valuable contribution to 
the growing body of literature on risk society by providing a rich, detailed description of 
a specific risk controversy concerning a highly integrated energy technology, as well as 
one energy corporation’s strategies and definitions of risk as it attempted to increase the 
market demand for its fossil fuel product.  This reearch also contributes to the literature 
                                                           
1
 In 2008, CEED and Americans for Balanced Energy Choices (ABEC) combined their assets and missions to 
form the American Coalition for Clean Coal Electricity (ACCCE) (www.cleancoaluse.org).  
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on corporate strategic communications by investigatin  how one issue advocacy 
advertising campaign, a contested form of corporate political speech which makes claims 
to educate civil society on issues of public importance, was embedded in social contexts 
and political processes.  Finally, this research also contributes to the political sociology 
literature by providing insights into how private corporations, acting as legal ‘persons’, 
have the heightened potential to manipulate public participation and restrict civil society 
involvement in the practice of political-democracy.  
In the next chapter, I provide a review of Beck’s risk society, Habermas’ public sphere 
and the characteristics of political communication in the liberal constitutional 
democracies of late modernity, concluding with a review of the development of the 
corporation in U.S. society.  Throughout my literatu e review, I provide the theoretical 
framework within which Chesapeake’s communication strategies are interpreted.  In 
Chapter III, I offer details of the research strategy and methods used in my study.  I 
discuss the general historical context which gave rise to the Red Rock case, an 
environment long fraught with conflicts between capit l, as well as capital and the lay 
public in Chapter IV.  Chapters V through VII reflect my analysis.  In Chapter V, I 
identify the six communication strategies used by Chesapeake and discuss the importance 
of direct and indirect influence in forums of decision-making.  In Chapter VI, I compare 
and contrast Chesapeake’s definition of risk before state and lay publics in civil society, 
addressing how the logics of capital and risk were activated in an attempt to create an 
external environment accepting of Chesapeake’s long-term goals.  In Chapter VII, the 
final analysis chapter, I investigate the question of corporate power in risk society, 
focusing on the creation of predictable, and therefore manageable and managed, 
7 
 
pathways of public political action.  In the final chapter, Chapter VIII, I offer further 






REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
Risk controversies appear with some regularity in late modernity, and represent efforts by 
entities to control information concerning risk and harm related to advanced technologies.  
Chesapeake’s involvement in the Red Rock case is a good example of such a risk 
controversy.  To establish the context for this research, I first review Beck’s risk society 
thesis, focusing on the production of bounded knowledge in risk society.  I then turn to a 
review of how the production of bounded knowledges in risk society impact civil society 
decision-making processes.  In this section of the li erature review, I highlight Habermas’ 
conceptualization of the public sphere, focusing on the colonization of the public sphere 
by capitalist market imperatives.  I then provide a brief overview of the changing role of 
corporations in society, focusing on the importance of judicial review in providing 
legitimation for the concept of corporate ‘persons’ with protected rights to political 
speech.    
The Nature of Risk Society 
Ulrich Beck’s conceptualization of risk society (Beck 1989/1992/1995/1996/2006/2009) 
provides a useful framework within which the manifest and latent content of 
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communications within communication pathways in late modernity can be analyzed.  
Underlying the concept of risk society is the claim that societies reliant on advanced 
technologies of late modernity are undergoing—or have already undergone—a 
fundamental paradigmatic shift in the logic of social organization (Beck 1989), namely a 
shift from a focus on wealth to one which focuses on risk.  According to Beck 
(1989/1992/1996), social organization in early modernity was grounded in the logic of 
wealth, with the unequal distribution of wealth legitimated through the capitalist system.  
In the late modernity of the risk society, unequal distribution of wealth,  goods, and 
services has been overlaid by the unequal distribution of both the residual and the 
potential risks and harms produced by the very technological advancements upon which 
society has come to depend (Beck 1989).  Thus populations, both nationally and globally, 
are differentially exposed to social danger situations which reflect the established 
inequalities of social strata, class, and development (Bullard 1990/2000; Dunlap and 
York 2008; Gill 2007).  These dangers, experienced first by the most disadvantaged 
populations, especially through the siting of technologies which create ecological 
devaluations and expropriations (Bullard 2000; Dunlap and York 2008), eventually affect 
even those persons who profit from their implementation through the “irreversible 
endangering of human, plant, and animal life on a global scale”  (Beck 1989/1996/2006).  
Thus, in risk society, legitimations for the growth and implementation of technology must 
focus on the rational management of risk.   
The lived and publicized experiences of the ecological devaluations and expropriations of 
capitalist expansion have created a generalized social re ognition of the environmental 
hazards to which diverse publics—and, ultimately, the entire ecological system—have 
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been, are, and might be exposed (Beck 1989/1992).  However, the non-human causal 
agents of ecological devaluation and expropriation created by technologies remain, for 
the most part, invisible and beyond immediate human perception.  Regardless of whether 
these agents are particulate matter released into the atmosphere, gases or other molecular 
compounds released into air, ground, or water, or radioactivity, for example, statements 
of direct causality linking technological developments and ecological risk are dependent 
upon testing and scientific research.  Such testing and research, including the scope of 
investigations, the identification and operationaliz tion of variables, the parties for whom 
research is undertaken, and the validity of results and their interpretation, occurs in places 
structurally removed from the general public, namely within and between specialized 
departments in institutions of higher education, (overwhelmingly) private corporations, 
and government agencies (Maeseele 2011; Reed and Reed 2009; West 2007).  These 
knowledges, both highly specialized and structurally distant from the general public, 
become difficult—if not impossible—for lay publics to understand (Giddens 1991).  This 
distancing has served to amplify the role of expert knowledge in risk society, and publics, 
when making decisions concerning past, present, and future harms, have become highly 
dependent upon interpretations of risk provided by experts (Beck 2009).  
Expert knowledge production, which defines the causal link—or lack thereof—between 
technology and risk, occurs concurrently with heightened perceptions of the hazards of 
technology within lay publics.  These technologies, while developed and implemented for 
their positive effects, are also experienced through the unequal distribution of ecological 
devaluations and expropriations (Beck 2009).  This inherent contradiction within risk 
society, namely, the benefits of advanced technology which, when implemented, create 
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inevitable and irreversible risk and harm, threatens the very legitimacy of the political-
economic system (Beck 2009; Habermas 2006).  Thus knowledge has become highly 
politicized, as competing political-economic interests defend technological development 
by minimizing risk and harm while maximizing positive effects and intended 
consequences.  Claims made by political-economic interests to ‘accurate’ expert 
knowledge, therefore, become socially and politically significant (Beck 1989; Schudson 
2006) as the lay public attempts to sort the varied an  often contradictory content of 
messages it receives across a wide variety of communication sources. 
Risk assessments made by publics regarding future technological developments are 
influenced by structural distancing from sites of technological development and the 
ability to understand highly specialized knowledges and processes.  The intrinsic 
demands of technological development in risk society, development which requires 
collaboration between and within institutions strucurally removed from lay publics, 
leave lay publics in a structural position from which they are ill-suited to understand and 
assess the accuracy of technocratic claims communicated to the public.  In attempts to 
make sense of the information received from technocratic experts so that individual 
decisions regarding risk and harm can be reached, Jones (2004) notes that publics have 
begun to seek knowledge from alternative sources (S e also Brown and Masterson-Allen  
1994).  This quest for alternative knowledge, together with the inherent contradiction 
within risk society, has created the need for powerful private sector groups, including 
corporations, interest groups, front groups, and the like, to expand information flows, 
even to the point of mimicking social movement organiz tions (McNutt and Boland 
2007, Mix and Waldo Forthcoming; Walker 2012), if they are to maintain their control of 
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capital through the successful management of public per eptions of risk.  The very fact 
that knowledge can be manipulated by altering, miniizing, augmenting, dramatizing, or 
downplaying information concerning particular risks compared to others and dependent 
upon purpose and publics targeted becomes a crucial public relations tool, making those 
who are in the position to construct definitions of risk powerful socio-political actors 
(Beck 1989).  Power struggles between competing interes s over particularistic 
definitions of risk ensue.  Because mass media remains a central communication pathway 
for the dissemination of information to publics (Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes and Sasson 
1992) and the ensuing social construction of risk, power struggles over risk definitions 
are particularly prominent across an ever-expanding array of mass media technologies.       
Competing private interests are aware that the content of their communications to publics 
concerning hazards and risks contribute to public per eptions of risk and harm.  The 
content of communications, because it becomes part of the information upon which 
individuals draw when making decisions concerning rsk and the threat of harm, is 
therefore critical in directing and perpetuating economic expansion (Cable, Shriver and 
Mix 2008).  Publics, however, are not simply consumers who must be “sold” the benefits 
of risk technologies.  Private interests must also take into account that publics, 
conceptually independent from the established institutions of the state (Habermas 
1996/2006), exercise varying degrees of influence on the state—whether through voting, 
petitioning, activism, or protest—and thus directly and/or indirectly affect the legislative, 
judicial, and regulatory policies developed by elected and appointed officials within 
established institutions of the state.  To mediate public involvement in politics that may 
result in constraints upon corporate practices and market expansion, corporate interests 
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must also be active along established communication pathways within and between 
institutions of the state.  Thus corporations and business associations act to influence state 
decision making bodies through lobbying (Sadrieh and A navarjula 2005; Pellow 2001), 
contributing funds to political campaigns (Grier, Munger and Roberts 1994), providing 
expert testimony in congressional and government agency hearings (Kim, Chung and 
Kim 2011), litigation (Picou, Marshall, and Gill 2004), as well as engaging in many other 
efforts to influence political forums (Beder 2010; Messer and Shriver 2009; Pellow 
2001).  What this increased involvement of powerful private corporate interests in 
political forums means for the survival of political-democracy remains an open question 
(Beck 1989/1992).    
At the one extreme, Beck (1989/1992) theorizes that the dependence on expert 
knowledge in risk society, when coupled with the systemic need to mediate the risks and 
hazards produced by complex technologies upon which so iety depends, threatens to 
replace political-democracy with more totalitarian forms of government.  Beck (1989) 
writes, “under the driving force of the threat, responsibilities will be redefined, 
competence to act will be centralized, and all details of the process of modernization will 
be overlaid with bureaucratic controls and plans” (pp. 102-3) and a state-centered 
approach.  At the other extreme, Beck (1992) sees the possibility of the strengthening of 
political-democracy through the expansion of democrati  participation.  In this alternative 
scenario, Beck (1992) states that due to the reflexivity of risk and harm, the effects of 
which eventually reach even those who profit most directly from the implementation of 
technology, risk society has the potential to eliminate “all the protective zones and social 
differentiations within and between people” (Beck 1992: 111), encouraging especially 
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grassroots, extra-legislative actions which will exert transformative pressures on both 
institution of the state and corporate entities.  Nevertheless, Beck (1992) goes on to 
clarify that, “The question…of how the universal challenge of an industrial system 
producing wealth and destruction is to be solved democratically remains completely 
open, both theoretically and practically” (p. 117).              
Civil Society, Bounded Knowledge, and the Public Sphere 
Complicating any construction of risk is the fact that technological developments in risk 
society do not offer a clear choice between safe and risky alternatives, but only choices 
between qualitatively different risks (Freudenburg and Pastor 1992).  Risks constructions, 
whether targeting the lay public or institutions of the state, are therefore critical for 
economic expansion.  At the same time, the constantly changing nature of technocratic 
knowledge in risk society brought on by market imperatives for efficiency and expansion 
constantly increases uncertainty, the impacts of which are made even more significant by 
the manipulation of information and knowledge by powerful interest groups (Ekberg 
2007; Giddens 1990; Habermas 2006).  Insecurity within the public increases at the same 
time that system imperatives require increased reliance on expert knowledge.  The result 
is not only a citizenry lacking the requisite knowledge and information necessary for the 
critical assessment of issues affecting the public good (Habermas 2006), but an increase 
in antagonisms between those profiting from risk, a well (Beck 1992/1996). 
One communication pathway connecting the public to onstructions of risk is media, 
particularly mass media and the expanding array of technologies used to provide 
information to the public.  In fact, mass media is broadly considered the primary 
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communication pathway connecting the public to the public events and social issues 
impacting the public at large (Gamson et al. 1992; Oliver and Myers 1999).  Arguably, 
media partially fulfills normative expectations of democratic practice as being “a 
prominent place for public, inclusive debate and discussion” (Perrin 2006; Perrin and 
Vaisey 2008:781).  Thus risk society of late modernity is also media society (Habermas 
2006).  In an ideal sense, media systems suitable for the functioning of democracy 
provide unbiased accounts of events and issues so that publics may make fully informed 
decisions concerning issues that impact the general well-being of society (Gamson et al. 
1992).  However, media scholars have pointed out that media is neither neutral (Gee 
2011a/2011b; Gunter 2005; Richardson 2007) nor doesit necessarily provide forums for 
inclusive political discourse (Perrin and Vaisey 2008).  Further, even when polarized, 
conflicting positions on any given issue may be present in media, the course of action 
implicitly or explicitly suggested to the public need not promote public participation, but 
rather suggest that the matter be best left to others, whether technocratic decision-makers 
or market forces (Maeseele 2000).    
The democratic ideal of communication which encourages informed public deliberation 
is captured by Jürgen Habermas’ ([1962] 1989/2006) notion of the public sphere, broadly 
conceptualized as an inclusive communicative space grounded in critical discourse 
mediating between civil society and institutions of the state.  While the public sphere, in 
the very early development of liberal constitutional democracy, was found in specific 
places where public opinion was formed through face-to-face deliberation among 
competing viewpoints, the public sphere of contemporary liberal constitutional 
democracies is much more abstract.  Habermas (2006) contends that the contemporary 
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public sphere forms an intermediary system of communication between formally 
organized and informal face-to-face deliberations at the top of the political system 
(institutions of the state) and at the bottom of the political system (conversations among 
individuals in everyday life of civil society).  Thus, the public sphere is at the periphery 
of the political system and contains a wide variety of messages originating from a wide 
variety of actors, including political actors, interest groups, and civil society actors.  
Messages are, in turn, selected and shaped by actors within the institution of the mass-
media, who process content and present messages in an organized format and are thus 
instrumental in helping to form considered public opinion.   
In order for media to fulfill its roll in facilitating the development of considered public 
opinions, Habermas (2006) asserts that two conditions must exist.  First, a “self-
regulating media system must maintain its independence vis-à-vis its environments [i.e.: 
state and corporate interests] while linking political communication in the public sphere 
with both civil society and the political center [and]  second, an inclusive civil society 
must empower citizens to participate in and respond t  public discourse that, in turn, must 
not degenerate into a colonizing mode of communication” (Habermas 2006:420).  In U.S. 
political culture specifically, claims to equal and active participation in political discourse 
stand alongside the marked historical absence of a public sphere (Gamson et al. 1992; 
Oliver and Myers 1999; Perrin 2006, Schudson 1984).  Nevertheless, Perrin and Vaisey 
(2008) argue that U.S. political culture “acts as if participation in a common public 
sphere were the staple of [U.S.] democratic practice” (p. 781), even though this same 
political culture is marked by a wide variety of malaises, including low levels of trust in 
the political process, feelings of powerlessness, apathy, and cynicism, a striking 
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indifference in political outcomes, and a general lack of political sophistication within 
civil society (Gamson et al. 1992; Habermas 2006; Iyengar 1991; Somerville 2011). 
 While an in depth discussion of the theoretical and empirical criticisms of Habermas’ 
([1962] 1989/1996/2006) public sphere is outside the scope of this review, two attributes 
of media systems that aid in the development of considered public opinions are of 
primary concern for this research, namely the independence of media from both the state 
and powerful private interests and the empowerment of citizens to participate in and 
respond to public discourse.  The first, namely media independence, speaks to both the 
control over and ownership of media outlets.  The second, namely the empowerment of 
individuals to participate in political discourse, speaks to the implicit and explicit courses 
of public action embedded within media communications.  Habermas’ ([1962] 1989) 
explanation of the historical development of the public sphere, particularly the influence 
of capital, provides important insights into the current state of media in risk society.  
According to Habermas ([1962] 1989), very early in the development of liberal 
constitutional democracy, a fleetingly existent plura istic public sphere of critical 
discourse quickly became dominated by the elite intrests of merchants and capitalists.  
These elite interests constrained public debate and influenced authoritatively binding 
decision-making in favor of the particularistic interests for the expansion of capital.  In 
advanced capitalism, Habermas (2006) contends that the public sphere has been 
colonized by market imperatives and cannot, therefore, function to facilitate the 
formation of a truly public opinion crucial to the functioning of democracy.   
To have a media system colonized by market imperatives can be understood in a variety 
of ways.  First, colonization by market imperatives can mean the tendency in capitalism 
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for business interests to become centralized in order to increase efficiency and stifle 
competition.  Gamson et al. (1992)  therefore note that malaises in U.S. democracy have 
coincided with the centralization of media outlets in large, for-profit corporations whose 
subsequent treatment of ‘news’ has produced bounded knowledges of issues affecting the 
common good.  Bounded knowledge, in turn, serves to constrain the range and content of 
solutions to social issues and, in practice, relinquishes political debate to exchanges 
among proclaimed ‘experts’ and particularized power interests.  Without access to a full 
range of insights from a structurally independent media, the practice of representative 
democracy by an ill-informed and fragmented public e omes, in actuality, a competition 
between powerful interests who, striving to gain the upper-hand in the outcomes of 
authoritatively binding decision-making, vie for the support of targeted publics through 
an expanding variety of information outlets.   
Second, colonization of the media by market imperatives can also refer to the relative 
importance given to economic concerns over other concerns when reporters and 
journalists cover ‘newsworthy’ events.  Because it is mpossible for every public event or 
issue to be covered by mass media, reporters and journalists, when meeting production 
deadlines, actively decide which particular events a d issues qualify as ‘news’.  In one 
example of news coverage of public events and issues in Madison, Wisconsin, 
newspapers, Oliver and Myers (1999) found that public events and issues, whether 
directly organized by business and business associations or indirectly promoted through 
organizational sponsorships by businesses and business associations, received high rates 
of news coverage compared to other types of public events and issues.     
19 
 
Lastly, colonization of the media by market imperatives can be understood as a reflection 
of the dominance of market imperatives that structure echnological innovation and its 
implementation in risk society (Beck 2006).  Risk technologies, the development and 
implementation of which requires expert and specialized knowledges, are experienced by 
civil society not only through beneficial effects, but also through increased risk and harm.  
Competing private interests manipulate information c cerning risk and harm, including 
information in mass-media communications, as they struggle to influence the social 
construction of risk definitions.  Members of the lay public in civil society, facing 
competing and contradictory definitions of risk, “split apart into minorities of specialists 
who put their reason to use nonpublicly” (Habermas 1989:175) in face-to-face private 
conversations in civil society. Adding to the strains on political-democracy are the 
implicit and explicit suggestions for solutions to public issues which may, in fact, suggest 
that public action be of particular, and therefore manageable, forms.  Communication in 
risk society, therefore, “completely lacks the form of communication specific to a public” 
(Habermas 1989:175), making the public sphere public only in theory and not in practice.  
Communications in the public sphere have, therefore, become a degenerating form of 
socio-political communication, creating a paralysis of civil society (Habermas 2006), a 
cultural reliance on bounded technocratic knowledge provided by experts, (Habermas 
[1962] 1989; Beck 1992/2006, Giddens 1990/1991), and an interpenetration of corporate 
interests in media, government (Habermas [1962] 1989/2006; Pellow 2001), and 
regulatory agencies (Miller and Mooney 2010).  This suggests, reminiscent of Beck 
(2006), an actual decrease in the public practice of democracy, allowing power to become 
consolidated.  However, instead of power consolidating in the bureaucracy of the state, 
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power may, instead, become consolidated in special interests, particularly corporate 
interests and resulting in business-managed democracy (Beder 2010).    
In risk society, knowledge is commodified in technological innovation and expansion.  
Knowledge related to the risks and harms of technology is also necessarily produced due 
to the reflexivity of risk.  In order for capitalist c markets to maintain, expand or develop 
markets and realize economic gain, the dissemination of knwledge concerning risk and 
harm is tightly controlled and manipulated by special interests.  This manipulation of 
knowledge as controlled information is disseminated to the public along a vast array of 
media technologies, the most important pathway of which is the institution of mass-
media.  Bounded knowledges and competing and contradic ory information concerning 
risk and harm found in mass-media, as well as the use of information technologies by a 
growing number of state, corporate, and civil society actors, has resulted in a public 
communications space (Sethi 1987) rather than a public sphere.  Within the public 
communications space, information provided by special interests compete in a 
“marketplace of ideas” (Sethi 1987) and lay publics, lacking the requisite knowledge to 
adequately assess the accuracy of claims concerning risk and harm, are no longer able to 
hold accountable the very institutions which structure and impact public life.  Within this 
peculiar communicative environment of U.S. political ulture, the potential for powerful 
private interests to manipulate public opinion, manuf cture consent for institutional 
practices, and influence electoral outcomes, public policy, and regulatory efforts 




Judicial Review and the Growing Legitimation of the Corporate ‘Person’ 
Constitutional rights protect the political speech a ts of individual persons from undue 
suppression by a powerful state.  In contemporary U.S. society, however, for-profit 
corporations have gained the legal status of ‘persons’, and protected rights of political 
speech have been continually expanded through judicial review to include corporate 
communications.  The expanding rights of the corporati n to protected political speech, 
which protect certain forms of corporate communication from regulation by the state, 
have direct implications for the practice of democracy in the U.S., especially because the 
manipulation of knowledge concerning risk and harm is of fundamental importance for 
the expansion of markets and the accumulation of capital.  Because the expansion of 
constitutional protections are defined by judicial decisions, namely decision of the United 
States Supreme Court (USSC), the process of judicial review is key in understanding the 
communication strategies developed by corporations in their attempts to manage risk and 
harm.        
The notion of the corporation beginning in English corporate law and extending through 
at least the mid-19th century in the U.S. regarded the corporation not as private enterprise 
pursuing particularistic interests separate from the state but rather as a “legal device by 
which to extend public power to private individuals” (Federman 2003).  The corporation, 
therefore, was originally intended to function as a direct extension of the state’s interest 
in economic development.  In the U.S., the beginning of the contemporary status of 
corporations as legal ‘persons’ separate from the stat  is traced to the 1886 Supreme 
Court case, Santa Clara County v. Pacific Railroad, which, while not explicitly 
addressing corporate personhood per se, eventually became cited as precedent in granting 
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corporations the status of persons (Gerencser 2005; Stoll 2005).  Since that time, other 
constitutional protections have been expanded to corporations, as well.   Between 1890 
and 1970, expanded constitutional protections of corporations as persons included due 
process rights, the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, the right to a 
jury trial in a criminal case, the right to compensations for government takings, freedom 
from double jeopardy, and the right to a jury trial in a civil case (d’Errico 1996; Nace 
(2003) in Stoll 2005, Sovacool 2010).   
The right for individual persons to engage in political speech is considered essential for 
the proper functioning of a political-democratic state.  Since gaining the legal status of 
‘persons’, the right of corporations to engage in speech has also been redefined and 
expanded, with distinctions between commercial and political speech being the most 
basic way in which the content of corporate speech is differentiated (d’Errico 1996).  
Prior to the latter half of the 20th century, there were few attempts at the federal level to 
legislate the contents of corporate speech (Lipton 2010), and most attempts at the state 
level have been rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court (C tler and Muehling 1989).  Thus 
the judiciary, and the practice of judicial review, has become a key communicative space 
in which corporations have succeeded in creating legitimacy for their use of political 
speech.   
Traditionally, because corporate status was an extension of the state’s interest in 
economic development, company charters defined the commercial purpose of the 
corporation.  As markets were expanded and multiple corporations appeared developing 
same or similar products, corporate communications which focused on promoting a 
particular product brand, with the persuasive goal being to convince consumers to 
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purchase a particular product brand instead of another comparable product, became 
understood as product advertising.  With market differentiation, however, another form of 
corporate speech appeared which became understood as commercial advocacy 
advertising.  The persuasive intent of this type of corporate speech is to generate support 
for an entire product category, rather than any particular brand within a product category, 
and is typically promoted by an industry organization or parent company (Miller and 
Sinclair 2009).  For example, advertisements issued by a particular corporation with the 
persuasive intent of promoting their particular brand of residential gas heater over all 
other available brands of gas heaters would fall under product adverting.  However, 
advertisements issued by an association of corporations, all of which develop and sell 
residential gas heaters, with the persuasive intent of promoting the general category of 
gas heaters over, say, residential propane heaters, would fall under commercial advocacy 
advertising.  Both types of speech acts by corporations or industry groups fall under the 
even broader category of corporate commercial speech and such speech is (more or less) 
regulated by the Federal Corporation Commission (FCC), the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and is to adhere to established standards 
of truth.   
Judicial review has been instrumental in defining the rights of corporations to engage in 
political speech.  Beginning in the 1960s, the United States Supreme Court (USSC) 
became active in defining the parameters of acceptable corporate commercial speech.  In 
1964 (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan), the USSC ruled that commercial speech which is 
substantial and valuable to public opinion may be protected speech, even if it is 
commercial, and in a subsequent 1975 ruling (Bi elow v. Virginia), the USSC extended 
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First Amendment protection to commercial speech if t e advertisement discusses is ues 
deemed valuable to the public (Heath and Nelson 1985).  In 1976 (Virginia Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council), the USSC extended to corporations 
the right to engage in commercial speech under protections of the First Amendment 
(Stoll 2005).  In effect, corporations and industry g oups do have the protected right to 
promote products or product categories which are socially and/or politically contested—
or are part of a socially and politically contested broader issue—if the issues are 
substantial and valuable to the public and/or the formation of public opinion.  To further 
extend the previous example, then, a corporation or i dustry group which promotes the 
adoption of solar heating units over gas heating and, thereby, promotes the product 
category ‘solar energy’ by referencing the ecological benefits to be had by reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions associated with the use of fossil fuels is engaging in protected 
commercial speech.         
At the same time that the USSC began addressing the cont nt of and rights to corporate 
commercial speech, it also began to address public con erns regarding the ability for 
corporations to influence electoral outcomes through advertising and endorsements.  In 
1976 (Buckley v. Valero), the USSC therefore differentiated between express advocacy 
and issue advocacy.  Express advocacy advertising co tains wording such as ‘vote for’, 
‘elect’, ‘cast your ballot for’, ‘vote against’, ‘defeat’, or similar phrases and is intended to 
encourage a particular behavior among potential voters for or against a designated, or 
expressed, candidate.  Such advertisements were subjected to federal election laws 
(Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971), which placed limits on corporate electoral 
expenditures on political campaigns.  Issue advocacy advertising, on the other hand, does 
25 
 
not contain such explicit phrasing and was, therefore, declared to be due the protections 
afforded political expression under the First Amendment (An, Jin and Pfau 2006).  As 
forms of political speech, neither express advocacy nor issue advocacy 
advertisements/campaigns are subject to the relativy high standards of truth required of 
commercial speech.   
Additionally, the USSC upheld limitations on individual expenditures on political 
campaigns, while limitations on independent and total campaign expenditures were ruled 
as being in violation of the First Amendment.  Corporations, therefore, have a right to 
contribute money to political campaigns, allowing them to indirectly engage in express 
advocacy2 (Nace (2003) in Stoll 2005).  Issue advocacy, on the other hand, was not 
financially restricted, with the Court reasoning that “equity of funding (with clear 
implications for the deep pockets theory) could not be used to prevent companies from 
informing the public” (Heath and Nelson 1985:66).  Attempts at federal legislation 
limiting corporate spending on political speech have been challenged in court (Zardkoohi 
1985).  A 2010 Supreme Court ruling (Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission) 
reaffirmed the right for corporations to engage in political speech, “including the right to 
spend money to influence elections” (Thompson and Kight 2010).  In this case, the 
USSC ruled that, as a matter of “First Amendment policy, the ‘marketplace of ideas’ and 
democracy are best served by unrestrained corporate poli ical expenditures” (Lipton 
2010:1962).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
                                                           
2
 Justice Rehnquist and Justice White dissented to the majority opinion of the Court.  White argued that 
restriction on corporate spending did not affect free speech protections because CEO’s could speak out 
on their own and pay for advertisements with their own money.  Rehnquist feared that the perpetual life 
of corporations, when coupled with their limited liability, could undermine first amendment protections 
for individual citizens (Stoll 2005). 
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The legal distinction between commercial advertising, which is regulated, and issue 
advocacy, which is protected political speech, is open to considerable interpretation.  
From a strictly commercial standpoint, issue advocacy advertising, also called 
‘marketplace’ or ‘controversy’ advertising, is but one form of business communication 
specifically designed to “protect a company’s market by influencing public policy” 
(Miller and Sinclair 2009:37) or  to “attempt to sway public sentiment” on (often) 
controversial issues (Cutler and Muehling 1991:49).  While issue advocacy advertising 
has some precedent as a corporate practice beginnin i  the early 20th century, expanding 
to political elections in 1996 (An et al. 2006; Burgoon, Pfau, and Birk 1995; Cutler and 
Muehling 1989; Hall and Reynolds 2010; Sethi 1977/1987), the practice remains highly 
contested, even within the economic community itself (Carroll 2012; Hamil 1991; 
Johnson-Cramer 2012; Lea 2012; Moir 2001; Ridley-Duff 2007/2012; van Staveren 
2009).  USSC judicial review of contested corporate and industry level advertising 
campaigns, as well as challenges to state and federal legislation reigning in corporate 
speech, serves to grant legal legitimacy to the concept of corporations as ‘persons’ 
entitled to unregulated protected political speech.  Legality aside, USSC rulings and 
corporate campaigns have raised serious ethical concerns regarding how far First 
Amendment protections of political speech can be ext nded to corporations before the 
rights of individuals are violated.     
Regardless of questions surrounding the legal legitimacy and ethics of issue advocacy 
advertising (Lukaszewski 2008; DeRupo 2009), this form of commercial speech has been a 
recognizable part of customary business practice since the beginning of the 20th century 
(Cutler and Muehling 1989).  Issue advocacy advertising is said to have begun with 
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AT&T’s 1908 campaign promoting a regulated nationwide telephone network, expanding 
in use by 1936 (Burgoon et al. 1995), and becoming frequent by the mid-1970s, 
especially in energy- (Ingersoll-Rand Mining Machinery Group, Dresser Industries, Inc., 
Mobil Oil, Edison Electric Institute3) and defense-related (United Technologies 
Corporation, Grummer, SmithKline Corporation,  Bethl hem Steel, Kaiser Aluminum 
and Chemical Corporation) (Cutler and Muehling 1989; Sethi 1977/1987) industrie .  By 
the 1980s, more than one-fifth of U.S. firms noted their use of issue advocacy advertising 
(Burgoon et al. 1995).  By 1996, issue advocacy advertising publicly entered politics as 
U.S. political parties, as well as interest groups and PACs, expanded their repertoires of 
campaign techniques to include this tactic.  In the 2004 presidential election alone, 
approximately $1 billion dollars was spent on issue advocacy advertising campaigns (An 
et al. 2006).  Hall and Reynolds (2010) found that e major corporate issue advocacy 
campaigns since 2005 have focused heavily on public po y issues including health care 
reform, economic policy, and energy and environment policy.   
Various factors are attributed to the rise of issue advocacy advertising.  Cutler and 
Muehling (1989) note that for-profit corporations and businesses perceived themselves as 
being unjustly blamed for a variety of societal faiures and, therefore, seek to educate the 
public through issue advocacy campaigns.  Sethi (1987) suggests that corporations, 
especially beginning in the mid-20th century, are reacting to a lack of objectivity on the
part of the media, as well as a general anti-busines  climate in legislative and regulatory 
bodies and the judiciary.  Anti-business biases have caused corporations to stop relying 
on more conventional communication techniques such as press releases, letters to the 
                                                           
3
 Edison Electric Institute is the industry association of U.S. investor-owned electric utilities.  These utilities 
provide 70% of U.S. electricity needs, as well as representing international industry-related firms.   
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editor, or other un-paid mass media coverage when trying to achieve positive publicity.  
Corporations have turned, instead, to paid corporate communications in order to assure 
that viewpoints consistent with a corporation’s expctations reach targeted publics.  
Miller and Sinclair (2009) suggest that, as public and media criticism regarding such 
issues as the environment and energy gained foothold in the general public in the 1970s, 
industries involved in the generation of risk-relatd products such as coal, oil, gas, 
alcohol, tobacco, and pharmaceuticals became particularly active in issue advocacy 
advertising and campaigns as part of efforts to establi h, maintain, and/or restore public 
trust or legitimacy.   
Formalized bodies of the state, which define both the parameters of acceptable speech 
and the regulatory contexts of technological harm, are according to Sethi (1987), the 
most formidable barrier between corporations and the positive public perception and 
acceptance of particularistic corporate interests.  This is because, once established and 
institutionalized, formal constraints are slow to change, requiring the election and/or 
appointment of public representatives sympathetic to corporate interests, as well as 
considerable effort on the part of corporations to actively provide testimony, bring or 
contest lawsuits in court, and/or challenge legislation, regulatory agency rules,  or lower 
court settlements in appellate courts.   
Analytical Framework  
The risk society thesis provides a useful analytical framework within which to understand 
the expansion of corporate communication strategies ov r the last century.  Risk societies 
are organized around the processes of distribution of harm and risk, experienced in 
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unequal ecological devaluations and expropriations, as well as the imbalanced 
distribution of technocratic knowledge concerning the causes of harm and risk.  Due to 
the organizing principles of risk society, concurrent developments of a growing general 
awareness of environmental risks associated with advanced technology and an increasing 
structural distancing of technological development and requisite knowledge production 
from the lay public have occurred.  These developments, in turn, have contributed to a 
legitimation crisis caused by the requirements of the expanding technologies upon which 
risk societies have come to depend and threatening the very legitimacy of the political-
economic system itself.  In response, political-economic interests must defend 
technological development by minimizing risk and harm, emphasize the accuracy of 
information presented, and expand state and civil soc ety venues in which risk definitions 
are presented.  Contemporary corporations, unlike early corporations which were under 
direct regulation of the state and served the state’  interests in economic expansion and 
development, have gained legal legitimacy as ‘persons’ independent from the state with 
protections afforded political speech.  The standards of truth required of conventional 
commercial advertising are higher than that of political speech, however.  These lower 
standards of truth, when coupled with the communication of bounded knowledges and 
the inaccessibility of technocratic knowledges to lay publics, give corporations 
considerable freedom to construct risk definitions at local, national, and 
transnational/global levels. 
The drive for capital accumulation encourages corporati ns to craft particularistic claims 
targeting lay publics in order to encourage specific social constructions of risk.  As the 
ecological risks associated with the hegemonic hardenergy path, which includes the 
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burning of fossil fuels, the development, production, and implementation of synthetic 
fuels, and nuclear energy, have gained salience in the global community, competing risk 
definitions concerning energy are particularly apparent (Aldridge 2009).  Conflicts over 
definitions of risk between capital interests within the energy industry have not only 
pitted once mutually compatible fossil fuel energy sectors against each other, but hard-
energy interests against soft-energy/sustainable interests (Aldridge 2009).  The 
construction of risk by particular capital interests is intended to create an environment in 
which a corporation, or association of corporations, can benefit economically from the 
nature of risk they construct.  In addition to mass-media, the intrinsic requirements of risk 
society also cause risk controversies to emerge in the regulatory, legislative, and judicial 
arenas of the state.  These arenas, like the arenas in which the technological 
developments and requisite scientific knowledge production of risk society are produced, 
are structurally removed from civil society.   
This research investigates a single risk controversy within the energy industry. This risk 
controversy occurred in Oklahoma and became known as the Red Rock case.  In order to 
provide the framework within which the Red Rock case can be understood, this chapter 
reviewed Ulrich Beck’s conceptualization of the risk society of late modernity.  In risk 
society, capital interests like Chesapeake must provide definitions of risk and harm in 
order to maintain, expand, or develop markets.  Risk definitions are highly politicized and 
become a source of power.  The chapter then considered Jürgen Habermas’ theory of 
political communication in late modernity, reviewing how the public sphere—an 
abstracted communicative space in which public opini n is theorized to form—is now 
colonized by market imperatives.  The importance of market imperatives in late 
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modernity is then elucidated through a brief review of the development of the corporate 
‘person’, including specific legal protections including that of protected political speech.  
Corporate ‘persons’, acting as political communicators through engagement in protected 
political speech, have gained a level of legal legitimacy similar to that granted 
constitutionally to the individual person.  In the n xt chapter, I discuss my research 
strategy, including data sources and collection, methods, and research questions.           
 

























The case study method, defined loosely as the detailed investigation of social phenomena 
in order to provide an analysis of the context and processes which illuminate the 
theoretical issues being studied (Hardy 2001; Hardy, Harley, and Phillips 2004; 
Kohlbacher 2006) is the central component of my research strategy.  The selected case 
focuses on the proposed construction of a coal-fired, baseload electric generation facility 
intended to expand the existing Sooner Power Plant near Red Rock, Oklahoma.  The 
originating application, however, concerned future peaking needs to be met with natural 
gas peaking plants and was filed with the Oklahoma Corporation Commission - Public 
Utility Division (OCC PUD) by Public Service Company of Oklahoma (PSO), a 
subsidiary of Ohio-based American Electric Power (AEP), in January, 2005.  By the time 
the OCC held public hearings in the fall of 2007, two additional applications, one filed by 
PSO requesting that the OCC confirm the need for additional baseload capacity and 
another filed by OG&E requesting that the OCC allow f r the recovery of construction 
costs to begin before the plant was completed, had been consolidated for hearing 
purposes only into what became known as the Red Rock case.  The most public portion 
of the Red Rock case was an issue advocacy campaign sponsored by Chesapeake.  I,  
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therefore, focus on Chesapeake’s involvement in the political-economic debate 
concerning the Red Rock power plant.    
Because qualitative methods are well suited for the inv stigation of meanings, contexts, 
processes, as well as the identification of discursive practices (Denzin and Lincoln 2008; 
Foucault 1970/1972; Hessey-Biber and Leavy 2006), I used qualitative analysis for this 
study.  Specifically, I undertook a content analysis and a critical discourse analysis of 
artifacts of communication, namely written texts and, where appropriate, associated 
images.  Content analysis analyzes texts and images in an effort to understand the nature 
of social reality as it ‘objectively’ exists at a prticular time (Hardy et al. 2004; Hardy 
2001; Phillips and Hardy2002) and is characterized by a concern with being objective 
and systematic, producing analytic categories amenabl  to later quantitative analysis and 
even hypothesis testing (Kassarjian 2001; Krippendorff 2004).   Discourse analysis, on 
the other hand, strives to uncover the way in which what is experienced as social reality 
is produced, locating meanings historically and socially through interrelated bodies of 
texts, or ‘discourses’, that bring ideas, objects, subjects, and practices into social reality, 
structuring the nature of relationships and privileging some with power while 
disempowering others (Hardy et al. 2004, LeGreco and Tracy 2009).       
To add “rigor, breadth, complexity, richness, and depth” (Denzin and Lincoln 2008:7) 
and to heighten the credibility of research findings, I triangulated data (Hessey-Biber and 
Leavy 2006).  The triangulation of data draws on multiple sources and standpoints in 
order to “attempt to secure an in-depth understanding” (Denzin and Lincoln 2008:7) of 
risk definitions in the Red Rock case (Hessey-Biber and Leavy 2006).  Date include 
newspaper articles and multi-model issue advocacy advertisements, regulatory agency 
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and judicial documents, and the web site content of the now-defunct Know Your Power 
(KYP) campaign website.   
Newspaper articles and print issue advocacy advertisements are used because journalism 
“exists to enable citizens to better understand their liv s and their position(s) in the 
world” (Richardson 2007), with print media (i.e., newspapers) traditionally considered to 
serve as a key communication pathway for the information from which civil society 
makes knowledgeable decisions concerning issues of public importance (Richardson 
2007).  Secondly, “News media are the primary venue through which competing risk 
claims are disseminated to the public making the question of the systematic bias in 
coverage an important one” (Gunter 2005:672; Lussier and  Sherman 2009; Richardson 
2007).  Oklahoma Corporation Commission (OCC) documents contained in the public 
record of the Red Rock case are used because, due to th  nature of the structuring of 
electric generation, state agency regulatory bodies have authoritative oversight over 
public utilities, here, PSO and OG&E.  The inclusion of documents filed with the 
Oklahoma State Supreme Court (OSSC) related to an Application to Assume Original 
Jurisdiction and a Petition for Writ of Prohibition against the OCC in the Red Rock case 
rests with the importance of judicial decisions andopinions in structuring competing 
claims regarding structured interactions in U.S. society.  The use of the Know Your 
Power (KYP) website, funded by Chesapeake, rests on the incr ased use of the Internet 
by government, business entities, and civil society organizations as a vector, or 
communication pathway, for providing information to publics (Deacon, Pickering, 
Golding and Murdock 1999; Lussier and Sherman 2009).   
35 
 
 Newspaper articles, editorials, letters to the editor, and op-eds4 inspected during analysis 
are from the Tulsa World (TW) and the Daily Oklahoman (DO), covering the time span 
from January, 1990, through January, 2011 (N = 1,330 articles).  These newspapers are 
used because they report the highest circulation in Oklahoma, cover national, regional, 
and local issues, and meet Oklahoma requirements to qualify as a newspaper of general 
circulation for the publication of public notices (25 OS §§101-114).  This body of text 
was collected using the on-line archives of both newspapers.  Search terms, moving from 
the general to the specific, were ‘electricity’, ‘electric generation’, ‘coal’, ‘coal-fired 
plants’, ‘Red Rock’, and ‘Know Your Power’. (See Table 2 on page 36 for the 
distribution of articles across time for both newspapers). The newspaper materials were 
read chronologically in order to gain a general understanding of the broader historical 
context concerning electric generation in which the Red Rock case occurred5.  I focus 
especially on news articles, op-eds, and letters to the editor published between January, 
2005, through December, 2007, which mark the beginning and end points of the Red 
Rock case before the OCC (n = 456) . 
Newspaper issue advocacy advertisements from, and in response to, the 2007 Know Your 
Power (KYP) campaign were collected during the spring of 2012.  Collection began with 
a visual search of the microfilm collection of the Stillwater News Press (SNP) available 
through the Stillwater Public Library and furnished by The Oklahoma Historical Society.  
                                                           
4
 An op-ed is sometimes confused with an article written by the editor or editorial board, i.e., an editor’s 
opinion piece.  However, an op-ed is often found on the page ‘opposite the editorial’ page.  An op-ed, 
which names the author, offers the opinions of the author, which are not necessarily those of the editor 
or editorial board. 
5
 An additional 7 articles from the Daily Oklahoman covering the years 1980 through 1989 were also read 
to aid in contextualizing the Red Rock case; unfortunately, access to articles covering the same time 
period from the Tulsa World were not available through the newspaper’s website.   
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The SNP microfilm search was followed by a microfilm search of both the DO and the 
TW, continuing until no new images were found.  These advertisements were compared 
 
to those entered into the public record at the OCC, and it was confirmed, at the very least, 
that no other advertisements had been entered into the public archives of the Red Rock 
case.  Five unique KYP advertisements were found; a final social responsibility 
advertisement by Chesapeake followed the campaign.  One KYP issue advocacy 
advertisement featured a large photograph of a young girl holding an inhaler in front of 
her mouth, another featured a female representative of the American Lung Association of 
the Central States voicing concern about the effects of oxic emissions on fetal 
development, a third featured a photograph of Oklahoma State Treasurer, Scott 
Meacham, emphasizing his fiscal responsibility to oppose Red Rock,  and a fourth, very 




2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
The Daily Oklahoman 6 0 3 3 2 4 1 21 17 8 3 2

















Table 2.           Comparison of Newspaper Data
by Source Newspaper
Yearly Count and Trend Line
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In total, eighteen advertisements were analyzed and included both KYP advertisements 
and responses to the KYP campaign by other corporations (for example, Devon Energy), 
business associations (for example, CEED), and public ti ities (OG&E).    
Web content from the now defunct KYP website located at knowyourpower.net resulted 
in twenty-nine pages of text, including images.  These data were available through Dr. 
Tamara Mix, Oklahoma State University, Department of S ciology, and was collected on 
February 17, 2008.  Subsequent attempts through May 24, 2013, to retrieve data from 
web archives (i.e., web.archive.org) did not provide a ditional texts concerning the Know 
Your Power web campaign as implemented in Oklahoma.  The page, ‘About Us’, 
identified KYP as “a coalition formed to educate citizens – on a state-by-state basis – 
about power generation plants in their states and especially about newly proposed coal-
burning plants”.  This is the only page to mention Chesapeake’s relationship to the KYP 
internet arm of the KYP campaign, with the text reading, “Chesapeake Energy 
Corporation is the founding sponsor and to date has been the primary source of funding 
for KYP chapters nationwide”.  Another page, titled “Send A Message”, provided links to 
sample letters to “your state legislator”, “a mayor or city council representative”, and “to 
the editor”6.  Unfortunately, the letter templates were not collected as part of the original 
data and are no longer available in the public domain (web.archive.org).  Three pages 
were Oklahoma specific (six pages also addressed the proposed Holcomb coal-fired plant 
in Kansas).  One Oklahoma-specific page (‘Energy Profile’) addressed primary fuel use 
                                                           
6
 The links were entitled:  “Sample letter to your state legislators”, “Sample letter to mayor or city council 
representative”, and “Sample letter to the editor”.  The web archive at web.archive.org also captured 
these links on January 28, 2008.  The letters themselves, however, are no longer available.  Clicking on the 
links results in the message, “404:  Page not found.  This error is generated when there was no web page 
with the name you specified at the web site”.          
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in Oklahoma, mentioning the abundance of natural gas resources in the state, and a 
second (‘Related Links’) provided active links to the homepages of the OCC, the 
Oklahoma Sierra Club, the American Lung Association, and the Energy Information 
Administration.  The final Oklahoma page (‘Current Status’) announced “Victory in 
Oklahoma”.   
 Documents from the OCC public archives related to the OCC’s public hearings on the 
Merits of the Case comprise the most comprehensive data concerning the case (N = 3,507 
pages).  These texts were retrieved during the summer of 2011 from the OCC website and 
are in the public domain.  Documents include: (1) all motions, statements of position, 
expert witness lists, expert witness direct7, supplemental and rebuttal testimonies, briefs, 
and motions generated by all applicants and interveners in the cause, (2) all reports, 
recommendations, orders, and final orders issued by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)  
and the Oklahoma Corporation Commissioners,  and (3) all officially filed statements of 
public comment.  Subsumed under the OCC documents are rel ted documents from the 
Oklahoma State Supreme Court (OSSC), including an Application to Assume Original 
Jurisdiction and a Petition for a Writ of Prohibition filed by the Quality of Service 
Coalition (QSC) and Chesapeake (n = 23 pages). Also subsumed under the OCC 
documents are public comments submitted to the OCC (n = 1,250 pages).  These public 
comments include: (1) e-mails, letters, and news articles submitted by individuals, (2) e-
mails, letters, news articles, and form letters submitted by small businesses, hospitals, 
corporations, and cities, towns, and municipalities, and (3) letters and studies submitted 
                                                           
7
 Direct testimony refers to the statements made by a party or the party’s witness under oath.  
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by civil society organizations, including but not limited to the Sierra Club and the 
American Cancer Society.     
 While examining the newspaper, website, advertisement, and public comment data, I 
used an interpretive approach to content analysis, making notes and creating loose 
analytic coding categories (Hessey-Biber and Leavy 2006).  This approach allowed for a 
nuanced understanding of the themes that emerged in the archival documents. Each 
artifact was examined chronologically line by line and brief analytical memos were 
made.  I then utilized open coding techniques (Berg 2004) creating a more systematic 
series of grounded, common, and consistent categories.  The emergent categories were: 
need, corporate involvement, environmental implications, facility cost, strategies and 
tactics, ethical discussions and implications, perceptual shifts concerning primary fuels, 
regulations, stakeholders, and timeline of key events. 
The OCC and OSSC documents, the structure and content of which are required to meet 
pre-determined standards set forth in the Oklahoma Administrative Code (OAS) and the 
Oklahoma Statutes (OS), statutory provisions, and common law were approached in two 
ways.  During the first reading of these documents, I again used an interpretive approach 
to content analysis, making analytical notes and creating loose analytic coding categories 
(Hessey-Biber and Leavy 2006).  As in the newspaper, w bsite, and advertisement data, I 
then utilized open coding techniques (Berg 2004) creating a more systematic series of 
grounded, common, and consistent categories.  The emergent categories in the court 
documents were:  need, used and useful, cost, recovery f construction work in progress, 
competitive bidding, and hedging.  These categories were reduced to ‘need’, under which 
the category ‘used and useful’ was subsumed, and ‘cost’, under which the categories of 
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‘recovery of construction work in progress’, ‘competitive bidding’, and ‘hedging’ were 
subsumed.  Unique categories only emerging in documents submitted by two interrelated 
interests included:  constitutional rights, damages and suffering, and abuse of power.        
I next approached the OCC and OSSC data from a critical discourse analytic perspective.  
I analyzed the documents for the presence of formal arguments, which required the 
identification of premises and conclusions, as well as the presence of supporting 
arguments and isolated claims (Gee 2011a/2011b, Richardson 2007).  This time-intensive 
process allowed for the identification of explicit and implicit assumptions upon which 
claims and arguments were based, the manifest intent or purpose of the document, and 
the most likely latent intent of each document under analysis.  Upon completion, the 
emergent categories in OCC and OSSC categories were collapsed into cost, need, and 
free-market neoliberalism/opposition to state power.  I then approached the newspaper, 
focusing on the years 2005 – 2007, and the print and web KYP data from a critical 
discourse analytic perspective.  I analyzed the documents for the presence of formal 
arguments.  Because formal arguments were less common in these data, I also analyzed 
these texts for implicit and explicit claims and rhetorical forms of argumentation.  The 
arguments and claims found in the OCC and OSSC documents were then compared to 
claims present in the newspaper and KYP print media and internet campaigns.     
Written texts (and photographs) provide pertinent and nuanced information, but have 
some limitations. The use of these forms of archival m terials through content and 
discourse analysis does not provide express opportunity to access public perception.  In 
this case, public engagement in editorial venues through news outlets was limited.  The 
KYP website did maintain a comment site while the campaign was active in Oklahoma, 
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but there are no public comments from Oklahoma on the KYP website; a search of web 
archives revealed that there was content added to the page on Dec. 19, 2007, which 
consisted of one page directed toward the Holcomb plant in Kansas and appeared under 
the tab “Rhetoric vs. Reality”.  Dr. Tamara Mix had some limited contact with a 
Chesapeake corporate representative, who despite admitting that the online site and ad 
campaign were the only form of community outreach, felt that the campaign was a good 
faith effort to engage in grassroots, community coaliti n building and public education. 
Those comments are largely extemporaneous and anecdotal and cannot be systematically 
analyzed. 
Limitations 
The selection of news matter was restricted to locate newspaper coverage of the use of 
coal in electric generation, with a particular focus on the role of Chesapeake Energy 
Corporation in the Red Rock debate.  The data are, therefore, limited and can in no way 
provide insight into how either newspaper covered energy issues as a whole, or how 
particular events and issues were selected by journalists for coverage.  The data do, 
however, allow the Red Rock case to be temporally situated within the larger geo-
political struggles which precipitated the U.S. turn to domestic supplies of coal for 
electric generation, as well as political-economic pressures to deregulate the public 
utility.      
The methods and data used in this study necessarily lim t the ability to generalize 
findings across a wide variety of dissimilar cases.  In particular, the manifest and latent 
content of Chesapeake’s communications are specific to this particular case.  A further 
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limitation is that not all of Chesapeake’s corporate communications in the Red Rock case 
are publicly accessible.  Nevertheless, the identifica on of corporate communication 
strategies, even where specific content is absent, is useful in identifying concerted 
corporate involvement in processes intended to directly and indirectly influence 
authoritatively binding decision-making.   
A further substantial limitation is that no definitve conclusions can be drawn concerning 
the effectiveness of the corporate communication strategies undertaken by Chesapeake in 
this case.  Corporate communications are related to both short-term and long-term goals 
for the capital expansion of corporations and economic sectors.  Long-term goals and 
strategies, however, especially those of an entire energy sector, cannot be addressed 
through either the time-span this study considers or the strategies of one corporate actor.   
In spite of these limitations, this research makes a valuable contribution to the risk 
society, corporate strategic communications, and political sociology literature.  First, this 
research provides a rich description of how one corporation maintained vertical oversight 
of regulatory, legislative, and judicial processes tructurally connected to a perceived 
competitor’s decision that threatened to limit the corporation’s market share.  Secondly, 
this research highlights the origins and intent of one corporation’s carefully crafted risk 
definitions targeting individuals within state institu ions and civil society.  Finally, 
corporate involvement in the definition of risk for state and civil society, especially under 




The next chapter, Chapter IV, provides the historical context from which the Red Rock 
case arose.  This chapter is then followed by three chapters presenting the analyses and 
findings.  Chapter V addresses the first research question, namely, “What corporate 
communication strategies did Chesapeake use to control i formation concerning the Red 
Rock debate?”.  Chapter VI addresses the question, “How did Chesapeake construct risk 
and shape the coal versus natural gas debate?”  Finally, Chapter VII addresses the final 
two questions, namely:  (1) “How does Chesapeake’s involvement in the Red Rock case 
illustrate corporate power?”, and (2) “What are the implications of corporate power on 
public participation in democratic process?”       
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Risk definitions in late modernity are strategically defined and do not arise independently 
of the social environment (Lupton 1999).  The context in which risk definitions arise, 
“including temporal, sociocultural, historical, political, economic, legal, and biophysical 
factors and conditions” (Ritchie and Gill 2008:186), shape how publics will interpret and 
socially construct risk and harm.  It is, therefore, n cessary to situate the proposed 
expansion of OG&E’s coal-fired Sooner Power plant near Red Rock, Oklahoma, within 
its historical political-economic contexts.  In orde  to provide this context, all newspaper 
articles collected from the TW and the DO were read in chronological order, and notes 
were taken to identify general social and political trends impacting electricity production.  
When necessary, outside sources such as the U.S. Code, the Oklahoma Constitution, Title 
17 of the Oklahoma Statutes, and the Oklahoma Administrative Code (OAC) were 
consulted to provide clarification of newspaper data.    
In this chapter, I first clarify the status of the U.S. public utility.  I then trace the impacts 
of the OPEC Oil Embargo on both the choice of primay fuels used to meet baseload and 
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peaking electricity demands and the subsequent national-level push to deregulate the 
public utility.  I then clarify the legal structuring of the regulation of the public electric 
utility in Oklahoma, tracing how an application to the OCC moves through the regulatory 
process.  Finally, using only the OCC data, I end the chapter with a clarification of the 
Oklahoma public utility applications which were combined to form what became publicly 
known as the Red Rock case.  The overview presented i  this chapter provides the 
necessary historical and structural context within which Chesapeake’s corporate 
communication strategies in the Red Rock debate can be understood. 
Providing for the Common Good through the Regulated Public Utility  
Historically, as the generation of electricity became increasingly widespread, the term 
‘public utility’ was used to describe the growing industry (Warkentin 1998).  As a public 
utility, electric utilities are considered to be vest d with the public interest, a concept with 
roots in case law in which certain businesses were “common callings” (Warkentin 
1998:48).  As such, businesses designated as common callings were bound by the general 
rule that they were forbidden to refuse to sell a product or service to anyone; these 
businesses would serve all consumers, without discrimination, at a reasonable cost.  
Electric generation has also been called a ‘natural monopoly’, a classification which 
occurs when, due to economies of scale, one large business concern, here an electric 
generation plant, can supply an entire market more efficiently and at lower cost than 
many small producers (Lussier and Sherman 2009).  The ‘natural monopoly’ status of the 
electric public utility is due to technological requirements of electric generation; 
electricity is generated at a centralized generation facility, transmitted to stations located 
within the general areas where the electricity is to be used, and, finally, distributed to 
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individual end users, whether residential, commercial, or industrial.  The construction and 
maintenance requirements of electricity generation facilities, transmission lines and 
stations, and distribution lines and end-use measurments make electric utilities the most 
capital-intensive industry in the U.S. (Warkentin 1998), and open competition is 
traditionally considered to lead to cost-intensive duplications in the system which would 
not only be counterproductive, but increase electric rates for the end-user (Warkentin 
1998; Lussier and Sherman 2009).     
In classical liberal and neo-liberal economic theory, monopolies are undesirable in a 
capitalist economy; a monopoly with control over an entire market no longer has the 
necessary incentives to pursue the highest quality possible at the lowest possible cost to 
consumers, incentives which can only be provided by market competitors.  Therefore, 
industries with natural monopoly status, such as the public utility, are regulated by 
federal and state governments.  State government commissions regulate electric public 
utilities by overseeing territories, approving franchises, supervising transmission and 
distribution quality issues, and approving rates charged to end-users.   
Coal or Natural Gas?  Nothing New in Oklahoma 
Prior to the 1970s, many electric generation facilities relied on petroleum as a primary 
energy source, with others, as was typical in Oklahoma, relying heavily on natural gas.  
In 1978, however, in response to the ‘energy crunch’ caused by the U.S. reliance on fossil 
fuels and the OPEC Oil Embargo (1974), federal legis ation prohibiting the construction 
and operation of electric generation facilities fueled only by petroleum and/or natural gas 
was passed by Congress (Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act (FUA); 42 U.S.C. 8301 
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et seq, 1978).  Further provisions of the FUA required that electric generation facilities be 
certified as to their capability to use coal, or another alternate fuel, as a primary energy 
source (FUA Section 201(d)).  Beginning in the 1970s, gaining support during the 1980s, 
and intensifying in the 1990s, a push toward the der gulation of the U.S. electric public 
utility system occurred, gaining ground at both the national and state level.  This push 
toward deregulation was based primarily on the assertion that electric “generation has not 
produced measurable economies of scale for some time” (Warkentin 1998:47).  
Regulatory changes began occurring in support of competition in the wholesale electric 
generation market (Hess 2011), a trend that is verifiable in the Oklahoma Statutes.  In 
1987, FUA was amended, and the prohibitions against the use of natural gas or petroleum 
as a primary energy source in new and existing electric power plants and major fuel-
burning installations were repealed.   
As the use of coal (and nuclear energy) grew, public concern regarding the health and 
environmental impacts of the burning of non-renewable fossil fuels to generate 
electricity, as well as the nuclear generation alternative, were growing.  Relevant to this 
research are the emissions concerns surrounding coal consumption; as electric utilities 
turned to domestic coal, especially high-sulfur coal, the greatest concern was that of ‘acid 
rain’, produced when water vapor in the atmosphere combines with sulfur dioxide in the 
air, forming sulfuric acid as it falls to earth and egatively effecting water bodies, 
cropland, wildlife, and tree growth.  The proliferation of large-scale coal-fueled electric 
generation plants in the Ohio Valley and other parts of the Midwest were considered to 
be a major source of the increased acidification of the environment, especially in the 
Northeast and Canada.  As can be expected within the framework of risk society, attacks 
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by industry associations on the expert knowledge production which explained the 
formation of acid rain, as well as federal level legislation to regulate SO2 emissions 
related to the formation of acid rain, began (and bear a similarity in form and content to 
more contemporary attacks on anthropogenic climate change).  For example, the 
following claims are presented by Carl Bagge, President of the National Coal 
Association, Washington, D.C., at an address to the Mid-America Energy Summit in 
1983: 
Studies that portend acid rain is a major threat to the health of Americans 
and to cropland, wildlife and environment have identified only 215 bodies 
of water nationwide that are acidified, he said. Of these, 206 are in New 
York and all are in the Northeast…Moreover, 49 are nothing more than 
ponds and 152 are too small to qualify under federal specifications as 
lakes…Also, Northeastern supporters of tighter emission controls on the 
coal industry are failing to consider millions of automobiles and thousands 
of installations that burn fuel oil in that part of the country might be more 
to blame for possible acid rain problems, Bagge notd.  Supporters of new 
controls, despite having no scientific evidence to sh w the problem either 
really exists or is caused by coal, are willing to extract billions of dollars 
from the industry and consumers, he said. [Vandewatr 1983]. 
 
In Oklahoma, electric generation in the 1920s often burned high-sulfur coal from 
Oklahoma mines.  In the 1930s, however, the use of natural gas for electric generation 
expanded.  For example, OG&E converted two of its coal burning units, Muskogee 1 and 
2, to the more abundant, more easily transported, and relatively cleaner natural gas.  Until 
1975, OG&E added natural gas burning plants as demand for electricity in the state 
increased.  As in the nation as a whole, however, natural gas was also a primary fuel for 
heating, competing with electric generation needs after the on-set of the OPEC Oil 
Embargo of the early 1970s.  Natural gas prices rose and, by the end of the 1970s, natural 
gas shortages in the Northeast and Midwest contributed to the Powerplant and Industrial 
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Fuel Use Act, or FUA (1978), mentioned above, which prioritized natural gas for heating, 
not electric generation.  While some regions in the U.S. turned to nuclear energy, 
Oklahoma consistently rejected this option, choosing lower-sulfur, Wyoming coal 
instead.   
Oklahoma’s turn to Wyoming coal was not contention-free, however.  Some of the 
concerns illustrated in the following quote, while local in focus, are suggestive of many 
of the claims against the burning of coal today, including supply and generation facility 
requirements, cost, inefficiency, and negative environmental impacts:      
Coal's drawbacks, however, are many. It requires massive storage space, 
unlike gas, which just flows out of pipelines and is burned immediately. 
Coal requires huge crushing and handling equipment. Because coal 
burning is dirty, it requires tremendous anti-pollution equipment. And 
burning coal leaves ash as a by-product, so disposal is a constant 
concern… All these things translate into higher cost... Because the coal-
burning plants require so much handling and anti-polluti n 
equipment…the Sooner units, use a large amount of the electricity they 
produce just to drive their own components… Each of these units is rated 
at 550 megawatts of generating capacity. But about 35 megawatts of each 
unit, or almost 7 percent of capacity, goes to power its own associated 
equipment, without creating any direct revenues for the company…For 
[Muskogee 4 and 5], $35 million had to be spent just on electrostatic 
precipitators. The giant equipment is used to extract ash and pollutants 
from plant exhaust so the hot air coming out of the 350-foot smokestacks 
includes no visible smoke and is more than 99 percent ash free… The low-
sulfur coal, which is less polluting, is used here in place of Oklahoma's 
high-sulfur coal comes by rail from Wyoming….[Vandewater 1984].  
Nevertheless, the above excerpt is representative of the concerns surrounding coal-fired 
baseload generation in Oklahoma at the onset of the national push to deregulate the 





Co-Generation Facilities Vie for the Electricity Market 
Oklahoma public utilities moved to meet electricity demand primarily through the use of 
coal-fired baseload electric generation plants for continuous electricity demand combined 
with natural gas-fired peaking plants for occasional periods of increased electricity 
demand.   With the political attempt to deregulate the electricity market, however, non-
public utility power producers, called independent power producers, proliferated.  These 
producers built less capital intensive natural gas co-generation electric generation 
facilities for, primarily, industrial users.  Co-generation technology captures heat lost 
during the production of electricity and converts it into thermal energy, usually in the 
form of steam or hot water, with both electricity and thermal energy available for sale on 
the energy market.  Energy companies interested in xpanding markets proposed a 
solution for meeting future electricity demand:  a co-generation facility could provide 
cheap steam both for residential, commercial and industrial heating and industrial 
processes while, at the same time, providing electricity—if utilities were required by 
regulators to buy power from co-generation facilities at rates set by corporation 
commissions.  Co-generators challenged utilities’ long-term planning before corporation 
commissions, arguing that, if co-generation were not embraced, baseload coal-fired 
facilities combined with natural gas peaking plants represented a high-cost, high-risk 
solution for meeting future electricity needs.  The following claims attributed to Don 
Smith, then president of Oklahoma City-based Smith Co-generation Management, Inc., 
who challenged OG&E’s long-term plan for meeting electric needs, are representative of 
co-generation challenges of the 1990s: 
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Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co. customers will face power shortages and 
pay tens of millions of dollars a year more than they should it the electric 
utility doesn’t prepare for growth…If this commission doesn’t act to stop 
OG&Es high-cost strategy…(it) will cost ratepayers on average $33 
million an year (extra) for each of the next 40 years…The solution to that 
problem is for OG&E to buy power from two new 110-megawatt steam 
and electricity generating plants that [Smith’s] company proposed to build 
in Oklahoma City by 1993…Such plants not only could sell power to 
OG&E for no more than its lowest-cost alternative but also could attract 
industry by providing cheap steam for heating and industrial 
processes…[Smith] wants the Corporation Commission to order OG&E to 
buy power from his proposed co-generation plants at a r e set by the 
agency” [Vandewater 1991]. 
These lines of reasoning against public utility planning summarized in the above quote 
did not abate over time, as is evidenced by the following statement made a full thirteen 
years later by former Louisiana Senator, Bennett Johnston, speaking on behalf of 
Burlington, Massachusetts, based InterGen8 before the Public Utility Purchased Power 
Study Commission, an Oklahoma legislative task force: 
Oklahoma electric utility customers could save nearly $90 million a year if 
state regulators required utilities to buy power from the least expensive 
sources…requiring utilities to accept competitive bids for all the power 
they use…OG&E customers alone could have saved at leas $51 million 
this year if the utility had bought more electricity from Redbud9 and other 
independent power producers. [Wilmoth 2004].  
  
The review of the historical context of electric generation above shows that the 
proposed expansion of OG&E’s Sooner Power Plant near R d Rock, Oklahoma, 
which was part of what became known as the Red Rock case, grew from an 
environment long fraught with concerns about U.S. dependence on foreign 
sources of petroleum after the on-set of the OPEC Oil Embargo, energy security, 
                                                           
8
 InterGen owns a 1,200 megawatt natural-gas-fired power plant in Luther, Oklahoma.    
9
 Redbud, a 1,230 megawatt natural-gas-fired power plant constructed and operational in 2004 near 
Luther, Oklahoma, was acquired in a settlement between Kelson Holdings LLC and OG&E in 2008.   
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a tension between choices of primary fossil fuels for specific end needs, a 
growing concern with federal environmental regulations, and a general push 
toward deregulation of the public utility.  The following public comment 
submitted to the OCC concerning the Red Rock case—and which informs the title 
given to this research project—implicitly addresses the concerns and contentions 
related to electricity production: 
OG&E customer literature itself diclosed (sic) (within the past two 
years) that the [Sooner Power] plant almost went off-line, due to 
the fact that the coal was down to a two day supply…This is a self 
admitted example of a potential for catastrophe to Oklahomans 
depending on energy.…Kay County…is already at a statistically 
significant level [for current emissions] of Sulpher (sic), [and] 
based on available air space for incremental/additional permitting, 
80% or more is already allocated….additional emission  [caused 
by the Red Rock expansion of the Sooner Power Plant] would 
violate the Clean Air Act, and several other laws….Why is coal 
even being considered, when Oklahoma has much cleaner n tural 
gas which should be supplemented with Solar (sic) and windpower 
(sic) on the large acrerage (sic) at this site?  Are we the Taxpayers 
supposed to be paying for another Corporate Welfare sch me?  Or 
is it Bush’s “Clean Coal” Agenda” (Saying “Clean Coal” is like 
saying “Dry Water”)…As our voice, demand a viable system.  NO 
COAL EXPANSION!!! [Public Comments, 7/23/2007, p. 206].     
           
Oversight of the Electric Public Utility in Oklahoma 
I now turn to address the regulation of the public e ectric utility in Oklahoma.  In 
Oklahoma, the agency legislated to maintain oversight of regulated public utilities is the 
Oklahoma Corporation Commission, with the Public Utilities Division (OCC PUD) 
responsible for processing all public utility applications.  The authority with which the 
OCC operates is found in the Oklahoma Constitution, Title 9, and the Oklahoma Statutes, 
Title 17.  The Commission is headed by three Commissioners, whose offices are filled 
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through a staggered, general election.  As of 2010, each Commissioner serves a six-year 
term, with one position open for election every two years.  Prior to 2010, there was no 
statutory limit placed on the number of terms, whether consecutive or non-consecutive, 
an elected Commissioner could serve, making Corporation Commissioner, Bob Anthony 
(R-OK), who served as a Commissioner during the Red ock case, the longest serving 
Commissioner in the U.S.  
(www.occ.state.ok.us/Comm/Anthony/Bob_Anthony_Bio.html).   The Commission has 
the authority to create any rules necessary for the execution of the duties specified for the 
agency within the Oklahoma Constitution and legislation.  Any promulgated rules, after 
submission to the Governor and upon the Governor’s signature, become part of the 
Oklahoma Administrative Code (OAC).   
Hearings of applications, or ‘causes’, occur before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), 
and those whose presence is required include:  (1) OCC PUD staff representatives, 
associated counsel of record, and (when necessary) expert witnesses, (2) the Attorney 
General or designated representatives, associated council of record, and necessary expert 
witnesses, and (3) representatives for the utility or utilities filing an application, together 
with council of record and necessary expert witnesses.  The cost of expert witnesses 
testifying for the OCC PUD and the Attorney General are paid by the filing utility and, 
upon appropriate action as specified by legislation and the OAR, these costs can usually 
be recovered by the utility through OCC-approved rate increases.  Both the Attorney 
General’s office and the OCC maintain internal lega departments, from which councils 
of record are drawn.   
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In any cause before the OCC PUD, parties claiming to be affected by a filed cause may 
file a Motion to Intervene.  Upon hearing, a petitioning party may be granted intervener 
status by the Commission and be recognized as a party of interest10 in the cause being 
heard.  While hearings occur before an ALJ, who administers a report of findings and 
recommendation to the OCC, the OCC is not mandated to wholly adopt the 
recommendation of the ALJ in its issuance of a final order.  Upon the issuance of a final 
order, the Oklahoma State Supreme Court (OSSC), the court with jurisdiction to hear 
civil appeals, is the appeal court to which utilities and/or parties of interest with 
intervener status may turn for potential relief.  See Figure 1 on page 55 for a summary of 
how a cause before the OCC PUD travels through the procedural process.  
The Principle of Judicial Efficiency:  Creating the Red Rock Case 
What became reported in the media as the Red Rock case was the consolidation of three 
separate yet interrelated causes pending before the OCC.  The initial cause was an 
application by the Public Service Company of Oklahoma (PSO) for a Determination that 
Additional Electric Generation Capacity will be Used and Useful (CAUSE PUD 
200500516), which became generally known as the ‘peaking case’.  Independent power 
producers Lawton Co-generation, LLC, and Energetix, LLC (Energetix) were parties of 
interest in this case, as were the associations Oklahoma Industrial Energy Consumers 
(OIEC) and the Quality of Service Coalition (QSC).  The second cause was an 
application by PSO for a Determination that Additional Baseload Electric Generation 
                                                           
10
 When the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the 
action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or iimpede 
his ability to protect that interest.  Intervention is allowed under the Oklahoma Statutes (O.S.) and under 
the Oklahoma Administrative Code (OAC). 
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 Capacity will be Used and Useful (CAUSE PUD 200600030), which became generally 
known as the ‘baseload case’.   
The peaking and baseload causes filed by PSO were consolidated for the purpose of 
hearing only in response to a motion from the Attorney General, Drew Edmondson, who 
cited the common law Principle of Judicial Efficiency as the relevant principle for 
consolidation.  The logic supporting the Motion to C nsolidate was that both the peaking 
and baseload cases were the product of a single Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) produced 
by PSO in compliance with legislation, and that both causes rested on almost identical 
testimony of the same expert witnesses.  Therefore, c nsolidation would conserve 
valuable judicial resources.   
The third and final cause consolidated into the Redock case was the application of 
Oklahoma Gas and Electric Corporation (OG&E) for an Order of the Commission 
Granting Pre-approval to Construct Red Rock Generating Facility and Authorizing a 
Recovery Rider (CAUSE PUD 200700012).  This application was the result of a Request 
for Proposal (RFP) initiated by PSO to meet its estimated future baseload electric 
generation needs and in response to which OG&E won the bid11.  Other interveners in the 
Red Rock case included Redbud, LLC, American Electric Services Pacific, Inc., (AES 
Pacific), and American Electric Services Shady Point, LLC (AES Shady Point), who, 
along with OG&E, had also submitted bids in response to PSO’s RFP.  Additional 
interveners included the OIEC, OG&E Shareholders Asociation, Wal-Mart Stores East, 
                                                           
11
 The Red Rock generation facility was to be the combined effort of PSO, OG&E, and OMPA.  However, 
the OMPA is not a regulated utility under Oklahoma law.  OMPA had a contractual agreement with OG&E 
which concerned only the portion of OG&E’s contract with PSO.  Since OG&E’s contract with OMPA did 
not affect the portion of the Red Rock expansion to be controlled by PSO, the OMPA does not enter into 
the proceedings before the OCC.    
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LP, and the Quality of Service Coalition (QSC).  [See Table 3 on page 58 for a summary 
of applicants and interveners in the Red Rock case]. 
From the list of formally recognized parties involved in the Red Rock case before the 
OCC (Table 3, page 58), it is obvious that Chesapeake Energy Corporation was not a 
formally recognized intervener in the Red Rock case.  N vertheless, newspaper articles in 
2007 frequently mentioned Chesapeake in conjunction w th the Red Rock case; the exact 
nature of Chesapeake’s involvement, however, remained highly ambiguous.  For 
example, in addition to explicit references to the corporate entity, Chesapeake Energy 
Corporation, articles also referred to statements made by Chesapeake’s owner and CEO, 
Aubrey McClendon, both before the OCC and the Society of Petroleum Engineering, as 
well as frequently quoting Chesapeake’s Senior Vice-President of Corporation 
Development, Tom Price, Jr.  Chesapeake Energy Corporation was also mentioned in  
conjunction with the Quality of Service Coalition (QSC), an unincorporated association 
granted intervener status in the Red Rock case.  In addition to involvement in the Red 
Rock case, newspaper articles also explicitly named Chesapeake Energy and Aubrey 
McClendon in relation to a group which called itself the Texas Clean Sky Coalition; 
Chesapeake, an outspoken member of the coalition, had spent “more than $1 million in 
advertising to oppose the plan [by Texas Electric Corporation (TXU) to build 11 new 
coal-fired electric plants in Texas]” (Wilmoth 2007a).  In Oklahoma, Chesapeake and 
Aubrey McClendon were mentioned in relation to yet another coalition, Know Your 
Power, which appeared to sponsor advertisements in Oklahom  newspapers in opposition 
to the proposed coal-fired baseload facility considere  by the OCC in the Red Rock case.   




 proposed plant in Oklahoma, but proposals for coal-fired baseload electric generation in 
Kansas, as well.  In Kansas, both the knowyourpower.net website, and a print 
advertisement campaign were ruled to be illegal, and Know Your Power became defunct. 
Table 3.   Applicants and Interveners in the Red Rock Case 
 
Applicant 
(Filing Date) Cause Number 
Intervening Party 
(Date Intervention Status Granted, 
Commission Order Number)  
Public Service Co. of 
Oklahoma (PSO) 
(Filed:  Dec. 21, 2005) 
NO.  PUD 200500516 
Application for a 
Determination that 
Additional Electric 
Generating Capacity will 
be Used and Useful 
1. Oklahoma Industrial Energy Consumers 
    (Jan. 17, 2006; Order No. 518228) 
2.  Energetix, L.L.C. 
(Jan. 30, 2006; Order No. 519057) 
3.  Lawton Co-generation, L.L.C.  
4.  Quality of Service Coalition 
(March 29, 2006; Order No. 52295) 
5.  Redbud Energy, LP 
(July 19, 2006; Order No. 527197) 
 
Public Service Co. of 
Oklahoma (PSO) 
(Filed:  Feb. 1, 2006) 
NO.  PUD 200600030 




Capacity will be Used 
and Useful 
1. AES Pacific Inc./AES Shady Point L.L.C 
(Nov. 21, 2006; Order No. 532455) 
2.  Oklahoma Industrial Energy Consumers 
(March 1, 2006; Order No.520924) 
3.  Energetix, L.L.C. 
 (March 1, 2006; Order No.520925) 
4.  AES Pacific Inc./AES Shady Point L.L.C 
(March 16, 2006; Order No.521753) 
5.  Quality of Service Coalition 
 (April 5, 2006; Order No. 522764) 
6.  Oklahoma Gas &Electric Company  
 (Jan. 18, 2007; Order No. 534335) 
 
Oklahoma Gas and 
Electric Co. (OG&E) 
(Filed:  Jan. 17, 2007) 
NO. PUD 200700012 
Application for an Order 
of the Commission 
Granting Pre-Approval to 
Construct Red Rock 
Generating Facility and 
Authorizing a Recovery 
Rider  
1.  Oklahoma Industrial Energy Consumers 
     (Jan. 31, 2007; Order No. 534938) 
2.  Public Service Company of Oklahoma 
     (Jan. 31, 2007; Order No. 534939) 
3.  OG&E Shareholders Association 
(Feb. 22, 2007; Order No. 535822) 
4.  Redbud Energy, LP 
(Feb. 23, 2007; Order No. 535899) 
5.  Wal-Mart Stores East, LP  
Feb. 23.2007 (Order No. 535897) 
6.  AES Pacific Inc./AES Shady Point L.L.C 
(Feb. 23, 2007; Order No. 535901) 
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Some fleeting references were also made to possible Chesapeake political activity at the 
national level.  Chesapeake was apparently associated wi h a 502(c)(4) lobbying 
organization in the state ofDelaware, the Clean Skies Coalition, which employed a 
lobbyist in its behalf.  The Clean Skies Coalition was the apparent forerunner of the 
American Clean Skies Foundation, officially recognized as a public charity by the IRS in 
November, 2007, with headquarters located in Washington D.C.  While the exact nature 
of Chesapeake’s involvement in either the Clean Skies Coalition or the American Clean 
Skies Foundation is beyond the scope of this research, it is nevertheless interesting that 
Oklahoma newspapers reported the resignation of Oklahoma Corporation Commissioner, 
Denise Bode, from the OCC shortly before hearings were to commence on the Red Rock 
case.  Bode left the OCC to become the CEO of the Am rican Clean Skies Foundation, 
from where she stated that the purpose of the Foundation was to promote natural gas by 
providing “as much information as possible…to be a kind of Heritage Foundation for the 
energy and the environment” (Cappiello 2008).  This Foundation launched a website, 
cleanskies.org, in 2007 and began broadcasting Clean Skies.tv in 2008.  The five 
members of the Foundation’s original Board of Directors represented four corporations, 
three of which are headquartered in Oklahoma.  One corporation, Chesapeake Energy, 
supplied two of the five directors, namely, Aubrey McClendon and Tom Price, Jr., names 
which had become very familiar in Oklahoma in relation to the Red Rock case.  
This chapter showed that the Red Rock case did not emerge suddenly, but was deeply 
rooted in global geo-political issues, national energy policies, domestic sources of 
primary fuels, and local energy demands.  Before the OPEC Oil Embargo (1974), 
petroleum was the primary fuel of choice for electric generation, with some areas in the 
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nation, particularly Oklahoma, becoming heavily reliant on natural gas.  The FUD (1978) 
restricted the use of both petroleum and natural gas as a primary fuels for electricity 
generation, however, and domestic coal became the primary fuel of choice for baseload 
electric generation, with natural gas becoming a source for temporary peaking needs.   
A political-economic push to deregulate the electric public utility gained momentum in 
the 1990’s, and Oklahoma legislation changed to reflect the trend.  Independent power 
producers, who built smaller, lower-cost co-generation facilities, proliferated.  In 
Oklahoma, corporate interests seeking to expand markets challenged the regulatory 
structure, attempting to convince Commissioners to require utilities to purchase 
electricity from co-generating interests.  The 2000’s saw great fluctuations in the price of 
natural gas, and the electricity purchased by public utilities through contracts and on the 
spot market to meet peaking demands caused heavy rate increases for end-users, 
especially residential users.  It was into this general political-economic environment that 
the Red Rock case emerged.   
The OCC is given authority by Title 9 of the Oklahoma Constitution and Title 17 of the 
Oklahoma Statutes.  Applications filed by public utilities with the OCC follow a specific 
course through the regulatory process, summarized in Figure 1 on page 55.  Entities who 
consider themselves to be potentially adversely impacted by a final OCC order 
supporting a public utility’s application may file an Motion to Intervene with the OCC-
PUD.  The Red Rock case was the consolidation of three applications filed between 
December, 2005, and January, 2007, by two Oklahoma public utilities.  PSO filed the 
first two applications, which became known as the peaking and baseload cases, and 
OG&E filed the final application requesting pre-approval to construct the Red Rock 
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facility and authorizing a recovery rider of financi g costs.  There were a large number of 
interveners in the Red Rock case.  The applicants, causes, and interveners in the Red 
Rock case are summarized in Table 3 on page 58. 
Chesapeake Energy Corporation did not formally intervene in the Red Rock case.  
Nevertheless, newspaper coverage of the Red Rock case frequently mentioned 
Chesapeake, as well as its owner and CEO, Aubrey McClendon, and its Senior Vice-
President of Corporation Development, Tom Price, Jr. in relation to the case.  In the next 
chapter, I clarify Chesapeake’s relation to the Redock case and answer the first 
research question:  “What corporate communication strategies did Chesapeake use to 
control information concerning the Red Rock debate?”  
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CHAPTER V     
 
 
NATURAL GAS IS ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF HISTORY!  STAND WITH 
CHESAPEAKE AGAINST COAL12  
 
In risk society, the careful control of information concerning the risks and harms caused 
by advanced technologies is critical in directing ad perpetuating economic expansion 
(Cable, Shriver, and Mix 2008).  Competing private int rests are aware that the content of 
their communications to publics concerning hazards nd risks contribute to public 
perceptions of risk and harm.  The content of communications becomes part of the stores 
of information upon which individuals draw when making decisions concerning risk and 
the threat of harm.  As media technologies expand, so, too, does the use of media 
technologies by state, civil society, and corporate actors, as communication pathways 
expand to provide risk definitions to publics seeking alternative information sources 
(Jones 2004).  This chapter identifies the communication strategies used by Chesapeake 
to control information concerning risk in the Red Rock debate.   
In order to identify Chesapeake’s corporate communication strategies related to the Red 
Rock case, I first clarified Chesapeake’s relationship to the formal OCC proceedings 
                                                           
12
 Adapted from Aubrey McClendon’s public comments at the OCC public hearings [Public Comments, pp. 
148 – 151]. 
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regarding the Red Rock facility.  To do this, I compared each mention of Chesapeake, 
Aubrey McClendon, Tom Price, Jr, and Know Your Power eported in the TW and DO 
with the OCC data.  This led to the identification of a relationship between Chesapeake 
Energy Corporation and the Quality of Service Coalition (QSC), an intervener and 
recognized party of interest in all three of the causes that were consolidated into the Red 
Rock case.  This led to the identification of four co porate communication strategies used 
by Chesapeake in communicating both directly and indirectly with the state.  I then 
analyzed the OCC data, including the OSSC data subsumed under the OCC documents, 
to identify themes in the data.  General themes which pertained to all entities emerged.  
However, three themes emerged which were specific to only the QSC and Chesapeake.  I 
then analyzed key documents for the presence of formal arguments, identifying premises 
and conclusions.   
To understand how the OCC data related to statements attributed to Chesapeake in the 
newspaper data, as well as to the Know Your Power issue advocacy advertising 
campaign, I then compared the formal arguments in the OCC data to the more informal 
claims reported in the newspaper data and in the issue advocacy campaign.  I identified 
two corporate communication strategies used by Chesapeake in communicating with lay 
publics in civil society.  
In this chapter, I first explain the relationship between Chesapeake Energy Corporation 
and the Quality of Service Coalition (QSC).  I then identify and explain the six corporate 
communication strategies used by Chesapeake in the Red Rock case.  I end the chapter by 
relating these corporate communication strategies to risk society.      
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The Unincorporated Association:  Representation without Member Documentation 
In newspaper coverage of Red Rock, the names of Chesapeake Energy Corporation, its 
owner and CEO, Aubrey McClendon, and its Senior Vice-President of Corporation 
Development, Tom Price, Jr., were mentioned in relation to the Red Rock case.  Analysis 
of the OCC documents revealed that Chesapeake, in bhalf of itself, did not file a Motion 
to Intervene in the Red Rock case, being represented i stead by the Tulsa-based Quality 
of Service Coalition (QSC).  The QSC was represented formally before the OCC and the 
OSSC by its attorney of record, Lee Paden.  In the QSC’s Motion to Intervene, the 
organization self-identified as an unincorporated association whose members, having 
valid franchises with PSO, had a direct interest in the OCC proceedings.  To support 
QSC’s claim of direct interest, the motion asserted that, as “customers of PSO”, 
members’ rates, charges, tariffs, and terms and coniti s of service might be affected by 
the outcome of the proceedings and, therefore, its participation in the hearings was 
necessary.  The QSC, with no objections from principle applicants or other interveners, 
was granted intervener status as a party of interest by the OCC.   
Due to the nature of the relief sought by QSC within its Motion to Intervene, QSC was 
granted full participation in discovery, the filing and presenting of testimony, cross-
examination of witnesses, participation in all formal and informal conferences and 
hearings, and the filing of briefs and any other pladings “to the extent the association 
deemed it necessary to protect its interests”.  Unfortunately, due to the legally informal 
nature of an unincorporated association, which has no legal requirement to formally file a  
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list of members with any agency, the actual members of the QSC are not identifiable13.  
However, Chesapeake was identified in newspaper accounts and within a number of 
formal documents in the OCC data as the most active member of the Coalition.   
The common law purpose of an unincorporated associati n is to actively and adequately 
represent the particular interests and concerns of it members before external entities.  
Those members who feel their interests are not adequat ly represented by the 
unincorporated association are under no obligation to remain members.  Based on 
common law, therefore, the QSC was responsible for actively and adequately 
representing the interests of its members, including its most active member, Chesapeake, 
before the OCC.   
As an intervener and recognized party of interest in the Red Rock case, the QSC, and by 
association, Chesapeake, entered the following major formal motions, pleas, briefs, and 
appeals into the OCC record: 
1.  Motion for Amendment of PSO Testimony (May 19, 2006) 
2.  Bench Memorandum [on Rule-Making Questions of Pre-Approval] 
(March 13, 2007) 
3.  Statement of Position (May 21, 2007)  
4.  Motion to Suspend Procedural Schedule and Stay Proceeding (June 11, 
2007) 
5.  Proposed Exhibit List (June 27, 2007) 
6.  Brief Requested by the Administrative Law Judge Concerning the 
Issuance of a Request for Proposal Under the Oklahom  Corporation 
Commission’s Competitive Bidding Rules, OAC 165:35:34 (August 13, 
2007) 
                                                           
13
 The Tulsa World (2007) reports that the Quality of Service Coalition is “a consortium of Oklahoma 
businesses, municipalities and homebuilders” (Womack  2007a).   
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7.  Brief Requested by the Administrative Law Judge Concerning the 
Existing Authority of a Utility to Engage in Hedging (Gas/Coal).  
Whether Changes Would need to be made to Commission Rules and/or 
Oklahoma Statutes to Authorize and/or Encourage Hedging and the 
Potential Regulatory Pitfalls of Hedging (August 13, 2007) 
8.  Quality of Service Coalition’s Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law for Inclusion in the Report of the Administrative 
Law Judge (Proposed Report of the Administrative Law Judge) (August 
13, 2007) 
9.  Appeal to the Report of the Administrative Law Judge (August 28, 
2007)   
The first corporate communication strategy I identified, therefore, is indirect corporate 
participation of a corporate entity/person in a rule-making body of the state, here a 
regulatory body, through an unincorporated associati n of similar interests.   
Enhancing Social Responsibility:  Corporate ‘Experts’ as Concerned Citizens 
Both the TW and the DO reported that Aubrey McClendon verbally opposed the Red 
Rock facility during public hearings on the Merits of the Case.  Examination of OCC 
documents confirmed that, during the Hearing on the Merits on the Red Rock case which 
began on July 2, 2007, continued on July 9, and concluded on July 31, 2007 [exact dates:  
July 9 – 11, 16 – 20; 23 – 26, 30 and 31], and which was opened daily to public 
comments by the ALJ, Aubrey McClendon, owner and CEO of Chesapeake, verbally 
contested the Red Rock case on July 30, 2007.  Following common law practice, those 
members of the lay public who verbally address the ALJ read their comments from 
written statements, which are then submitted into the public record of the case.   
McClendon’s public comments included a four-page letter with four newspaper article 
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attachments14.  In the public comment, McClendon clarified his (and Chesapeake’s) 
opposition to the Red Rock facility, as well as oppsition to new legislation (Title 17 O.S. 
§286).  The analysis of the manifest and latent conent of McClendon’s public comment 
is consistent with the summary content of documents formally submitted by the QSC to 
the OCC.  Because the QSC’s documents will be considered in greater detail later, 
McClendon’s comments will not be specifically address d here.  Thus, the second 
corporate communication strategy is direct corporate p rticipation, through a corporate 
‘expert’ acting as a member of civil society, in a rule-making body of the state, here a 
regulatory body, during a public hearing.    
Additionally, according to both the TW and the DO, Aubrey McClendon sent letters to 
Oklahoma legislators urging opposition to the Red Rock project.  These letters, while 
being included as a strategy used to oppose the Red Rock facility, are unavailable in the 
public domain and, therefore, cannot be included in the content and discourse analysis.  
The third corporate communication strategy I identified is, therefore, direct representation 
of interests before state legislators through the through the circulation of letters to 
legislators by a corporate expert acting as a member of civil society.        
Double Representation:  The Corporation and its Unincorporated Association 
Both the TW and the DO reported that Chesapeake and the QSC petitioned the Oklahoma 
State Supreme Court (OSSC) in order to halt the Red Rock proceedings.  An inspection 
                                                           
14
 One article is entitled, “Redbud officials question need for Red Rock Plant” (Francis-Smith.  July 13, 
2007.  Vol. 112(136), The Journal Record).  The second is, “Inside Messy Reality of Cutting CO2 Output: A 
Power Giant, Waiting for Congress to Act, Takes Some Baby Steps” (Smith.  July 12, 2007.  The Wall Street 
Journal).  The third article is:  “Costs Surge for Building Power Plants” (Wald.  July 10, 2007.  The New York 
Times Late Edition).  The final article is:  “Coal’s Doubters Block New Wave of Power Plants” (Smith.  July 
25, 2007. The Wall Street Journal).   
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of the OCC data, under which OSSC documents were subsumed, confirmed that 
Chesapeake, as first petitioner, and the QSC, as second petitioner, filed an Application to 
Assume Original Jurisdiction and Petition for Writ of Prohibition on June 8, 2007, with 
the Oklahoma State Supreme Court (OCC as respondent).  In Oklahoma, the 
extraordinary Writ of Prohibition is a common law writ not specifically mentioned within 
the Oklahoma Statutes (1953 OK CR 72, 97 Okl. Cr. 41, 257 P.2d 849 State Ex Rel. v. 
Lackey), although a definition of a Writ of Prohibition is provided in rules of the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) (OCCA Rule 10.6).  According to 
common law, a filing for an extraordinary Writ of Prohibition must, at minimum, include 
a petition and a brief which sets forth the arguments a d authorities for the assertions of 
the petition.  Additionally, the petitioner has the burden of establishing:  “(1) a court, 
officer or person has or is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, (2) the 
exercise of said power is unauthorized by law, and (3) the exercise of said power will 
result in injury for which there is no other adequate remedy” (Eschols:  n.d., p. 7).   If 
granted, the Writ of Prohibition results in an order, called an Order of Mandamus, that 
directs the court, officer or person to cease the exercise of power; in this case, the OCC 
would be required to immediately stop proceedings.  Related to, and in conjunction with, 
the actions taken by Chesapeake and the QSC at the OSSC, the QSC filed a Motion to 
Suspend Procedural Schedule with the OCC on June 11, 2007 (Point 4 on page 65).  
Chesapeake’s and the QSC’s application and petition were denied without comment by 
the OSSC on August 7, 2007.  The fourth corporate communication strategy I identified 
is, therefore, direct corporate representation, strengthened by a joint filing with an 
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unincorporated association representing the corporation’s interests before another agency 
of the state in a related matter, at the highest level state court.   
The Corporate ‘Expert’: Building Bridges between the State and the Public Sphere 
Aubrey McClendon was featured, alongside Stuart Solom n of OG&E, in an op-ed 
article published in the TW on August 26, 2007 (McClendon 2007).  Both McClendon’s 
and Solomon’s positions on the Red Rock facility were published under the heading, 
“Point / Counterpoint.”  McClendon’s letter was written in a numbered format presenting 
five reasons to oppose the Red Rock facility.  These r asons include: 
1.  It’s a bad deal for rate payers.  OG&E’s president has suggested that 
construction costs for the coal plant were too risky for company 
shareholders to shoulder, but it would be fine for Oklahoma residential 
and business ratepayers to front the complete cost…. 
2.  Oklahoma doesn’t need it.  We have more than enough excess 
capacity in Oklahoma to meet the projected future ne d for power.  State-
of-the-art, combined-cycle natural gas plants… 
3.  The environmental burden is too heavy…Tulsa experienced several 
ozone alerts this month…Proximity to Red Rock could mean Tulsa bears 
the brunt of the pollution...with major negative economic and public 
health consequences… 
4.  Coal is cheap—not!  Power generated by the Red Rock coal plant will 
certainly cost ratepayers more than expected in the future as a bipartisan 
bill will likely soon pass in Congress to cap or tax carbon 
emissions…How much ratepayers will pay is not known.... 
5.  “Ultra super critical” technology is unproven…This technology, 
still unproven in the U.S., makes dirty coal only 10 percent cleaner.  
That’s like getting a dirty shirt from the cleaners with only 10 percent of it 
cleaned.  It is not clean.  Oklahoma ratepayers should not be the guinea 
pigs for this new technology. [McClendon 2007]  
These reasons are all contained prominently within the print advertisements of the KYP 
issue advocacy campaign. As found in the print arm of the KYP issue advocacy 
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campaign, McClendon calls natural gas a fuel of the 21st century, presenting the only 
choice for the OCC concerning Red Rock as “no”.   
Unlike the print and web arms of the KYP issue advocacy campaign, however, 
McClendon’s (2007) letter does mention unconventional drilling techniques, stating, 
“new drilling technologies…make it possible to find gas at depths and in formations 
unimaginable a few years ago.”  There are only positive results attributed to new drilling 
technologies, namely, “clean, abundant, reliable and affordable” (McClendon 2007) 
natural gas (See Charman 2010 for a discussion of evironmental effects of horizontal 
drilling, or ‘fracking’).  The fifth corporate communication strategy identified in the data 
is, therefore, direct representation of corporate in rests before lay publics in civil society 
through the publication in print mass media of a statement from a corporate ‘expert’ 
defining risk.     
Educating Civil Society:  Chesapeake Exercises Rights to Protected Political Speech 
The most publicly prominent effort by Chesapeake in the Red Rock case was an issue 
advocacy advertising campaign which included television and radio spots, print 
advertisements in area newspapers, and a website.  Because television and radio 
advertisements were no longer available in the public domain, only the print 
advertisements appearing in area newspapers and website materials were analyzed.  The 
newspaper portion of the issue advocacy campaign bean as a three-page (consecutively 
running) spread on Sunday, July 29, 2007, in the DO, two days before the final public 
hearing before the ALJ and one day before Aubrey McClendon’s oral reading of his 
public comments at the hearings.  The same advertisement ran in the SNP on Sunday, 
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August 5, 2007, one week after the first publication and five days after the hearings on 
the merits concluded.  This inaugural advertisement was the only print advertisement in 
the KYP print campaign to feature the Chesapeake brand logo and name, as well as the 
only advertisement which featured both the Chesapeake and the Know Your Power 
(KYP) logo.  With this launching of KYP, Chesapeake announced the web portion of its 
issue advocacy campaign.  The print advertisement promised:   
In the coming weeks, each question [concerning the Red Rock coal plant] will 
be the focus of a thoroughly researched and balanced presentation of the facts.  
We’ll also make it easy for your voice to be heard.  Very soon, you’ll be able 
to email your legislators, mayor, city council members and others with your 
opinion, urging action at [logo knowyourpower.net].   
 
The next print advertisements of the KYP issue advocacy print campaign did not 
appear until Sunday, September 2, 2007, however, with the final advertisement, a 
social responsibility ad, running on or around September 18, 2007.  In total, four 
distinct issue advocacy advertisements were created for the campaign. All 
advertisements across papers on any given day were not identical; further, not all 
papers carried all four core advertisements.  Consistent across all four 
advertisements, however, was the lack of the Chesapeake name or logo, as well as 
the prominent display of the Know Your Power.net logo.  Also consistent across 
these issue advocacy advertisements—and located at he very bottom of the page, 
directly under the centered Know Your Power logo—was the statement, “A 
Statewide Coalition of Concerned Doctors, Health Organizations, Educators, 
Citizens, Businesses and Students”.  For a summary of the advertisements, see 




SUMMARY OF CHESAPEAKE’S PRINT ADVERTISEMENTS in the KNOW YOUR POWER CAMPAIGN 
     TOPIC VENUE     SIZE   DATE SPONSOR 
PHOTOGRAPH    
Number 
Represents : 












Introduction        
   KYP 
    
   DO 
  SNP 
3 full pages 
3 full pages 
7/29/2007 
8/05/2007 Chesapeake 
- - - - - - 
Cost Risks    DO 
 
 
   TW 
1 full page 
 
 










- - - - 
Health Risks        
  Asthmatic children 
 







  Particulate matter  
 
   DO 
   TW 
 
1 full page 
















  Red Rock is Wrong 
 
  SNP 
 















   DO 














*  This particular photograph is also found on the KYP website, ‘Rising Pollution’ . 
**  This particular photograph is also found on theKYP website, ‘Background’.   
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data is, therefore, the implementation of a multi-media issue advocacy advertising 
campaign which promised to educate and inform the public concerning the residual risks 
and future threats of harm related to coal-fired electric generation.  A thorough reading of 
newspaper material and official state documents reveals that communications with which 
Chesapeake was either indirectly or directly involved concerning the Red Rock case 
included at a minimum:  (1) formal representation before the OCC by the Quality of 
Service Coalition (QSC) in the three combined causes known as the Red Rock case, (2) 
the direct (and joint) filing of an Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction and a 
Petition for Writ of Prohibition with the Oklahoma State Supreme Court, (3) oral and 
written opposition to the Red Rock proposal during public hearings at the OCC, (4) 
letters to state legislators urging opposition to the Red Rock power plant, (5) an op-ed 
letter (McClendon 2007) in at least one newspaper with large circulation, and (6) the use 
of an issue advocacy media campaign across diverse media, including television and 
radio spots, newspapers, and the Internet. 
Beck’s framework of the risk society states that, in risk society, the logic of the 
accumulation of capital is overlaid with the logic of the distribution of risk and harm.  
Corporations seeking to create, maintain, or expand their markets in pursuit of wealth are  
directly connected, in varying degrees, to advanced technologies, the implementation of 
which differentially expose human populations to eclogical risk and harm.  Fear of harm 
can create opposition to corporate practices.  Corporations must, therefore, carefully 
manage scientific knowledge which causally connects technologies to risk and harm if 
corporations are to foster externalized social enviro ments conducive to corporate goals 
and practices.  As information technologies expand, so too must corporations expand 
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their utilization of media technologies if they are to broaden their control of information 
concerning risk and harm.  Beyond the use of more traditional forms of communication 
traditionally found within communications with the state (face-to-face verbal 
communication and highly formalized written texts) and lay publics (op-eds in 
newspapers and statements to reporters), Chesapeake also implemented an issue 
advocacy advertising campaign which utilized newspaper print and web formats, 
television and radio advertisements, and the Interne .      
Habermas’ conceptualization of the public sphere, an ideal communicative space for the 
formation of deliberated public opinion which mediates between formal institutions of 
the state and civil society, indicates that corporate communicators must, when 
constructing risk definitions, tailor communications to meet the expectations of the state 
as well as the expectations of civil society.  The purpose of these tailored 
communications is to manage social constructions of risk and harm relevant to the 
accumulation of wealth.  Chesapeake’s involvement in the Red Rock case can, therefore, 
be divided into communications managing risk and harm within formal institutions of the 
state and communications managing risk and harm within lay publics in civil society.  Of 
the strategies identified, four involved strategic communications with the state, including:  
(1)  formal yet indirect involvement through the QSC at the regulatory agency overseeing 
public utilities, (2) informal  yet direct public comments at a public hearing at the OCC 
(comments subsequently entered into the permanent record),  (3) formal direct 
involvement with the judiciary, here, the highest court of original jurisdiction over civil 
matters in Oklahoma, and (4) informal engagement of legislators through, at a minimum, 
letters written to make clear Chesapeake’s stance regarding Red Rock.  The final two 
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strategies were directed at the lay public in the form of: (1) a multi-media issue advocacy 
campaign, and (2) an article written by Aubrey McClendon for the press which was 
published in the TW, the newspaper with largest circulation in the state of Oklahoma.  
Table 5 on page 76 provides a summary of these communications and their target 
audiences.  An overview of how these strategies related to each other across time is 
provided in Figure 2 on page 77.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Because the complex technologies upon which risk societies depend do not offer clear 
choices between risk but rather choices which are either more or less risky, expert 
knowledge is vulnerable to manipulation by communicators.  The content of 
communications that are directly constructed by a communicator are under the control of 
the communicator, and the information concerning risk and harm crafted within these 
communications serve the express interests of that communicator.  Chesapeake, as a 
corporate communicator, had direct control over a majority, but not all, communications 
associated with the corporation in the Red Rock case.  Communications over which 
Chesapeake had complete control over information concerning risk and harm include the 
content of the KYP issue advocacy campaign, the article published in the TW authored by 
Aubrey McClendon, the letters written by Aubrey McClendon to Oklahoma legislators, 
and the oral comments made by Aubrey McClendon during the OCC public hearings, 
comments which were subsequently entered into the OCC record.  Additionally, direct 
communications are necessary (yet in this case undocumented) if an interest wishes to be 
adequately represented within an unincorporated coalition, and such direct 




Summary of Chesapeake’s Corporate Communication Strategies in the Red Rock Case 
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*      Content unavailable; not included in content or discourse analysis. 
**    Content unavailable; not included in content or discourse analysis. 




Temporal Overview of Chesapeake’s Corporate Communication Strategies in the Red Rock Case 
 
†  Public Hearing on the Merits of the Case heard before the ALJ began on July 2, 2007, and ended on July 31, 2007. 
††  The ALJ issued Findings of Fact and Recommendations on August 21, 2007.  The OCC held public deliberations on or around Sept. 11, 2007  
       and issued its Final Order to all applicants and interveners on or around Oct. 11, 2007.  
NOTE:  Due to the unavailability of McClendon’s letters to state legislators, they are not included in this overview.     
Year 2006 2007 
Month Jan. Feb. March April May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. March April May June July Aug.† Sept.†† 
QSC 
  OCC 
  Mar. 29                       Sept. 11 
 
 
                  July 30   
 
 
    .              June 8  Aug. 7  
 
 
                  July29    Sept. 18 
 
 
                  ≈ Aug. 1   
Chesapeake/QSC 
   OSSC 
A. McClendon   
OCC 
Chesapeake 
   KYP Print 
Chesapeake 
   KYP Web 
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The earlier assumption (which was based on common law understandings of the purpose 
of the unincorporated association) that Chesapeake w s actively and adequately 
represented before the OCC is strengthened through the joint filing before the OSSC.  
The link between Chesapeake and the QSC establishes, at the very least, Chesapeake’s 
indirect control over the content of communications pa sing from the QSC to the OCC.   
Direct and indirect control over communications, when combined with the audiences 
targeted by these communications, provides an overview of communication pathways 
between Chesapeake and key audiences external to the c rporation, audiences who can, 
in varying degrees, either act to constrain or expand potential markets.  These 
communications pathways, with relative levels of contr l, are presented in Figure 3 on 
page 79. 
This chapter answered the first research question, “What corporate communication 
strategies did Chesapeake use to control information concerning the Red Rock debate?”  
Data analysis revealed six communication strategies, four of which addressed various 
audiences within the state and two which addressed lay audiences in civil society.  
Chesapeake had direct control over the information presented in five of the six 
communication strategies.  In three of the communication strategies, communications 
issue from Chesapeake as a corporate ‘person’; one of th se communication strategies 
was Chesapeake exercising rights to protected political speech.  Table 6 on page 80 
provides a final summary of these findings.  In the next chapter, I identify and describe 
how Chesapeake constructed risk definitions, as well as how these risk definitions shaped 
















1.  Solid arrows represent communications over which Chesapeake has complete control over content. 
2.  Dashed arrows represent communications over which Chesapeake has limited to no control. 
3.  The amount of control over communications betwen the Quality of Service Coalition and the 
Oklahoma Corporation Commission is unknown; the QSC is an unincorporated coalition for which an 
official list of members is unavailable.   
 











Lay Public(s)  
Know Your Power Campaign 
newspapers website 
Oklahoma Corporation Commission, 
Public Utility Division 
Chesapeake Energy Corporation Quality of 
Service 
Coalition 







Table 6.         Comparing Corporate ‘Speakers’ in Chesapeake’s Corporate   
                                          Communications in the Red Rock Case 
 
 
Corporate Communications Directed at the 
State 
Corporate Communications Directed at 
Lay Publics in Civil Society 
Communications from the Corporate ‘Person’ Communications from the Corporate ‘Person’ 
     *  Formalized and indirect representation of corporate    
         interests before the OCC through the QSC  
     * Direct representation of corporate interests through  
        the exercise of political speech in a multi-model  
        issue advocacy advertising campaign 
     * Formalized, direct, and joint representation of  
        corporate interests before the OSSC 
 
 
Communications from an ‘Expert’ Corporate Person 
Acting as a Member of Civil Society 
Communications from an ‘Expert’ Corporate Person 
Acting as a Member of Civil Society 
     * Direct oral and written representation through public  
        comments before the OCC 
   * Direct written representation of interests through an    
      op-ed in the Tulsa World 
     * Direct written representation through letters to state  
































CHAPTER VI     
 
 
DEFINING RISK IN THE RED ROCK CASE 
 
Within the framework of risk society, electric generation, a complex technology, is a site 
of conflict over definitions of residual risks and future threats of harms.  In light of 
Habermas’ (2006) conceptualization of the public sphere in advanced liberal 
constitutional democracies, any definition of risk requires that information be conveyed 
along communication pathways ultimately linking target audiences within formal 
institutions of the state and lay audiences in civil society.   In constructing risk for target 
audiences, language is of primary importance.  Elements of language can be arranged to 
form claims and construct formal and rhetorical arguments in such ways that meet the 
basic expectations of language use held by targeted audiences (Krippendorff 2004) while 
simultaneously supporting a communicator’s goals for capital accumulation.   
In risk society, while specific technologies and associated risks will vary dependent upon 
immediate context, the underlying assumptions governing the use of symbols, including 
language, will conform to hegemonic logics of social organization (Gee 2011a/2011b; 
Krippendorff 2004; Richardson 2007).  In risk society, Beck specifically states that, due 
to the system dependence on technology, the logic of modernity legitimizing the 
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distribution of  wealth is overlaid by the logic of late modernity legitimizing the 
distribution of risk and harm; both logics must, therefore,  be active in order to increase 
capital accumulation.  Risk society must necessarily function according to complex 
interactions between two logics, those of wealth distribution and risk distribution, and all 
definitions of risk must recognize and negotiate the logics of both.  Which logic serves as 
the primary logic in any communication can be expected to vary dependent upon the 
goals of the communicator and the targeted audience.  Regardless of the weight given to 
either logic within a specific communication, it is a sumed that the intent of corporate 
communications is to create a general acceptance of orporate practices within the 
targeted audience.   
In this chapter, I address the second research question, “How did Chesapeake Energy 
construct risk and shape the coal versus natural gas debate”?  In the first section of the 
chapter, I explain how risk was defined in the Red ock OCC proceedings.  I then focus 
on risk as defined by the QSC and Chesapeake.  In the third section of the chapter, I turn 
to Chesapeake’s definitions of risk in the KYP issue advocacy campaign, and connect 
risk definitions before the state to risk definitions targeting civil society.  I conclude the 
chapter by considering how Chesapeake’s risk definitions before the state and civil 
society shaped the parameters of the Red Rock debate.         
Risk and the Logic of Capital 
In order to determine how Chesapeake defined risk and shaped the coal versus natural gas 
debate in the Red Rock case, it is prudent to begin inquiry at the point where the Red 
Rock case originated, namely in formal communications with the state, specifically the 
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OCC.  I undertook a critical discourse analysis of the texts—and ensuing documents 
targeting the OSSC—noting the structuring of language used, the claims and arguments 
offered, and the relative importance given claims supporting capital accumulation and 
claims concerning ecological risks and threat of harms.  The available texts associated 
with the KYP campaign, which emerged toward the end of OCC proceedings concerning 
the Red Rock proposal, were treated in an identical manner.  This allowed comparisons 
of language use, forms of argumentation, and the relativ  importance of the logics of 
capital and risk across communications developed for i ferent target audiences. This 
analysis allowed me to draw conclusions concerning how Chesapeake constructed risk 
and shaped the coal versus natural gas debate in thRed Rock case.   
Due to the formalized nature of proceedings within institutions of the state and written 
rules governing communications with the state, applications, motions, and other written 
forms of communication followed standardized formats nd relied heavily on the 
presentation of prior cases and decisions made in previous regulatory and judicial 
proceedings.  The complex nature of the electric generation technologies considered 
required highly specialized knowledges which were filed as direct, supplemental, and 
rebuttal testimonies by expert witnesses in the cas, generating hundreds of pages of text.   
Consistent with tradition guiding truth-finding in US civil proceedings, proceedings took 
place in a courtroom before an Administrative Law Judge, experts for applicants formally 
filed direct testimony regarding their statistical modeling, analyses, and findings, direct 
testimony was subject to discovery and cross examintio , surrebuttals filed, and 
supplemental testimony provided.  These exchanges and procedural requirements 
followed OCC procedural rules, and questions of fact and law were decided by an 
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Administrative Law Judge.  Because of the adversarial nature of U.S. court proceedings 
in general (and the dramatization of criminal proceedings in particular), newspaper 
coverage of the proceedings tended to be presented as competitions between two 
adversaries, which were quickly reduced to ‘big coal’ versus ‘big natural gas’ in the DO 
and TW.  The actual content of the testimonies before the OCC, and the filed documents 
before the OSSC, however, reveal a more complex presentation of positions than the 
polarization of ‘coal vs. natural gas’ conveys.   
The primary purposes of the Public Utility Division f the OCC in regulating the public 
electric utility is to regulate the rates charged for electricity consumed by end-users, to 
oversee the cost of fuel acquisitions, and to watch over the transmission and distribution 
infrastructure of public electric generation facilities—concerns informed by the logic of 
capital distribution.  It is relatively unsurprising, therefore, that the two emergent  and 
organizing categories found in the OCC data were those of ‘need’ and ‘cost’.  Given that 
communication in risk society must negotiate between two logics, the logic of capital and 
the logic of risk, it was nevertheless expected that within claims and arguments advanced, 
the logic of risk distribution would also emerge.   
The claims and arguments advanced within the category of ‘need’ heavily favored the 
logic of capital.  More specifically, various parties of interest questioned PSO’s actual 
concrete need for, in the first case, additional self-build peaking capacity (PUD 
200500516) and, in the second case, additional self-build baseload capacity (PUD 
200600030).  In general, natural gas interests (Energetix, LLC, Redbud, and the QSC) 
contended that peaking capacity could be met through additional contracting with 
independent power producers, namely, the abundant natural gas co-generation facilities 
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which were running far below capacity.  If the OCC required PSO to contract with these 
facilities, according to these interests, natural gas would even solve PSOs perceived need 
for additional baseload capacity.  PSO, however, maintained that its main source for 
electric generation was already natural gas, and that the volatility of the natural gas 
market, coupled with the nature of co-generation units which are not designed to run over 
the long term at full capacity, necessitated a diversity of fuel choice to include coal and 
wind generation.   
Analysis of claims and formal arguments advanced within the category of ‘cost’ also 
favor the logic of capital, especially claims and arguments advanced within the original 
direct and supplemental testimony presented by PSO and OG&E.  It is within the claims 
and arguments advanced against PSO’s least cost solution to future peaking and baseload 
electric generation needs that claims loosely following the logic of risk first surface.  The 
range of topics introduced within arguments against both the peaking and baseload needs 
of PSO, and the later contract between PSO and OG&E, was expansive and is understood 
as attempts by various interveners to cast doubt upon PSO and OG&E expert witness 
testimony.  In fact, claims and arguments advanced against PSO and OG&E is the source 
of much of the environmental claims-making concerning risk and harm which surfaced in 
the KYP issue advocacy campaign.  Because of the complexity of ‘cost’ before the OCC, 
this category is considered in greater detail.       
PSO’s original and supplemental testimony concerning cost followed established 
requirements concerning the information necessary for the OCC to evaluate the 
Integrated Resource Plans (IRPs) of major electricity generating facilities.  These 
requirements mandated that the calculation of cost include first and foremost the actual 
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material construction costs across a variety of avail ble advanced generation 
technologies. These material construction costs were further required to be qualified by 
two additional cost considerations, the first being projected primary fuel costs and the 
second being the hypothesized effects of potential federal regulations of fossil fuel 
emissions.  Thus, the statistical modeling of the least cost option for the choice of  
electric generation technology was calculated using a statistical model which estimated 
the projected material costs qualified by the interaction between technology-specific 
projected primary fuel costs and potential costs related to possible federal regulations 
controlling fossil fuel emissions.  Ultimately, the estimated least-cost option across a 
variety of coal and natural gas technologies identifi d self-build natural gas-fired peaking 
plants and an ultra-supercritical coal-fired baseload electric generation plant as PSO’s 
optimal solution for long term ability to meet expect d future electricity demand.  These 
self-build solutions identified in PSO’s IRP were subjected to vigorous criticism by 
parties of interest.  At this stage of the OCC proceedings, which was before OG&E filed 
its application in January, 2007, major counterclaims to the least cost option select d by 
the statistical modeling focused on the very unknows that statistical models are intended 
to mediate and included the rising cost of construction and the unknown cost of any 
future federal regulations regarding CO2, NOx, HG, and SO2 emissions.  However, it 
was only in regard to the self-build ultra-supercriti al coal-fired baseload electric 
generation plant (Red Rock) that counterclaims drawing upon the logic of risk surfaced, 
specifically, air quality and public health.  These counterclaims originated in particular 
from natural gas interests and emphasized ‘externalized costs’ of pollution on air quality 
and public health.  Quite simply, the rhetorical construction of ‘externalized costs’ 
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encompassed factors not included in the operationalization of independent variables 
known to exert considerable influence on capital costs f electric generation facilities.  
The selection of externalized costs as emphasizing air quality and public health are the 
calculated choice of communicators and draw upon general sensibilities of ecological risk 
and harm.   
Administrative rules promulgated by the OCC are in response to state level legislation, 
and rules specify obligations and responsibilities and can constrain action by some while 
empowering others (Lukes 2005; Richardson 2007).  One unique aspect of the Red Rock 
case was that this case coincided, in part, with rulemaking within the OCC.  At the point 
in time when PSO filed its first application with te OCC in December, 2005, no rules 
had yet been established by the OCC regarding cost-recovery related to pre-approval.  As 
part of its rule-making duty, the OCC requested in February, 2007, voluntary briefs from 
applicants and parties of interest in the Red Rock case addressing: (1) why the 
Commission should, or should not, grant pre-approvals for major utility projects under 17 
OS §286, (2) arguments for and against Commission pre-a proval and consideration of 
reasonable alternatives, and (3) the extent to which a pre-approval order by one 
Commission can or does bind a subsequent Commission (Order No. 535993, February 
27, 2007).  All parties except the QSC saw benefit in pre-approval for major utility 
projects, and these responses are well-summarized in the Attorney General’s brief as to 
the intent of the Oklahoma legislature concerning pre-approval: 
…a strong argument can be made that the intent of the legislature is 
clearly expressed in the statutory language at issue and that such language 
contemplates, at a minimum, the Commission will make  determination 
upon application as to whether there is a need for “construction or 
purchase of such generating facility.”  If such a need is found, the 
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Commission is then required to determine the extent of that need.  To the 
extent need is found, then that generating facility, or portion thereof as 
found, must be considered “used and useful” and it cos s subject to cost 
recovery rules promulgated by this Commission.    
The Attorney General also addressed the fact that arguments for and against pre-approval 
of major utility investments “are often made and the strength of those arguments judged 
based upon the particular interests of the audience”.  H  points out that public utilities 
generally “support preapproval because it provides a method by which to manage 
regulatory uncertainty”, which, in fact, is argued by PSO, among others.  He also points 
out that “commission staffs and consumer groups in some instances support pre-approval 
as it may bring a greater opportunity for participation in utility planning”, a statement that 
is generally supported in all briefs except that of the QSC.  Finally, the Attorney General 
states that, “Others may argue that pre-approval of major investments is, in reality, no 
different than approval of a certificate of convenience and necessity15,  pre-approval of 
security issuances, or least cost planning processes that typically occurs at most state 
commissions”, a position largely reflected in Redbu’s brief.  Thus, while all parties 
except QSC and, with some qualification, Redbud, agree that pre-approval reduces 
regulatory uncertainty, they also tend toward agreement that pre-approval and recovery of 
construction costs in progress shifts the financing r sk from the utility and its 
shareholders to the ratepayer, and that rules promulgated by the OCC must take this shift 
of financial risk into account when considering cost recovery.  Finally, those parties of 
interest who had submitted proposals in response to PSO’s RFP emphasized that the 
public can only be best served when proposals conform t  standards of competitive 
                                                           
15
 A certificate of convenience and necessity can be understood as a certificate from a public board or 
commission required by federal or state statute before engaging in certain public undertakings or services 
to protect existing franchises against injurious competition. 
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bidding.  Rules regarding competitive bidding practices were not in place at the time PSO 
issued its RFP and the claim was that the RFP did not allow bidders to receive a fair 
evaluation of their proposals.  (Competitive bidding resurfaced later, together with 
hedging, after OG&E filed its application with the OCC).  Thus, claims and arguments 
generally rely on the logic of capital, and all reference to risk involves capital risk related 
to the financing of large scale electric generation facilities, especially capital intensive 
coal-fired electric generation technologies. 
The State and Risk: Regulation and the Threat of Bounded Markets      
Chesapeake’s interests, as a member of the unincorporated QSC, were actively 
represented in all filings made by the QSC in the Red ock case. Among all participants 
in the case, the QSC, even though submitting briefs egarding competitive bidding and 
hedging, nevertheless communicated a unique and highly oppositional stance during the 
entire proceedings, beginning with its Bench Memorandum [on Rule-Making Questions 
of Pre-Approval] submitted on March 13, 2007, in response to Commission Order No. 
535993 [Pre-Approval] (See Point 4 on page 65).  According to the QSC, 17 OS §286 
was illegal because the legislature had, when passing th s legislation, overstepped its 
constitutional authority.  Due to the illegality of the legislation, the OCC would assume 
quasi-judicial power not granted to it under the Oklahoma Constitution if it engaged in 
pre-approval of major utility projects.  The QSC, instead of addressing 17 OS §286, the 
concern of the Commissioners, cited instead 1983 legislation, namely 17 OS §157, as the 
appropriate legislation under which the OCC must operate.  Thus, according to the QSC, 
the OCC could: 
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…consider the planned generation submitted by an electric utility and also 
consider other reasonable alternatives that might be available to satisfy the 
need for additional or replacement power for the future.  This statute is 
also a good example of a statutory authorization to consider reasonable 
alternatives that might be used to meet the future need for electric 
generating capacity to serve customers in the future” (Quality of Service 
Coalition Submission of Memorandum in Response to Oklahoma 
Corporation Commission Order No. 535992) [emphasis dded]. 
These arguments were repeated by the QSC in its Statement of Position, submitted on 
May 21, 2007.  (See Point 5 on page 65).  The intent of this line of argumentation, which 
directs attention back to the categories of ‘need’ instead of ‘cost’, draws into question the 
very authority of the OCC in promulgating rules which would provide established 
procedures for public utilities to undertake capital intensive self-build electric generation 
projects.  Capital intensive self-build electric generation, in turn, posed a threat to co-
generation facilities, facilities which, in turn, provide demand for natural gas. 
 The only other brief submitted by a party of interest that, in principle, bore any similarity 
to QSC’s oppositional stance was that of Redbud, an independent power producer 
operating a co-generation facility.  Redbud’s brief focuses on deregulation and implies an 
unholy alliance between the public utility and regulators, stating:   
It is important to note that nothing in Section 286 modifies the 
Commission’s constitutional and statutory authority to regulate electric 
utilities.  Although Oklahoma attempted in the 1990s to modify the 
utilities’ monopoly hold on customers and allow deregulated service to 
end users by a host of providers, deregulation was not implemented.  
Instead, Oklahoma customers continue to be served by one, and only one, 
provider—the regulated utility.  Although today there are a few additional 
players in the wholesale marketplace, they too have only one market for 
their product—the regulated utility.  These issues are important because 
they demonstrate that the regulatory compact between the state-sanctioned 
monopolies and the government has not changed substantially. [Brief of 
Redbud Energy, LP Pursuant to Order No. 535993, P. 2].   
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Redbud, instead of addressing when and how the Commission should grant pre-approval, 
addressed when the Commission should not consider granting pre-approval under 17 OS 
§286, namely: (1) when adequate resources are available to the utility within the regional 
marketplace to meet the resource needs sought to be met by a new purchase or through 
new construction, (2) failure of the utility to comply with competitive bidding rules 
established in OAC 165:35 – 34, (3) failure to demonstrate adequately the need and the 
timing of the new resource, and (4) the failure of the utility to provide specific and known 
cost information, hindering appropriate review of the pre-approval request (See page 3 of 
Redbud’s brief). 
The QSC’s stance toward the OCC proceedings is given symbolic force through its joint 
filings with Chesapeake before the OSSC.  The QSC and Chesapeake filed a joint 
Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction and a Petition for Writ of Prohibition with 
the OSSC, the court with jurisdiction to hear civil appeals, including appeals of decisions 
made by the OCC.  The decision to file the application and petition is firmly rooted in the 
structuring of U.S. government power which, in turn, is firmly rooted in the liberal 
constitutional democratic tradition grounded in thelogic of capital (Habermas 2006).  
The Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction was necessary because the Oklahoma 
Statutes grant jurisdiction to the OSSC to hear appe ls of final orders of the OCC, and no 
final order had yet been granted in the Red Rock case.  The common law intent of the 
extraordinary Writ of Prohibition is to present a wy for the state to provide individual 
citizens protection from injury suffered by unconstitutional abuses of power by actors 
within the state.  Its use by Chesapeake and the QSC is, therefore, a legal means to 
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further legitimize the concept of the corporate ‘person’ who can, in legal fact, suffer 
injury at the hands of others.   
As previously discussed, petitioners, when filing a common law Writ of Prohibition, must 
establish how the unauthorized use of power by an official of the state will result in injury 
to the petitioners for which there is no other adequate remedy other than a Writ of 
Mandamus delivered by the highest court (Eschols:  n.d., p. 7).  In constructing this 
injury, Chesapeake and the QSC argue that the unconstitutional OCC hearings, if 
resulting in the pre-approval of the Red Rock power plant, will cause Chesapeake and the 
members of the QSC to suffer, in the following order: (1) pecuniary loss by increased 
utility rates, (2) adverse environmental effects of a coal fired power plant, and (3) 
unconstitutional actions of the Commission.  The impl cations of these joint filings are 
many, but can only become legal fact through a direct ruling on the case within which 
justice(s) provide a written statement, with citations of established principles from earlier 
cases as applied to the case under consideration, which can be used to support future 
litigation before a court.  The OSSC denied both the application and the petition without 
comments (Welsh 2004).  Had there been a direct ruling, not only would corporate 
‘persons’ be able to claim possible injury due to legislation and rulemaking which restrict 
ability to pursue capital unhindered, but corporations could claim to suffer residual risk 
and harm from competitors whose product (here, electricity) is identical but whose 
technological choices (here, coal-powered vs. natural gas-powered generation facilities) 
to produce the product can be devalued through particularistic definitions or risk and 
threat of harm.  Thus, while general sensibilities concerning risk and harm are 
manipulated by the QSC and Chesapeake in constructing injury before the OSSC, their 
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use of the Writ of Prohibition nevertheless follows the logic of capital.  Additionally, in 
that the granting of the Writ would have provided further legal legitimation for the 
concept of corporate ‘persons’, the Writ would have functioned to further increase the 
power of the corporation by protecting it from regulation by the state.   
Aubrey McClendon’s public comments at the OCC public hearings16 serve, in part, as a 
less formal and more populist expression of the construction of injury before the OSSC.  
McClendon states, “In addition to the high cost of his proposed plant and its proposed 
use of risky new technology, we are also deeply concerned about this plant’s impact on 
Oklahoma’s air quality and on global climate change”.  This introduces the tone and 
content of Chesapeake’s Know Your Power issue advocacy advertising campaign.       
Risk in Know Your Power:  State Regulation Causes…..Asthma! 
The Know Your Power (KYP) issue advocacy advertising campaign targeted a variety of 
lay publics within civil society and utilized multiple communication technologies.  From 
the content of the print and the Internet arms of KYP—the only KYP data accessible for 
analysis—the use of language is, as expected, much ore informal than the language 
used in formal communications with the state.  Additionally, instead of communicating 
through formal argumentation as found in the formal communications directed at the 
OCC, the advertisements used common rhetorical devices and rhetorical forms of 
‘argumentation’ intended to elicit strong emotional responses in viewers; rhetorical 
claims were enhanced with photos and symbols.  To fulfill general federal requirements 
differentiating product advertising and direct advocacy advertising from issue advocacy 
                                                           
16
 The Tulsa World reports, “McClendon said his appearance Monday was not an endorsement of the OCC 
proceedings” (Womack 2007a).    
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advertising, the KYP issue advocacy campaign made explicit reference to its educational 
intent.  The stated claim of educational intent associated with issue advocacy was vital; 
the educational intent, if unchallenged by external parties, qualifies as political speech 
and provides protection from government regulation of corporate communications.  
Finally, drawing on cultural understandings of democratic practice, KYP used language 
that resonated with common perceptions of citizens’ re ponsibility to weigh evidence and 
make decisions concerning issues affecting the general public, enhancing feelings of 
democratic participation in governance.    
Explicit claims to ‘illegality’ and ‘unconstitutionality’, claims which formed the 
conclusions of carefully constructed arguments before the OCC and the OSSC, were 
completely absent in KYP.  Instead, illegality and unconstitutionality of state actions 
were presented as an unquestionable ‘objective’ reality, forming the implicit (unstated) 
assumptions upon which explicit, negatively worded claims were based.  The choice of 
highly charged language intended to elicit strong emotional responses in readers actually 
discourages, not encourages, the critical consideration of implicit claims.  Additionally, 
the rhetoric used within KYP’s print media arm, in particular, drew upon highly 
politicized concepts with negative connotations such as ‘large government’, ‘non-
competitive bidding practices’, ‘state-sanctioned monopolies’, and ‘exploitation of 
consumers’ already present within newspaper articles addressing a large range of 
politicized issues across the sample.  Within context, hese terms were firmly rooted in 
economic neo-liberalism and, therefore, follow the logic of capital.   
The phrasing of claims in KYP print advocacy advertis ments mirrored the use of 
language by Aubrey McClendon in public comments before the OCC, essentially 
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expanding corporate concerns regarding rulemaking to more populist perceptions of 
violations of individual constitutional rights by an uthoritarian state.  This freedom-
restricting state is presented as an objective reality, rather than a possible condition to be 
weighed by evidence.  Through unconstitutional decision making, the powerful state 
contributes to higher costs for the consumer and the inefficient use of existing resources.  
This presentation of ‘reality’ is particularly well illustrated in the issue-advocacy 
advertisement which ran in the SNP entitled, “The Top 10 Reasons Red Rock is Wrong 
for Stillwater” (Friday, September 7, 2007).  As an example, point two within the issue 
advocacy advertisement reads: 
The real reason OG&E and PSO want to build Red Rock is that 
Oklahoma’s utilities make more money when they spend more (of your 
money) to build big new coal-fired plants.  Our state’s utility regulatory 
structure means their answer to any need for more capacity is the most 
expensive upfront solution.  We believe this incentive to always build 
big new coal plants must be changed and we’ll work hard at the 
Oklahoma Corporation Commission to enable our utilities to profit from 
buying third party power  from clean-burning natural gas plants 
[emphasis in original].  
The proposed construction of the Red Rock plant is pre ented here as the necessary and 
negative outcome of the structuring of regulatory oversight of public utilities and major 
power providers.  Implied is that a deregulated electricity market would result in the 
choice of purchasing electricity produced by clean-burning natural gas provided by 
independent power producers.  This focus on the govrnment/state, followed by emphasis 
on the choice of coal and Red Rock, directs attention to legislation and regulatory rule-
making and the utilities involved, rather than allowing for a thoughtful consideration of 
risks associated with the burning of fossil fuels for electric generation.  Natural gas is 
presented at the very end of this particular statement, leaving the reader with the final 
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focus of ‘clean burning’ natural gas, the ‘natural’ choice of a properly functioning free 
market economy.  Further, members of the KYP coaliti n, who are publicly unknown but 
are implied to be a wide range of civil society actors, are presented as a positive force 
protecting the public good before the OCC.  Clearly, in this instance, any concept of risk 
is focused on the structured interaction between legislation, regulators, and the public 
utility, an interaction that is presented as necessarily producing the self-interested choice 
of self-build generation.  The fact that coal is the primary fuel of choice in the Red Rock 
facility is of secondary concern, subordinated under th  logic of capital.   
Manipulating Expert Knowledge:  Hiding the Role of Statistics in Market 
Predictions 
Consistent with the direct and supplemental testimon es provided by expert witnesses for 
the applicants in the Red Rock case and further dictated by the purpose of the OCC, the 
categories of cost and need were prominent within the print advertisements of KYP.  
Also consistent with the rebuttal testimonies of interveners in the Red Rock case, KYP 
rhetorical claims placed a marked emphasis on the objectively unknowable future trends 
of construction costs, primary fuels costs, and potential costs related to possible federal 
regulations which statistical modeling is meant to address, as well as variables excluded 
from the consideration of final costs of construction.  For example, in the issue advocacy 
advertisement featuring State Treasurer Scott Meacham, uncertainties surrounding cost 
and environmental regulation were neatly combined.  The text of the advertisement 
includes the following statement:   
As your State Treasurer, I am responsible for the long-term fiscal health of 
our state.  It is also my job to protect Oklahomans from undue risk.  I 
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believe building the proposed coal plant at Red rock would be imprudent  
and financially irresponsible, and you deserve to hear 
why…UNCERTAIN COSTS TO THE CONSUMER:  PLANT 
CONSTRUCTION… UNCERTAIN COSTS TO THE CONSUMER:  
POLLUTION  [Three Reasons Why Red Rock is Wrong, The Daily 
Oklahoman, September 4, 2007] [Emphasis in original text]. 
 
Thus, the uncertainty of the final cost of the plant, d therefore the uncertainty of rate 
increases on ratepayers who were already suffering under marked increases in the cost of 
electricity, was emphasized.  Absent from Meacham’s statement, however, is that the 
effects of the higher cost of electricity already felt by ratepayers, an objective condition 
which could conceivably prime readers to be particularly sensitive to concerns regarding 
cost, were actually due to the volatility of the price of natural gas on the energy market.   
Also drawing upon testimony provided by interveners in the OCC proceedings is KYP’s 
emphasis in print advertisement on the technology selected by the statistical modeling for 
the self-build coal-fired baseload electric generation facility.  Here, cost was connected to 
the capital risks involved in constructing an ultrasupercritical coal-fired electric 
generation facility within the U.S, embellished by wording which alluded to the 
mediation of ecological risk.  Thus, reason four in the Stillwater issue advocacy 
advertisement states, “The plant would use expensiv, unproven, pollution-fighting 
technology just to make a feel-good over-promise of “clean coal”…and [the technology] 
might not work at all” (Emphasis in original).  Reason six states that the plant “will 
burden Oklahomans with significant coal pollution reduction costs.  Carbon taxes are 
coming—the only question is how much extra money coal plants will have to pay for 
their heavy CO2 emissions” (Emphasis in original).   Finally, reason seven states that 
“Red Rock’s emissions will likely push OKC and Tulsa into non-compliance with EPA 
Clean Air standards…and standards are ever-more stringent…it comes with steep 
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penalties and costs (in the billions)…Once you lose clean-air status, it’  difficult, if not 
impossible to get it back” (Emphasis in original).  Again, the actual rhetorical emphasis i  
on cost as financial burden:  ultra-supercritical technology is not only unproven, but 
expensive.  Since the technology is unproven, it might fail to reduce harmful emissions.  
Because of the looming possibility of carbon taxes, a technology which does not reduce 
emissions from coal will burden Oklahomans with costs of pollution reduction.  Higher 
emissions caused by failed technology and unclean co l will push Oklahoma City and 
Tulsa into non-compliance with clean air standards, causing even more cost due to steep 
penalties and emission reduction measures.  Thus, te entire line of reasoning essentially 
becomes a slippery slope rhetorical fallacy which hinges on the decision to utilize ultra-
supercritical technology and will increase costs; rhetorical force is strengthened through 
the exploitation of fears related to residual risks generated by the use of coal as a primary 
fuel.     
Points that are markedly missing in the above advertisement, and which challenge the 
rhetoric used, include:  (1) ultra-supercritical technology is not—and was not at the 
time—unproven but widely used globally (reason four), (2) carbon taxes would also 
affect natural gas generation facilities (though, albeit, at potentially lower financial costs) 
(reason six), (3) there exist other sources of polluti n besides coal plant emissions that 
contribute to the risk of non-compliance with EPA Clean Air standards, and (4) 
corrective measures to improve air quality in Tulsa and Oklahoma City should arguably 
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already be implemented, irrespective of the choice f generation technology for meeting 
future electricity needs17.  
Chesapeake and the QSC, in constructing injury to support their application and petition 
before the OSSC, clearly intended to stay OCC proceedings and have declared 
unconstitutional the legislation in 17 OS §286 and subsequent OCC rules, supporting 
their conclusion by claiming injury due, in part, to the adverse environmental effects of a 
coal-fired baseload power plant.  These adverse environmental effects were dramatized 
and personalized through the advertisements in the print arm of KYP through rhetoric 
and the use and placement of photographs.  The typical hotograph is that of a person 
either living in the region, or a person who can easily stand as a representation of a 
‘typical’ person living in the region.  These photographs are prominently displayed, 
usually in the top one-third of the page.  For example, one advertisement features a large 
photo of Heather Griswold of the American Lung Association of the Central States, 
Oklahoma City, who reveals that “My husband and I are expecting our first baby”.  The 
accompanying text emphasizes the deleterious effects of particulate matter, stating: 
Even short-term exposure (hours to days) is linked to respiratory and 
cardiovascular disease causing deaths, increased numbers of heart attacks 
and strokes, more hospitalization and emergency room visits and increased 
severity of attacks.  Year-round exposure intensifie  the risk and severity 
of each health effect [Emphasis in original text].  
 
Another advertisement features the photo of a femal child prominently holding an 
inhaler at face level.  The text below this photo states that ““Cheaper” [coal fuel costs] 
                                                           
17
 Interestingly, in this particular advertisement, Chesapeake also offers a subtle critique of the modeling 
techniques PSO used to evaluate options, though the critique is probably less salient for the lay reader not 
well versed in the OCC proceedings and the content of expert witness testimonies.  Reason eight states, 
“Only on a narrow, variable commodity cost basis is coal “cheaper” to burn than natural gas…pollution 
reduction costs are potentially astronomical”. 
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doesn’t cover the harm coal emissions do to public health and consequent medical costs”.  
Next to the text is a small photo of Robert McCaffree, MD, from the Oklahoma Lung 
Association (#3 in the Nation for Asthmatic Children, Stillwater News Press, September 
9, 2007).  Thus, while overall the print advertisements subsume environmental concerns 
under ‘cost’, ‘externalized’ cost in the form of medical concerns, especially for non-
adults, are dramatized and personalized for the lay public. 
At the same time that ‘externalized’ costs—including the cost of medical complications 
due to poor air quality—are magnified for coal, these are minimized for natural gas. 
Examples from across advertisements include:   
“Another question is the idea of burning coal Instead (sic) of a clean fuel to meet 
our state’s growing electricity needs.  Specifically, Wyoming coal, instead of 
clean-burning, Oklahoma-produced natural gas”. 
 
“Why buy trainloads of Wyoming coal instead of using a clean Oklahoma fuel 
that is our state’s #1 product?” 
 
“We believe clean-burning natural gas is the answer not only to Oklahoma’s 
energy needs, but America’s—for energy security, economic vitality, cleaner air 
and better health”.  
 
Thus, while natural gas is presented as an unquestionably clean fuel, yet environmental 
advantages remain secondary to the key claims of the statements, namely economic 
vitality and energy security, which are clearly economic concerns related to growth and 
expansion.  The logic of capital, therefore, is given the primary emphasis, with word 
choice intentionally manipulating the logic of risk.   
Finally, Chesapeake attributes the decision of PSO and OG&E to construct the Red Rock 
expansion at OG&E’s Sooner Power Plant as serving only the self-interests of the unholy 
alliance between legislators, regulators, and regulated public utilities.  In an effort to 
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mediate any conclusions made by members of the lay public that Chesapeake’s actions 
and involvement in the Red Rock case was, at the very least, also motivated by self-
interest, Chesapeake seeks to delegitimize such a conclusion by implying that PSO and 
OG&E, due to their narrow scope of operation as electricity providers subjected to 
market competition, have a negatively biased view of Chesapeake.  The amorphous lay 
public, on the other hand, is implied to have a broader field of vision and a more 
‘unbiased’ perspective from which to draw conclusion  concerning Chesapeake’s intent.  
Chesapeake then provides the reader with the desire elements of intent it wishes to 
cultivate in the lay public.  Thus, in Chesapeake’s inaugural three-page issue-advocacy 
advertisement, the reader is greeted with the following statement: 
It’s likely that OG&E and PSO will see our effort as self-serving, 
motivated only by the economic gain that added demand for natural gas 
would bring to Chesapeake and its shareholders.  But we hope you’ll 
consider Chesapeake’s track record as evidence of our commitment to 
serving Oklahoma and the nation’s best interests.  As America’s #1 
explorer of natural gas, we bring great benefit to our home state—in jobs 
created, taxes paid and royalties distributed to communities and citizens 
statewide.   
Motivations related to social responsibility are cultivated in the above statement.  The 
image of Chesapeake as a socially responsible corporation is strengthened in the issue 
advocacy advertisement featuring State Treasurer, Scott Meacham: 
OKLAHOMA FUEL ENRICHES OKLAHOMA …Every citizen and 
business benefits when we nurture vibrant, home-grown industries that
employ and support thousands of Oklahomans and families, pay taxes and 
drive prosperity.  Natural gas is the #1 driver of Oklahoma’s economy 
today and will be in the future.  Let’s support Oklahoma’s energy 
producers instead of Wyoming’s coal producers.  We should be at the 
forefront of states using clean 21-st century energy. 
102 
 
The rhetorical force of the statement places the natural gas industry as a whole in a 
positive light, a light which also shines on Oklahoma-based Chesapeake.   
The social responsiveness of Chesapeake is further enhanced by a social responsibility 
advertisement running directly after the KYP campaign ended (“Social Responsibility, 
9/09/2007, DO and TW).  Smaller than the KYP advertisements yet prominently 
displayed in the lower half of a page, the advertisment features a photo of a minority, 
female child who is resting her head on her arms.  Her arms are crossed over a large, 
open book lying on what is to be interpreted as a school desk or table.  The child is 
smiling directly into the camera and a globe is visible behind her.  Above the child’s 
photo is the statement, “Doing Oklahoma a World of G od”.  Below the photograph, the 
text continues: 
The clean-burning natural gas we produce is bringing added prosperity to 
Oklahoma.  But future prosperity will demand well-educated kids and 
cleaner air.  We’re working to assure young Oklahomans have both 
advantages.  All to help keep our state moving forward. 
 
Instead of the coalition statement that appeared at the bottom of KYP print 
advertisements, this particular advertisement includes “NYSE” (New York Stock 
Exchange) and Chesapeake’s identifying abbreviation, “CHK”.  This particular 
advertisement also features the Chesapeake logo and the statement, “American’s #1 
driller of natural gas”.   
Are You Scared Yet?  Visit Knowyourpower.net 
The claim to injury brought by Chesapeake and the QSC before the OSSC was the 
dramatized content within the web arm of KYP campaign, and the public was informed 
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of the knowyourpower.net website through the print issue advocacy advertisements.  The 
first mention of the website was made in the three-page inaugural advertisement, the only 
advertisement in which the name of Chesapeake and the Know Your Power issue 
advocacy campaign were openly associated.  Subsequent issue advocacy advertisements 
provided the website address within the campaign’s logo.   
The content of the website focused on adverse enviro mental effects of burning coal 
(sixteen of the twenty-nine pages) and addressed such topics as coal (seven pages), global 
warming and possible future federal regulation of particular emissions (four pages), and 
public health (five pages).  For a detailed summary of webpage content relevant to 
Oklahoma, see Table 7 on page 104.  Further, the content of both arms of the campaign 
are self-referencing.  For example, in the prominent use of photographs, two photos 
found on the website are also used in the print arm of the campaign, namely the photo of 
the girl with the inhaler, which was found under ‘Rising Pollution’ in the web content, 
and a photo featuring a very dark image of smoke pouring out of smokestacks found 
under “Background’ in the web content (“Top 10 Reasons Red Rock is Wrong”, 
Stillwater News Press, Sept. 7, 2007).   
On the ‘About Us’ page on knowyourpower.net, which introduces Know Your Power as a 
“coalition formed to educate citizens”, mention is made of seeking to identify and recruit 
“like-minded organizations and individuals…including the health community (especially 
physicians specializing in pulmonary health and cardiovascular health), the American 
Lung Association and similar organizations focused on improving public health, 
community leaders, public officials, students and others”.  The impression of active 
recruitment was enhanced within the campaign by the content of the print advertisements,  
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TABLE 7.               SUMMARY of CHESAPEAKE’S GENERAL and OKLAHOMA-SPECIFIC PAGES at www.knowyourpower.net    
 
†Link provided to noted organization.       * Six (6) Kansas-specific pages not included in table.       **Links not included in totals 
Topic Page Name Layout Number of References to Experts per Page 
Number per Page Government/State Sphere Private Sector Education Civil Society 
Paragraphs Photos Links Federal Level State Level Corporation University SMO 
About US 5 - - - - - - - 
Coal Dirty Coal 2 3 - 1 - - - 1 
Global Warming 3 3 - - - - - - 
Clean Air Standards 2 3 - 1 - - - - 
Mercury Emissions 5 3 - - - - - 1 
Nitrogen Oxide 2 3 - - - - - - 
Particulate Emissions 1 2 - - - - - - 
Sulfur Dioxide 2 2 - - - - - 1 
Issue Background 2 5 - - - - - - 
Global Warming 8 4 - 1 - - - - 
Legislation 13 4 - 5 - 1 2 1 
Power Plant Pollution 8 3 - - - 1 1 2 
Public 
Health 
Rising Pollution 4 3 - - - - 1 1 
Particulate Emissions 2 2 - - - - 1 - 
Mercury Effect 7 4 - - - - - - 
Nitrogen Oxides 4 3 - - - - 1 1 
Sulfur Dioxide 5 3 - - - - - - 
Oklahoma Energy Profile 3 5 - 1 - - - - 







Sierra Club (Ok)† 
Am. Lung Assoc.† 
Current Status 3 4 - - 2 3 - 1 
Take 
Action Valuable Links 1 1 1 
 
1 
EPA Power Profiler† 
- - - - 
Teachers 1 1 - - - - - - 
Send A Message 2 5 3 Sample Letter:  state legislator; mayor/city council member; editor** 
TOTAL 23 pages* 85 66 8 11 3 6 6 11 
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 which indeed featured local representatives of the “American Lung Association and 
similar organizations” (American Lung Association of the Central States, Oklahoma 
City—Heather Griswald; Oklahoma Allergy and Asthma Clinic—Warren V. Filley, MD; 
Oklahoma Lung Association Board Member—Robert McCaffree, MD), a “public 
official”  (Oklahoma State Treasurer—Scott Meacham) nd a possible “student” (an 
unidentified female child, pictured from the waist up, holding an inhaler). 
Encouraging the perception of an active coalition while also partially fulfilling the claim 
made in the initial three-page print advertisement of providing a “thoroughly researched 
and balanced presentation of facts”, the knowyourpower.net website mentioned such 
organizations as the Sierra Club, the EPA, the Energy Information Administration (EIA), 
the American Lung Association, “Environmental Quality departments”, the American 
Cancer Society, the Mercury Deposition Network, andthe Natural Resource Defense 
Council.  However, complete references for the information included on the website were 
not provided. 
Chesapeake, in constructing risk in the Red Rock debate, constructed risk before the 
state, as well as before lay publics in civil society.  The way in which risk was 
constructed differed according to the intended audience.  Before the state, Chesapeake 
and the QSC relied heavily on formalized communications in formal proceedings, the 
only exception being Aubrey McClendon’s public comments during the public hearings 
on the Merits of the Case.  In contrast, risk construction before lay publics in civil society 
used a much more informal ‘educational’ issue advocacy campaign delivered through a 
range of mass-media technologies. 
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Before the state, Chesapeake and the QSC maintained n xplicit oppositional stance to 
new legislation and rule-making, a stance which provided unique coding categories that 
applied only to Chesapeake and the QSC.  These categories were:  constitutional rights, 
damages and suffering, and abuse of power.  The argument was that Chesapeake, and 
other corporate entities with similar interests, would suffer if the legislation and 
associated rule-making were allowed to stand.  Before lay publics in civil society, 
however, the explicit oppositional stance before the state became an implicit stance 
within the print and web arms of the issue advocacy campaign.  This difference is 
important.  Before the state, oppositional claims became the conclusions of formal 
arguments while, before civil society, this oppositi nal stance was communicated through 
unstated premises of highly charged, emotional, and fear-inducing claims.  The use of 
rhetoric and rhetorical forms of ‘argumentation’ makes the critical consideration of 
claims more difficult for the intended audience.   
Finally, in constructing risk before the OCC, formal arguments followed the logic of 
capital to challenge the emergent categories of ‘need’ and ‘cost’. It is first in the filings 
with the OSSC that the logic of risk surfaces befor the state.  Environmental concerns 
informed one dimension of the concept of ‘injury’ tha  was necessary for the OSSC to be 
able to consider assuming original jurisdiction in the Red Rock case and to grant the 
relief sought in the extraordinary Writ of Prohibiton.  In contrast, the print and web arms 
of the KYP campaign emphasized claims which exploited the logic of risk, using fear to 
magnify the threat of harm.  Nevertheless, explicit claims in the KYP campaign, while 
emphasizing risk and threats of future harms, were subordinated under the logic of 
capital.  These findings are summarized in Table 8 on page 107.                       
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Shaping the Red Rock Debate 
The actual risk and threats which concerned Chesapeake were risks to capital 
accumulation and current and future markets for natural gas, which were threatened by 
new legislation concerning pre-approval and subsequent OCC rulemaking.  Promulgated 
rules were to provide the procedural guidelines for public utilities to finance capital-
intensive projects to meet future electricity demand.  To protect its interests in capital  
Table 8.               Chesapeake’s Construction ofRisk in the Red Rock Case 
Risk Construction before the State Risk Construction before 
Lay Publics in Civil Society 
 Formalized Communications  Informal ‘educational’ issue advocacy 
campaign 
 Explicit oppositional stance to new 
Oklahoma legislation and related OCC 
rule-making 
 Unique thematic categories 
o Constitutional rights 
o Damages and suffering 
o Abuse of power 
 Implicit oppositional stance 
 Formal Argumentation 
o Before the OCC, arguments followed 
the logic of capital to challenge ‘need’ 
and ‘cost’ 
o  Before the OSSC, the logic of risk 
informed one dimension of ‘injury’ 
 Rhetoric and Rhetorical ‘Argumentation’ 
o Use of fear to magnify the threat of 
harm 
 
accumulation, Chesapeake became active in the OCC proceedings concerning PSO’s 
future peaking and baseload needs and OG&E’s related application through its 
association with the QSC.  To further protect its interests, Chesapeake and the QSC 
attempted to have the troublesome legislation declar d unconstitutional by the OSSC.  In 
order to support the application and petition befor the OSSC, it was necessary for 
Chesapeake and the QSC to define injuries that would be suffered due to abuse of state 
power; it is within the construction of injury, in an attempt to “win political meaning 
108 
 
from the fear of risk and harm” (Beck 1989), that the logic of risk and harm become 
active. 
Chesapeake’s issue advocacy campaign emphasized environmental issues broadly salient 
within civil society, especially greenhouse gases and other emissions, particulate 
pollution, mercury contamination, and smog, as well as their effects on climate and 
personal health.  These ill effects were connected only to coal.  References to the 
negative effects of emissions, such as the unknown cost of regulatory compliance and 
treatment of possible medical conditions were frequently mentioned.  The eminence of 
ill-effects was dramatized through the use of photographs which were, in turn, 
strengthened in their perceived legitimacy through the use of local persons and direct 
statements.  This construction helped to solidify a generalized malaise and diffuse 
concern into a local risk centered concretely on coal.  To encourage anti-Red Rock 
decision-making among those viewing the advertisements, negative wording (dirty, 
wrong, etc.), self-interest, and carefully selected images were associated with a text, “Red 
Rock Is Wrong”.     
It is within the Know Your Power issue advocacy campaign, which claimed educational 
purposes concerning issues of public concern (i.e.,“Global Warming”, “Legislation”, and 
“Power Plant Pollution”) to attempt to qualify the campaign as protected political speech 
that “attempts to win political meaning from the fear of risk and harm” become most 
apparent.  By magnifying the residual risks of coal-fired electric generation technology 
while minimizing residual risks of natural gas electric generation technologies, the 
campaign attempted to encourage the social construction of risk to favor natural gas over 
coal as the most reasonable solution to future electricity needs. In the short run, if 
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political meaning could be won from the campaign targeting Red Rock, then the 
construction of Red Rock could potentially be prevented, protecting market shares for 
natural gas in electricity generation in Oklahoma.  By drawing upon arguments and 
claims presented by applicants and other interveners b fore the OCC, Chesapeake was 
able to shape the information concerning primary fuels sed for electric generation that 
was readily available to lay publics.     
In further shaping the natural gas versus coal debate, Chesapeake designed the Know 
Your Power issue advocacy campaign targeting a heterogeneous audience of lay persons 
within civil society.  In doing so, Chesapeake drew upon various concerns raised by 
interveners and/or their expert witnesses before the OCC while, at the same time, 
omitting ‘exculpatory’ responsive testimony.  Exploited in the issue advocacy campaign 
were various claims presented by interveners against the actual need for the Red Rock 
facility and the estimated final construction cost.  The limitations inherent in statistical 
modeling were particularly exploited in an attempt to win political meaning from basic 
social recognitions of exposures to risk and harms experienced as the result of the 
implementation of advanced technologies.   
Challenges presented in testimony before the OCC were combined rhetorically with 
highly politicized topics at the national and state levels such as global climate change, 
deregulation of the electricity market, soaring energy prices, and energy security, as well 
as more localized concerns such as air quality, mercury contamination in Oklahoma 
waters, the prevalence of respiratory illnesses such as asthma, the effects of higher energy 
costs on the residential consumer, and economic stagna ion, all topics which were 
consistently covered in both the TW and the DO.  Using robust rhetoric combined with 
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photographs to elicit strong emotional reactions, Chesapeake hoped to appear reasonable, 
even proactive, while presenting only claims that delegitimized the decision by PSO and 
OG&E (and OMPA) to join in the construction of the R d Rock facility.  If an emotional 
reaction were, indeed, successful, a critical assessm nt of arguments for and against the 
Red Rock facility would be much less likely to occur within the lay public, with the 
potential effect being, at the very least, a heightened short term opposition to a coal-fired 
baseload generation facility at Red Rock. 
In shaping the Red Rock debate, the analysis indicates that Chesapeake carefully 
controlled the information it provided to targeted audiences.  While attempting to 
delegitimize and halt the OCC proceedings concerning the Red Rock case, the risks and 
threats of harm related to coal were magnified before lay publics in civil society.  At the 
same time that risks of coal were magnified, risks as ociated with natural gas were 
minimized.  Before both the state and before lay publics in civil society, however, the 
conclusion that Chesapeake wished targeted audiences to r ach was that Red Rock was 
the result of undue and unconstitutional government power.           
The use of a wide variety of strategies and the carful control of information presented to 
state bodies and lay publics in civil society indicate active corporate involvement in 
influencing external environments.  Activity and inte t do not necessarily translate into 
immediately realized policies, however.  Beck (1992/2006) theorizes that the control of 
information regarding risk and harm nevertheless becomes a source of power; the 
implications of the control of information on political-democracy remain open, however.  
If corporations are able to manipulate language to suggest a proper management of risk 
while actually intending to create an expansion of markets for risk technologies, then the 
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public and institutions of the state can form opinions about risk which are contrary to the 
protection of society from ecological harm.  Simply ut, following Lukes (2005), one 
exercises power over another “when A [i.e. a corporati n] affects B [i.e.: civil society 
and/or the state] in a manner contrary to B’s interests” (p.  34).  In the next chapter, I 
address the final research two questions, namely, “How does Chesapeake’s involvement 
in the Red Rock Case illustrate corporate power” and “What are the implications of 































CHAPTER VII     
 
 
KNOW YOUR (CORPORATE) POWER…TO MANAGE POLITICAL-DEMOCRACY 
 
This final analysis chapter addresses the final research questions, namely, how 
Chesapeake’s involvement in the Red Rock case illustrates corporate power in risk 
society, as well as the implications of this power on public participation in political-
democracy.  The case study method, which is a detailed investigation of social 
phenomena in order to provide an analysis of the context and processes which illuminate 
the theoretical issues being studied (Hardy 2001; Hardy, Harley, and Phillips 2004; 
Kohlbacher 2006), allows for the interrogation of the effects of corporate power on 
political democracy, a theoretical question left open in Beck’s conceptualization of risk 
society.        
Both Beck and Habermas are uncertain about the future of the practice of political-
democracy in late modernity, and both see the possibility of a decrease in democracy and 
an increase in centralized control.  In both cases, power remains a function of influence, 
with power itself remaining vague and ill-defined.  In order to answer the last two 
research questions, I first situate power within the context of risk society, connecting 
power as an attribute of social interaction to the production of texts.  I next consider the
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importance of access to restricted forums in which authoritatively binding decision-
making occurs for the creation of particularistic messages targeting lay publics within 
civil society.  This access, coupled with the expanding rights of corporate ‘persons’ to 
protected political speech, gives private corporations considerable latitude in the 
information provided in risk definitions designed to broadly influence social 
environments external to corporations.  Finally, I show how carefully crafted corporate 
communications, which contain within them implicit and explicit forms of socially 
acceptable courses of action, can function to channel public political participation along 
predictable communication pathways, freeing corporate actors to devote attention to 
critical decision making forums with authority to cnstrict corporate action and threaten 
capital and profit. 
Power in Risk Society 
Within the framework of risk society (Beck 1992/2006), late modernity is marked by 
societal dependencies upon complex technologies, technologies to which are attached 
residual risks and threats of harm that that are unique in their potential to cause 
irreversible ecological degradation and expropriations on a global scale.  The 
development, implementation, and assessment of complex technologies, as well as 
technologies mediating risk and harm, requires the pooling of expert knowledges within 
sites structurally removed from the general public.  Beck (1992/2006) contends that the 
ability to access this expert knowledge and, based upon access, subsequently define risk 
in messages directed at specific audiences becomes a source of political-economic power.  
This power rests in the ability to carefully craft definitions of risk for audiences who, in 
weighing competing risk definitions, make decisions that have beneficial or injurious 
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consequences for those capital interests promoting particularistic definitions of risk.  The 
logic of capital is overlaid with the logic of risk; particularistic capital interests carefully 
control information concerning risk and harm by magnifying some risks while 
minimizing others as they attempt to shape the social construction of risk (Richardson 
2007).  The goal of carefully crafted risk definitions, therefore, is “to get another or 
others to have the desires you want them to have…to secure their compliance by 
controlling their thoughts and desires” (Lukes 2005:23).  
In the context of this research, risk and harm are products of the primary fuels required to 
reliably generate electricity, specifically, coal and natural gas.  In the United States, 
electricity became defined as a ‘common calling’, requiring capital interests generating, 
transmitting, and selling electricity to serve all customers without discrimination.  
Further, the material outlays for generation, transmis ion, and delivery required the 
development of networks of transfer stations and distribution lines.  The massive capital 
investments required contributed to the designation of electric generation facilities as 
natural monopolies.  To ensure quality and fairness, the “common calling” became the 
public utility, regulated by the state for the public good through the creation of 
Corporation Commissions.   
In spite of increased attempts since the 1980s to deregulate the public utility, the 
historical structuring of electric generation predisposes Corporation Commissions, 
structurally distant from both the physical siting of electric generation facilities and the 
general public, to become key sites of risk controve sies where interveners challenge the 
expert witness testimonies and integrated resource plans of public utilities.  Private 
corporate interests, therefore, must manage risk definitions before an agency of the state, 
115 
 
as well as risk definitions before the general public.  And while the manifest content of 
communications regarding risk which target state audiences may differ significantly from 
communications directed at civil society, both types of communications will be 
constructed in such a way as to generate acceptance of corporate goals in the pursuit of 
capital.   
Power is not an intrinsic property of an individual, group, or office, but is only 
manifested through social interaction (Lukes 2005).  Texts and other forms of 
communication carry explicit and implicit assumptions concerning social positioning and 
‘proper’ action, revealing ideas about power.  Thus, texts “ought to be analyzed in 
relation to the social context in which it is being used and the social consequences of its 
use” (Richardson 2007:45).  The potential to exercis  power, and thus construct an 
environment conducive to one’s goals and interests, can be increased through associating 
power with authority, especially the authority resting in offices of the state.  These offices 
of the state, according to Sethi (1977/1987), pose the greatest constraints on the ability 
for corporations, when realizing capital goals, to communicate with the public.   
In risk society, one expression of power is the ability to both directly and indirectly 
participate in forums of authoritatively binding decision-making of the state and, based 
upon that participation, to carefully manage risk definitions for the general public in civil 
society.  Participation and the subsequent production of definitions of risk are attempts to 
manage the formulation of socially constructed understanding of risk upon which 
individuals within agencies, legislatures, and lay publics of civil society base decisions. 
In the Red Rock debate, Chesapeake not only indirectly and directly participated in state 
forums, but designed a multi-media issue advocacy advertisement campaign that 
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magnified the risk of coal while minimizing the risk of natural gas in electricity 
production.  These involvements provide indication of ways in which corporations can 
gain considerable control of their external environme ts, shaping state and civil society 
compliance and acceptance for corporate practices.  
Killing Two Birds with One Stone:  Intervener Status in Utility Applications 
In capitalism, the systemic need to maximize returns o  cost expenditures requires 
expansion of mechanisms to improve efficiency.  This maximization of returns includes 
efforts by corporations to manage their external enviro ments through coordinated efforts 
to influence public policy and public opinion.  In the Red Rock case, the QSC served to 
represent Chesapeake’s interests before the Corporation Commission.  The QSC, by 
establishing itself as an intervener and a party of interest in the Red Rock proceedings, 
had privileged structural access to the highly specialized knowledges and expert witness 
testimonies relevant to the principal parties’ applications before the OCC.  These 
knowledges came far in advance of the ALJ’s public hearings on the Merits of the Case 
and were considerably more comprehensive than any information that could be legally 
provided to the press.  Additionally, intervener status also provided the QSC with 
structural access to the necessary forums within which t e QSC could exert some 
influence in the formal proceedings before the OCC, not only in the direct Red Rock 
proceedings, but in rule-making pursuant to 17 OS §286.  All claims and arguments 
within briefs, motions, and other formal communications filed by the QSC, as well as 
oral arguments in preliminary hearings, necessarily become part of the body of evidence 
to be weighed, first, by the ALJ when preparing Findings of Fact and Recommendations 
and, second, by Commissioners as they prepare the Final Order.   
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The legislated purpose of intervener status is to protect those receiving services from a 
public utility from arbitrary utility actions, and the right to intervene is established by 
Oklahoma Statutes.  The common law legal tradition informing the U.S. legal system, 
however, results in considerable room for maneuvering when a party argues its right to 
intervene.  Moreover, tradition informs the rules of engagement between parties in civil 
(and criminal) cases.  Lack of statutory clarity is complicated by assumptions concerning 
motivation, namely, that interveners represent the general public good and not special 
interests before the OCC.  The civil proceedings granting intervener status to parties 
filing a Motion to Intervene was drawn into question within some public comments 
submitted to the OCC.  For example, one comment, se by a person involved in causes 
seeking rate making approval for OGE’s five 500 MW coal-fired units in many earlier 
OCC proceedings reads: 
Happily I am now at liberty to comment on an aspect [of intervention] that 
was, back then, forbidden ground.  First, I do not dispute the right of any 
entity to intervene…But in those past years the ruls of engagement 
dictated that the motivation of an intervener was not to be questioned, 
most especially by an applicant’s witness.  Time and my retirement have 
separated me from that questionable inhibition….Irrespective of the cloak 
of purity claimed by any intervener the fact remains that none can or ever 
will be held responsible for the future availability or cost of electric energy 
in Oklahoma.  Plainly stated, there is no burden of accountability that 
accompanies their right to intervene. [Public Comments, p. 201]. 
The concern raised by this and similar comments is that, while interveners can 
objectively influence the outcome of OCC PUD proceedings, they are not under direct 
democratic control and can, therefore, act in ‘personal’ self-interest.  Approval of a 
Motion to Intervene, therefore, can provide a recognized party of interest with many 
potential advantages.  In this particular case, Chesap ake and the QSC sought 
authoritative legitimation of their oppositional stance to state regulation from the OSSC.           
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By filing an Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction and a petition for a Writ of 
Prohibition with the OSSC before a Final Order was issued by the Commission, 
Chesapeake and the QSC hoped to legitimize their stance towards legislation they 
opposed (17 OS §286).  An order from the highest court t  stay the proceedings and a 
declaration that the legislation in question was, in fact unconstitutional, would make 
testimony and evidence presented by principle parties moot.  In particular, a decision that 
17 OS §286 (C), which provided utilities with the possibility of  obtaining better 
financing options  by having construction work in progress included in customer rates, 
was, in fact, unconstitutional, would remove the provision from the statutes.  This would 
make the building of large-scale electric generation facilities more costly in the long run 
and potentially prohibit the construction of large scale electric generation facilities.  The 
likelihood that coal burning electric generation technologies, which were favored in part 
by PSO because of the need to diversify its primary fuel dependence on natural gas, 
would be constructed was, therefore, decreased, potentially increasing the likelihood that 
public utilities would be forced to turn to independ t power producers in order to meet 
electricity demand.  The OSSC’s dismissal without comment of the application and 
petition cannot be automatically interpreted as a direct loss for either Chesapeake or the 
QSC, however.  Had PSO and OG&E (and non-regulated OMPA) decided to pursue 
construction of the Red Rock facility, a legislated appeals process is available.  Further, a 
dismissal did not affect the QSC’s status as a recognized party of interest in the Red Rock 
case. 
Most importantly, intervener status provided Chesapake, through the QSC, structural 
and early access to the expert testimonies of applicants and other interveners in the case 
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as well as to the concerns of the Attorney General’s office and the Corporation 
Commissioners.  One publicly prominent result of this structural and early access is 
illustrated in both the timing and content of the KYP issue advocacy advertising 
campaign. The central print advertisements and the launching of knowyourpower.net 
coincided with the ALJ’s public hearings on the Merits of the Case, continuing into the 
time period during which the ALJ was reviewing testimony and preparing to issue 
Findings of Fact and Recommendations.  Further, the end of the print advertisements 
roughly corresponded with the public deliberations f the Commissioners, after which the 
Final Order was issued; the Internet arm of the campaign, on the other hand, extended 
Chesapeake’s risk construction into Kansas, where another print campaign against 
Sunflower Electric and the Holcomb plant was eventually begun.    
Another result of structural and early access was the ability for the QSC to directly 
participate in influencing authoritatively binding decision-making regarding rules, rules 
which became part of the Administrative Law Code and re binding on future applicants 
and proceedings.  In the Red Rock case, after the unsuccessful attempt to stay the OCC 
proceedings, competitive bidding and hedging remained major concerns for the QSC.  
Briefs filed by the QSC in these questions supported Chesapeake’s broader goals of 
deregulation by challenging the legitimacy of PSO’s RFP, claiming it did not conform to 
competitive bidding practices, and supporting hedging for the procurement of natural gas 
as a way to stabilize the price of natural gas on the market.  A recommendation for the 
ALJ to deny the applications was also filed, which brought before the judge, in one 
document, the claims, arguments, and legal citations which supported the QSC’s and 
Chesapeake’s position on all matters being considered.  Of particular importance is that 
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understandings were shaped through texts that were pr s nted in a forum in which 
decisions by state officials about rules and procedur s impact the public good.  Private 
corporate interests, in being able to  actively and directly impact the  structuring of future 
interactions through participation in restricted forums, can exercise power through briefs, 
evidence, and testimony that privilege private, corporate ‘good’ over the public good.       
Inexorably tied to differential access to restricted forums of the state is differential access 
to the financial resources and specialized knowledges necessary to support such 
participation, an access based on social practices which define the relationship between 
capital and labor.  In the Red Rock case, potential interveners needed to be able to 
prepare the motions for intervener status, to adequat ly support the motions with relevant 
statutes, and to successfully argue their claims and arguments before the OCC.  These 
motions are typically prepared, filed, and defended by private legal experts for a fee.  
Additionally, every filing requires the ability to pay associated filing fees, legal 
representation, and experts to prepare and submit testimony, to analyze and rebut the 
expert testimony of others, to authoritatively respond to examination and cross-
examination at hearings, and to submit recommendations o the ALJ.  In the case of Red 
Rock, Chesapeake, through the QSC and associated legal counsel, had funds to devote to 
a venue in which it could represent its interests in a rule-making body directly affecting 
electric generation, transmission, and distribution.   
Of course, considerable financial resources are also required to pay public relations 
specialists to construct issue advocacy campaigns co taining particularistic risk 
definitions for a wide variety of lay publics in civil society.  In the Red Rock case, 
Chesapeake had the necessary finances to fund the KYP issue advocacy advertising 
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campaign which was designed by the OKC public relations firm, Ackermann-McQueen.  
This campaign incorporated various claims examined by the OCC and selectively 
focused harm and risk on coal within an overarching theme of ‘big government’ acting in 
violation of the rights of individuals.  While the exact cost of this campaign is unknown, 
it is doubtful that many actual individual persons i  civil society can fund such a 
campaign18.  Private corporations, however, having been recognized by the US Supreme 
Court as ‘persons’ with rights to protected political speech, and who can legally inform 
the public concerning issues affecting the public good through issue advocacy 
advertising, have considerable financial resources to devote to the construction of risk 
and harm in communications directed toward the public.  Because this form of 
advertising is not legally required to meet the strict standards of truth attached to product 
advertising, and because the lay public is structurally distanced from expert knowledge 
production associated with advanced technologies, private corporations have great 
latitude in defining risk, even to the point of overt misrepresentation of the risks 
associated with advanced technologies.  The public, having no assurance that claims 
presented in protected corporate political speech meet established standards of truth, are 
required to invest considerable time and effort in attempting to establish the accuracy of 
such claims amidst an ever-growing system of media communications.  One comment in 
the public record of the Red Rock case reads: 
The allegations made by opponents to the plant are just that, allegations 
without fact.  The opponents to this project cannot pr vide the name of the 
utilities that built coal plants that exceeded their budget by the number 
being quoted [up to $3 billion].  Despite my best efforts, nowhere can I 
                                                           
18
 It is known that Chesapeake, as part of the Clean Sky Coalition, participated in an issue advocacy 
campaign in Texas against TXU’s proposal to construct eleven coal-fired plants across Texas (Wilmoth 
2007b).  Expenditures for the campaign were estimated  over $1 million dollars (Wilmoth 2007a). 
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find independent support for such claims.  [Public Comment, 9/5/2007, P. 
35].    
Unfortunately, due to the structural positioning of the lay public to expert knowledge 
production, even “best efforts” do not necessarily ensure that decisions made by 
individuals in civil society lead to a truly considered public opinion. 
Chesapeake’s involvement in the Red Rock case, including the complete repertoire of 
communication strategies, communication content, and timing, provides insight into the 
exercise of corporate power in risk society.  The first insight is that of direct and indirect 
representation in restricted forums which provide access to restricted information. In the 
Red Rock case, Chesapeake, acting as a corporate ‘person’ and through the 
communications provided by an ‘expert’ person in the corporation, was able to directly 
and indirectly participate in OCC proceedings.  Indirect participation was accomplished 
through Chesapeake’s association with the intervening party, the QSC, with intervener 
status available only to those who show the ‘right kind’ of affected interests.  This is 
particularly apparent in QSC’s involvement in the Rd Rock case, which granted 
particularistic interests access to knowledge that is s ructurally inaccessible to the lay 
public.   
The second insight into the exercise of corporate power in risk society is that access to 
restricted forums provides corporate interests withan overview of various scientific and 
expert knowledges relevant to the case at hand.  In the Red Rock case, expert knowledges 
were related to advanced technologies and financial management strategies which 
required state decision-makers to make choices between qualitatively different risks and 
harms.  The issues and critiques considered in the Red Rock case became the content of 
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the KYP issue advocacy advertising campaign which defined risk and harm for civil 
society. The relationship between access to relevant scientific and expert knowledges to 
the Know Your Power issue advocacy advertising campaign informs the third insight 
concerning corporate power in risk society.  Advanced access provides special interests 
the ability to take stock of knowledges, ascertain strengths and limitations inherent in 
those knowledges and, based upon these strengths and limitations, prepare risk 
definitions for targeted audiences, distributing definitions through mass-media 
technologies.  Knowledge can thus be manipulated to form particularistic risk definitions 
for targeted publics.   
Within liberal constitutional democracies, the communicative space for the exchange of 
information is, while not an ideal public sphere, the space which connects the formal 
institutions of the state with civil society.  In being able to construct texts which 
contribute to understandings of the case at hand, wealthy corporate ‘persons’ can more 
effectively manage their external environments by influencing both restricted forums of 
the state and civil society.  Essentially, corporate persons can ‘kill two birds with one 
stone’   
“Go Out and Play by the (Implicit) Rules”:  Corpora te Management of Public 
Participation in Political-Democracy 
Beyond the more obvious potential advantages of differential access to restricted forums 
of authoritatively binding decision-making, a careful examination of the latent content 
and structuring of Chesapeake’s KYP issue advocacy advertising campaign provides a 
more nuanced insight into the implications of corporate power on public participation in 
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civil society.  The manifest content of language and photographs used in Chesapeake 
Energy’s KYP issue advocacy advertising campaign targeting lay publics within civil 
society placed a marked emphasis on environmental risks and harms related to coal, 
especially risks and harms to individual health.  Embedded within media communications 
are explicit and implicit suggestions for the course of action target audiences are to take 
when processing the information they have received (Maesseele 2000; Richardson 2007).  
My analysis of the KYP campaign reveals that, through the use of rhetoric combined with 
particularly selected traditional stereotypes of social and political action (i.e. texts and 
discourses), public participation was managed to conform to predictable courses of 
action.   
Turning first to the print arm of the KYP issue advocacy campaign, Chesapeake carefully 
controlled information to produce the unequivocal message that “Red Rock is Wrong” 
(“Red Rock is Wrong” advertisement, 9/07/2007, SNP).  Within U.S. culture, the use of a 
moral imperative defining “wrong” assumes the opposite category of another alternative 
being “right”, and this alternative was presented unequivocally as natural gas.  Natural 
gas is described euphemistically as ‘clean’, and is directly associated only with positive 
outcomes such as wealth and energy independence.  Natural gas is even mentioned 
together with wind generation as an electric generation technology of the 21st century and 
in direct contrast to coal, the fuel of the past.  Forward thinking and socially responsible 
individuals, therefore, will make the “right” choice by choosing natural gas over coal.   
The concept of ‘socially responsible’ action in theevery day is conveyed in the KYP 
campaign through long-standing, traditional stereotypes using photographs of persons 
that served as a heuristic for gendered and age-appropriate decision-making.  Thus, the 
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image of the female asthmatic child, presented above a small photograph of a male 
physician at a local allergy clinic, reinforces societal expectations concerning the need to 
protect the young and vulnerable (“Asthmatic Children”, 9/02/2007, SNP).  The image of 
the adult female, who reveals she is pregnant and is identified through her association 
with the American Lung Association, reinforces expectations holding women to be 
nurturing, helpful, socially concerned teachers andcaregivers, with an orientation toward 
family (“Particulate Matter”, 9/09/2007, DO and TW).  This stereotype is strengthened 
through the same small photograph of a male physician at a local allergy clinic used in 
the ‘asthmatic child’ advertisement.  Finally, the image of State Treasurer Scott 
Meacham, the public official entrusted with the fiscal responsibility of ‘the people’ of all 
of Oklahoma, reinforces expectations that males, having the responsibility of providing 
for the material welfare of  others, make decisions f r others (“Cost Risks”, 9/01/2007, 
DO).   
‘Socially responsible’ action as individual participation in political-democracy is also 
conveyed stereotypically within the KYP issue advocacy advertising campaign.  The 
inaugural three-page advertisement of the KYP campaign emphasized decision-making 
based on a weighing of the facts, the facts to be provided through Know Your Power 
(“Introduction”, 8/29/2007, DO).  Within each of the core KYP full-page print 
advertisements, readers were directed to learn moreat knowyourpower.net, where 
concerned individuals could also leave comments, and  u der the ‘Send a Message’ tab, 
access sample letters to public officials voicing opp sition against the Red Rock facility. 
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 Sample letters targeted state legislators, mayors or city council members, and editors19 
while letters to corporation commissioners, administrative law judges, and attorneys 
general, key offices continuously involved in hearings regarding electric generation, are 
markedly absent.  This absence is noteworthy because testimony and evidence are 
painstakingly examined by administrative law judges, attorneys general, and 
commissioners prior to any public hearings or public deliberations on applications before 
corporation commissions.  These same actors are also state authorities in rule-making.   
While it could be claimed that sample letters to these key offices were not provided 
because the lay public has entrusted elected representatives to act in its place and, 
therefore, is disinterested in the direct proceedings, this claim is not supported by the 
data.  Inspection of the public comments filed in the Red Rock case indicates that the 
OCC did, in fact, receive and enter into the permanent public record, letters and 
comments from the public, including form letters.  Various form letters in support of the 
Red Rock facility included, for example, two form letters sent by cities and towns 
receiving power from OG&E and OMPA, and another sent by individual persons in the 
Tulsa area. This suggests, at the very least, that sample letters to commissioners, if they 
had been included on the ‘Take Action’ page, would have provided another avenue 
through which Chesapeake could have meaningfully engaged civil society participation 
                                                           
19
 Unfortunately, the links to these sample letters were not functional, and the actual text of these letters 
could not be included in the data for analysis.  Additionally, in searching for the nature of the content of 
any of these sample letters in the data collected, I could find no evidence that a form-type letter to the 
editor was printed in either the Tulsa World or the Daily Oklahoman.  (This does not mean that such 
letters were never written, of course, only that if written and published, that content was sufficiently 
altered by senders as to make the form-letter origin undetectable).  The ability to ascertain if form-type 
letters originating from the website were written to legislators, mayors, or city council members in 
support of Chesapeake’s position was not possible. 
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against coal-fired electric generation—if not in Oklahoma, then in Kansas, where the 
campaign against ‘coal’ continued.   
Considering Chesapeake’s selection of strategies and the timing of these strategies, it is 
significant that socially responsible political action by individuals in civil society directed 
readers to send a letter to ‘legislators’, ‘mayors’, and ‘city council members’.  These 
political offices are structurally distanced from the direct OCC proceedings, and ‘editors’, 
especially newspaper editors, manage the content of a media traditionally considered to 
be the primary conduit for informing the public on issues of importance20.  Placed within 
the context of the complete repertoire of strategies, their purposes, and the specifically 
tailored content of each communication, the absence of letters to state officials directly 
involved in the OCC proceedings helps foster implicit support for Chesapeake’s claim 
that the proceedings before the regulatory agency in Oklahoma were unconstitutional, 
while also serving to implicitly undermine the legitimacy of the authority with which 
Corporation Commissions operate.  Of course, in Oklahoma, the very legitimacy with 
which the OCC was operating was already being actively and directly challenged by the 
QSC as a recognized party of interest in the Red Rock case and by Chesapeake and the 
QSC at the OSSC.    
The direct encouragement of letter-writing as public involvement was part of 
Chesapeake’s broader, and more long-term, strategy of influencing others.  First, action is 
encouraged by the statement, “You have a right to weigh in on new power plants in 
America”, implicitly connecting this individual right to explicit claims in the print 
                                                           
20
 In fact, the OCC required notices of its Hearing on the Merits of the Red Rock case to be published for 
two consecutive weeks prior to the hearing in the Tulsa World, the Daily Oklahoman, and a newspaper of 
general circulation in both Stephens and Comanche counties. 
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advertisements that the current regulatory structure was an infringement on individual 
constitutional rights, and thus un-American.  Weighin  in on power plants was to be done 
through prescribed courses of ‘socially responsible’ day-to-day interaction meant to 
influence the thoughts and desires of others (Lukes 2005) and extending corporate control 
through the action of civil society over external audiences.  The content under the ‘Send a 
Message’ tab of the website suggests the following action: 
You can help by becoming an advocate for clean air and working to 
influence others.  Talk to your neighbors, members of your church and 
other groups to help educate Americans about the true costs and 
consequences of building proposed coal-fired power plants across the 
country.  
 
Recruitment of advocates specifically targets Chesap ake’s interest in gaining the support 
of medical professionals, however.  The ‘Send a Message’ content states “Help recruit 
other advocates.  Healthcare professionals are keenly aware of the consequences of coal 
pollution”.  Reference is then immediately made to the Sierra Club as also being “an 
active opponent of coal plants nationwide”, implying a similarity in purpose between the 
Sierra Club and the KYP campaign.  While the Sierra Club was actively involved in the 
Red Rock case, filing a lengthy public statement and supporting documents as public 
comments at the OCC, these public comments in opposition to the Red Rock facility 
were made independently of any association with KYP.  Further, the Sierra Club’s 
comments did not advocate the use of natural gas as n lternative to the Red Rock coal-
fired plant.  Instead, the Sierra Club supported conservation and stressed the economic 
viability of sustainable energy for Oklahoma, stating: 
The Corporation Commission should consider readily available energy 
alternatives.  Oklahoma could benefit from the experiences of other states 
in implementing an aggressive demand-side management (DSM) program 
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to effectively reduce the demand for electric power…In addition, 
Oklahoma is awash in wind resources, particularly in the western portion 
of the state.  Combined, wind energy production and  reduction in power 
demand through DSM programs c an offset the need to build the 950 MW 
Red Rock power plant and be accomplished at a lower cost to Oklahoma’s 
ratepayers [Public Comments, pp. 5 – 6].   
The five photos on the “Send a Message” page of the website further imply that 
individual ‘socially responsible’ influence and advocacy will impact decisions within key 
institutions, primarily at the federal level.  The banner photo shows the dome of the 
nation’s capital behind four anti-coal banners which name public health and 
environmental effects associated with coal (asthma attacks, acid rain, mercury poisoning, 
and global warming).  Two smaller photos imply decision-making forums.  A further 
small photo implies education within schools, connecti g this photo to the content of the 
‘Teachers’ tab of the web site and Chesapeake’s final social responsibility advertisement 
following the campaign.  The final photo on the page depicts demonstrators, three of 
whom are holding signs.  One sign states, “I Love My Lungs”, and a second sign is a 
large, color photo of an apparently coal-smudged face ollowed by the text, “Coal Is 
Filthy”.  Unbeknownst to website visitors, however, is that the “Coal Is Filthy” sign is an 
issue advocacy advertisement of the Clean Sky Coalition,  mentioned earlier, which 
targeted Texas and the nation’s capitol and with which Chesapeake was significantly 
associated prior to launching Know Your Power in Oklahoma and, later, Kansas.   
The overall implication of the structuring and latent content of the website is that public 
input through individual-level advocacy and influenc , including the recruitment of 
professionals, the education of children, and letter writing to newspapers and elected 
officials, represent socially responsible and effectiv  strategies for civil society 
engagement in political-democracy and will realize th  public good.  Further all persons 
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have the same potential to influence others, where ideas compete in a ‘marketplace of 
ideas’ (Sethi 1977/1987), regardless of whether or not those persons are ‘actual’ persons, 
associations of persons, or corporate ‘persons’.  While these strategies have certain 
resonance with cultural understandings of how the U.S. political system ‘works’, there 
are concerns in the actual structuring of public participation in political-democracy in the 
KYP campaign.   
One concern involving the structuring of public participation in KYP involves the 
officials targeted for the sample letters designed by the campaign.  These letters target 
representatives who are structurally removed from the direct issue at hand and, therefore, 
have little direct influence over the outcome of Corporation Commission proceedings.  
This suggests that Chesapeake was more concerned in influencing public opinion 
concerning regulation in general than in the factual o tcome of any direct proceedings 
per se.                
A second concern is that the campaign, by claiming to be a broad coalition of persons and 
groups concerned about the public health effects of coal, captured potential activists and 
hindered the formation of actual local grassroots ac ivism.  There is no actual evidence in 
the data to support assertions that Know Your Power was, in practice, a coalition of 
groups acting together with Chesapeake through the pooling of resources and talents and 
the development of a mutually agreed upon comprehensiv  strategy against coal-fired 
plants, a finding consistent with information provided to Dr. Tamara Mix during informal 
conversations about KYP with a Chesapeake representative.  The data do support the 
conclusion that Chesapeake made use of information published for other purposes by 
various organizations, including the American Cancer Society, the Sierra Club, the EIA, 
131 
 
and the EPA, heightening the impression of mutual and compatible goals through the 
strategic use of links to specific organizations on the web site and the recruitment of local 
representatives to present to the public in the print arm of the campaign.  Civil society, if 
further educating itself through the Know Your Power website and engaging in the 
educational strategies suggested there, was actually only involved in furthering the risk 
definitions that Chesapeake had purposefully constructed for the protection of its own 
interests.  Essentially, the KYP campaign provided implicit and explicit suggestions for 
social and political participation that reinforce st reotypical cultural expectations 
concerning social responsibility and political action, keeping actual grassroots movement 
formation and possible disruptive innovations of protest repertoires to a minimum.  It 
appears that the only potentially disruptive public display of protest was a member of the 
Green Party, not affiliated with KYP, who appeared b fore the OCC in a polar bear suit  
and holding a sign reading “Global Warming is Real” to emphasize concerns about 
global climate change (Womack 2007b).  This person also submitted separate public 
comments against the Red Rock expansion to Commissioners Cloud, Anthony, and Roth; 
there was no support for natural gas in this person’s comments, however: 
Alternative sustainable energy sources can easily supply all our energy 
needs.  The Green economy is growing.  New Green innovations are 
happening every day.  Please do not tie Oklahoma to the Fossil Fuel 
past…No New Coal plants…Help us obtain Green jobs. [Public 
Comments, 7/23/2007, pp. 204, 210, 211, 312]. 
 
The implication of the entire KYP campaign on public participation in political-
democracy is a restriction of democratic political p rticipation.  This restriction was 
accomplished through three primary means:  (1) the use of conventional stereotypes to 
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represent socially responsible day-to-day interaction concerning issues affecting the 
public good, (2) the ability of corporations to funnel potential grassroots activism into 
purposefully manufactured pathways for political discontent, and (3) the provision of 
messages crafted by corporate interests to send to pre-selected political offices.  The 
result is an expansion of corporate control over civil society through the suggestion of 
courses of action and the provision of risk definitio s that reach incumbents and potential 
candidates for public office.  In keeping civil society occupied in an unknown but
potentially vast number of interactions far removed from the actual site of authoritatively 
binding decision-making—a civil society which then communicates adopted corporate 
messages intended to create a general social acceptn  of corporate practices and 
goals—corporations are freed to devote considerable resources to forums in which 
decision-making directly impacts corporate profits and markets.  Members of civil 
society are ‘sent out to play’ as long as ‘players’ abide by predefined and largely implicit 
socially responsible social and political actions.  Public participation in political-
democracy is managed along predictable courses of acti n that carry specifically tailored 
corporate messages.  In this way, publics are kept at outside the actual sites of immediate 
risk conflicts where authoritatively binding decisions are made.  As can be seen in Figure 
4 on page 135, civil society participation, if following the suggested strategies provided 
in the Know Your Power campaign, is active only in communication pathways 
structurally removed from the site in which decisions directly impacting the outcome of 
applications before corporation commissions are made.   
 Beck (1992/2006) contends that the ability to access expert knowledge and, based upon 
access, subsequently define risk in messages directed at specific audiences becomes a 
133 
 
source of political-economic power in risk society.  The source of power is the ability to 
carefully craft definitions of risk for audiences who, in weighing competing risk 
definitions, make decisions that have beneficial or injurious consequences for those 
capital interests promoting particularistic definitions of risk.  In this particular case, 
access to restricted regulatory proceedings through intervener status provided a forum for 
particular interests to challenge the legislative and regulatory framework defining the 
parameters of public utility actions.  Chesapeake, together with the QSC, attempted to 
gain further legitimation for their stance toward what they perceived as intrusive 
legislation by engaging the OSSC.  Access to restricted proceedings also provided early 
insight into the expert knowledges of all witnesses testifying in the OCC proceedings, 
much of which was manipulated to form many of the impl cit and explicit claims of the 
KYP campaign.  The goal of these carefully crafted risk definitions was to exercise 
power by “get[ting] another or others to have the desires you want them to have…to 
secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires” (Lukes 2005:23).  
How individuals within publics interpret the information provided them in messages 
within the public sphere, however, is beyond the dir ct control of the communicator.  
Communicators engaging in risk controversies are engagi g in efforts to provide the risk 
definitions that become the hegemonic social construction of risk.  Such efforts are 
necessarily connected to long-range goals and are difficult, if not impossible, to capture 
within a narrowly defined case such as the Red Rock case.  Nevertheless, as 
communicators manage the information in the message they construct, the messages 
themselves, as well as suggestions for appropriate political action, can stifle public 
134 
 
participation in political-democracy and produce more predictable and manageable 
expressions of opposition. 
 Attempts by Chesapeake to manage political participation are well-illustrated in the KYP 
campaign.  The KYP campaign challenged lay publics in civil society to ‘Know Your 
Power’.  The clever wording implies that individuals within civil society can and should 
seek out information concerning the primary fuels and vailable technologies used to 
generate the electricity it uses.  The manifest conent of the campaign further suggests 
that individuals and groups within civil society have the power to actively and 
meaningfully participate in decisions regarding the c oice of technologies implemented 
to meet electricity demand.  The structuring of socially responsible political participation, 
however, created a self-reflexive loop of risk definitions crafted by Chesapeake Energy.   
Publics were encouraged to engage in stereotypical behaviors and, while so doing, to 
convey the message to others that Chesapeake wished to encourage.  This managed 
participation provided a predictable and more easily controlled public participation 
which, if actually engaged in by concerned citizens, served more long-term corporate 
goals for creating a legislative and regulatory environment sympathetic to deregulation 























1.  Solid arrows represent communications over which Chesapeake has complete control over content. 
2.  Dashed arrows represent communications over which Chesapeake has limited to no control. 
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vote of the people.         
Lay Public(s)  
 








Know Your Power Campaign 
newspapers website 
Oklahoma Corporation Commission, 
Utility Division 
Chesapeake Energy Corporation Quality of 
Service 
Coalition 



















DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Cultural dependencies upon advanced technologies that provide benefits while also 
exposing populations to residual ecological risks and threats of future harm are 
characteristic of late modernity.  The deep interpenetration of advanced technologies into 
cultural practices has overlaid the logic of wealth distribution with the logic of risk 
distribution.  The controversy that arose around the proposed construction of the Red 
Rock expansion of the Sooner Power Plant in northern Oklahoma is an excellent example 
of the risk contentions occurring in late modernity (Beck 1992/1999; Giddens 2003).  In 
this case, risk contentions involved the negative sd -effects and threats of harm created 
by the generation of electricity.  Know Your Power, a multi-media issue advocacy 
advertising campaign sponsored by Oklahoma City-based Chesapeake Energy 
Corporation was a major source of risk definitions created for the general public.  The 
campaign chose words and phrases that magnified the negative side-effects of coal and 
minimized any negative effects of natural gas.  Chesap ake’s KYP campaign controlled 
information in such a way as to encourage social constructions of risk in favor of natural 
gas in order to expand market demand for its product.   
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The private corporation, like risk technologies, has become highly integrated in societies 
of late modernity.  Early corporations, which were direct extensions of the state’s 
interests in economic expansion, have become increasingly independent from the state.  
State oversight of private corporations is maintained through a multitude of regulatory 
agencies. The privatization of the corporation, however, has reduced the ability for 
publics to hold corporations accountable for corporate practices.   
Independence from the state has provided the necessary conditions for corporations to 
develop forms of ‘speech’ and ‘action’.  The exercise of corporate speech and action has 
allowed the private corporation to secure an increasing number of rights which protect 
actual individual persons from abuses of power by state actors.  Currently, the concept of 
the corporate ‘person’, complete with rights to protected political speech, has been 
legitimized through decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.  However, corporations are not 
actual persons; corporations, unlike individual persons, consolidate within themselves the 
capital, labor, and specialized expert knowledges of many persons, allowing corporate 
‘persons’ to simultaneously engage a wide variety of state and civil society forums at a 
magnitude not possible by actual persons. 
 In this study, I focused on the corporate communications of one corporation, Chesapeake 
Energy.  I investigated the exact nature of Chesapeake’s involvement in the Red Rock 
case.  By identifying the corporate communication strategies utilized by Chesapeake in 
this case, insight is provided into the ways corporati ns expand communications and 
tailor content for targeted publics, including legislative, regulatory, and judicial forums of 
the state and a wide variety of lay publics within civil society. I also investigated how 
risk definitions were constructed in the Red Rock case, revealing that, dependent upon 
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the goals of a particular corporation, complex interactions between the logic of capital 
and the logic of risk ensue, with the weight given each logic in the definition of risk 
highly context specific.  There is indication, however, that in constructing risk definitions 
for lay publics, the fear of risk and harm will be intentionally exploited to serve the logic 
of capital.   Finally, I considered Chesapeake’s impl cit and explicit suggestions for 
public participation in the Red Rock debate.  I found in particular that, within the KYP 
issue advocacy campaign, concerned individuals within the public were encouraged to 
contact elected representatives structurally far removed from the actual site where 
authoritatively binding decision-making concerning Red Rock occurred. These 
suggestions for public participation mirrored cultural expectations of how U.S. 
democracy ‘works’, providing predictable, and therefo  more easily controllable, public 
participation in political-democracy.  In creating a self-reflexive issue advocacy 
campaign, highly motivated individuals were potentially drawn to the 
knowyourpower.net website, where the names of prominent social movement 
organizations were displayed.  This use of names suggested an actual coalition and a 
similarity of goals between prominent environmental and public health organizations, 
such as the American Cancer Society and the Sierra Club, and Chesapeake. This strategy 
could, in fact, function to reduce grassroots organizing while expanding the possibilities 
for corporations to implement the use of a contested technology at the local level.     
Beck hypothesized that risk society contained within itself either the possibility for the 
consolidation of power within the state bureaucracy or the possibility for an expansion of 
democracy in the face of actual and hypothetical risks and harms.  Similarly, Habermas 
hypothesized that the practice of political-democracy in the advanced liberal 
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constitutional democracy is at risk due to the colonization of the public sphere by market 
imperatives, creating a state apparatus favoring particularistic interests of capital over the 
public good.  In the U.S., with the ascendance of the corporation as a legal ‘person’ with 
rights to political speech and a legitimized duty to educate the public on issues of public 
concern, it appears more likely that the most powerful players in risk society will be the 
private corporation.  Private corporations must manage risk definitions in the pursuit of 
capital.  With the ability to gain access to restricted sites in which authoritatively binding 
decision-making occurs, corporations can exercise power in the very forums which define 
the legal parameters for legitimate social action.  At the same time, corporations can 
structure educational messages for civil society which contain implicit and explicit 
suggestions for socially responsible political and social action.  As seen in the case of the 
KYP issue advocacy campaign, public participation has the potential to become highly 
managed, and therefore more predictable and controllable, further restricting the 
formation of a truly public opinion essential for the practice of political-democracy.           
To better understand how corporations manage risk perce tions, future research should 
expand inquiries horizontally within risk controversies.  For example, in this particular 
case, investigations into other venues in which Chesap ake was actively engaged in 
efforts to expand the market for natural gas technologies would provide insight into how 
corporate involvement in multiple risk controversies at the local level are interrelated.  
Future research should also expand inquiry vertically. For example, in this particular 
case, expansion of vertical inquiry will help situate the content of Chesapeake’s 
communication strategies in the Oklahoma Red Rock case within corporate efforts to 
address federal-level legislative, regulatory, and judicial decision-making that could 
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impinge upon Chesapeake’s abilities to increase its market share within the energy sector.  
Because regulations on coal are also regulations with potential to affect natural gas, it 
would be beneficial to investigate how Chesapeake managed federal-level venues 
impacting regulations on fossil fuels while also managing state-level venues impacting 
localized decisions concerning the implementation of specific electric generation 
technologies. 
Private corporate capital interests are actively working to increase the legitimacy of the 
corporate ‘person’ capable of engaging in socially responsible behavior for the common 
good.  Chesapeake’s issue advocacy advertising campaign emphasized the positive 
effects of natural gas exploration and consumption for Oklahoma and the nation.  At the 
same time, the KYP campaign presented itself as a grassroots coalition of concerned 
citizens, businesses, medical professionals, and social movement organizations working 
together to prevent the construction of coal-fired electric generation plants when, in fact, 
the data do not support this assertion.  Future resa ch should further investigate forms of 
corporate speech and action that adapt strategies and tactics used by grassroots activists 
when organizing for social change.  This study indicates that a corporation, in attempting 
to engage publics at a local level in a complex issue of public concern, may actually 
frustrate attempts by disadvantaged groups to be heard by creating the illusion of broad-
based consensus.   
Further, this study indicates that through the implcit and explicit suggestion of U.S.-
centric forms of stereotypical socially responsible political participation in political-
democracy, other cultural practices of consensus-building are delegitimized.  This has 
implications for the reproduction of institutionalized inequalities not only in the U.S., but 
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in corporate efforts to expand the pursuit of capital transnationally.  The reproduction—
and creation of—institutionalized inequalities is of particular concern in the current era of 
globalization in which corporations have actively assumed responsibilities originally 
given to the state in providing for the public good.   
The practice of democracy carries with it the expectation that all voices will be heard, and 
equitable solutions found, as publics form considere  public opinion on issues affecting 
the public good.  Habermas suggests, however, that the colonization of the public sphere 
by capitalist imperatives creates winners and losers, those who exploit and those who are 
exploited, a fundamental contradiction for political-democracy.  Beck further suggests 
that in late modernity, the need to mitigate the risks and harms of the very technologies 
upon which societies depend creates the need for capital interests to control information 
regarding risk and harm.  Carefully managed and selective information, however, cannot 
provide the basis upon which considered public opini n is formed.  It is seemingly 
inevitable, therefore, that voices were not heard in the Red Rock debate, and this does, 
indeed, appear to be the case.  In all the data examined in this study, the voice of Native 
Americans is markedly absent, especially the native peoples whose allotted lands are 
contiguous with OG&E’s Sooner Power Plant and the proposed site of the Red Rock 
expansion.  Future research should explore why this voice was absent, and how native 
populations perceive the risks to which they are exposed. 
There are important limitations inherent in this study.  First, the use of qualitative 
methods limits the ability to generalize findings across a wide variety of dissimilar cases.  
Additionally, the newspaper data were purposefully collected and no conclusions can be 
drawn concerning how either the TW or the DO covered energy issues or selected 
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particular events and issues for coverage.  Further, only Chesapeake’s corporate 
communications accessible in the public domain were included in the interpretive content 
and critical discourse for analysis.  This contributes to the inability to draw definitive 
conclusions concerning the effectiveness of Chesapeake’s corporate communication 
strategies in the Red Rock case.  The inability to draw definitive conclusions concerning 
the effectiveness of Chesapeake’s corporate communication strategies is that corporate 
communications are related to both short-term and lo g-term goals for the capital 
expansion.  The effectiveness of Chesapeake’s corporate communication strategies on 
long-term goals cannot be addressed by this study.   
This study does make valuable contributions to corporate strategic communications, risk 
society, and political-sociology literature.  First, this research provides a rich description 
of how one private corporation maintained vertical oversight of regulatory, legislative, 
and judicial processes structurally connected to a perceived competitor’s decision that 
threatened to limit the corporation’s market share.  S condly, this research highlights the 
origins and intent of one private corporation’s carefully crafted risk definitions targeting 
individuals within state institutions and civil society.  Thirdly, this study indicates that 
careful attention should be paid to actions of corporate ‘persons’ as they expand 
communicative strategies across local, state, federal, and transnational forums in which 
authoritatively binding decision-making occurs.  Communications within these forums, 
whether by qualifying as parties of interest, providing or challenging expert witness 
testimonies, or engaging in court proceedings—especially in courts with original 
jurisdiction to hear appeals and issue decisions that are binding on lower courts and other 
branches of government—provides access to expert knowledges that inform corporate 
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communications in which corporations to attempt to win political meaning from the fear 
of risk and harm.  Finally, this research helps to delineate the vague concept of corporate 
power by highlighting how corporations acting as ‘persons’ with protected rights to 
political speech have the potential to manage and restrict public participation in the 
practice of political-democracy.   
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